The Donovan Law Group

Kenneth R. Feinberg: “BP oil spill victims were never under financial duress!”

Tampa, FL (April 21, 2015) – Clint Guidry, the president of the Louisiana Shrimp Association, recently said many fishermen who were BP oil spill victims took Ken Feinberg’s “Quick Payments,” settlements that required no additional documentation from the claimants but also required them to sign away any further claims against BP, under duress.

But Feinberg refuses to believe that. Feinberg incredulously states,

“I’ve never seen any evidence of duress.” “I can either get a great deal more money with documentation, or I don’t even need documentation and I can get a check in the next couple of weeks or months. I’m not surprised at all, human nature being what it is. I see no duress. I see each fisherman making the decision of what’s best for the fisherman.”

“…when it comes to compensating innocent people, I think that what we [Feinberg Rozen, et al.] did and what BP did deserves a great deal of praise.”

I believe Kenneth meant to say,

“I was never under any financial duress. I think that I deserve a great deal of praise for limiting BP’s liability.”

The Feinberg Payment Methodology

The purpose of the Feinberg payment methodology was to generate as much financial duress as possible in order to maximize the number of signed releases.

Phase I

During GCCF Phase I, which operated from August 23, 2010 through November 23, 2010, GCCF accepted Emergency Advance Payment (“EAP”) claims. Over 475,000 EAP claims were filed with GCCF by BP oil spill victims from August 23, 2010 through November 23, 2010. GCCF paid in excess of $2.5 billion to more than 169,000 Phase I claimants. In sum, the average total amount paid per EAP claimant by GCCF was a paltry $14,793.00. A claimant who received an EAP during Phase I was not required to execute a “Release and Covenant Not to Sue” BP or any other party.

Phase II

During GCCF Phase II, known as the “Interim Payment/Final Payment” claims process, GCCF received the following three types of claims:

  • Quick Payment Final Claim,
  • Interim Payment Claim, and
  • Full Review Final Payment Claim.

Under the “Quick Payment Final Claim,” a claimant who had received a prior EAP or Interim Payment from GCCF could receive, without further documentation of losses caused by the BP oil spill, a one-time final payment of $5,000 for individuals and $25,000 for businesses. Claimants seeking a Quick Payment were required to submit with their claim form a “Release and Covenant Not to Sue.”

Feinberg cannot justify limiting payments under the “Quick Payment Final Claim” program to just $5,000 for individuals and $25,000 for businesses. There is no evidence that these amounts even remotely represent adequate consideration to compensate claimants for the damages that claimants did or will suffer as a result of the BP oil spill.

Under the “Interim Payment Claim,” a claimant allegedly could elect to receive compensation for documented past losses or damages caused by the BP oil spill for which the claimant previously had not been compensated. A claimant seeking an Interim Payment was not required to sign a “Release and Covenant Not to Sue.” A claimant was permitted to file only one Interim Payment Claim per quarter.

Under the “Full Review Final Payment Claim,” a claimant could receive payment for all documented past damages and estimated future damages resulting from the BP oil spill. Claimants wishing to accept a Final Payment were required to sign and submit a “Release and Covenant Not to Sue.” Any Full Review Final Payment awarded to a claimant was decreased by the amount of any previous payments received.

The GCCF status report data indicates that a total of 574,379 unique claimants filed claims with the GCCF during the period from approximately August 23, 2010 to March 7, 2012. The GCCF paid only 221,358 of these claimants. In sum, the GCCF denied payment to approximately 61.46% of the claimants who filed claims; the average total amount paid per claimant was a paltry $27,466.47.

The GCCF status report data further indicates that the GCCF:

(a) paid a total of 230,370 claimants who filed claims with the GCCF during the “Phase II” period;

(b) of these, 195,109 were either Quick Pay or Full Review Final payments; and

(c) only 35,261 were Interim payments.

In sum, Kenneth R. Feinberg forced 84.68% of the claimants to sign a “Release and Covenant Not to Sue” in which the claimant agreed not to sue BP and all other potentially liable parties; only 15.31% of the claimants were not required to sign a “Release and Covenant Not to Sue” in order to be paid.

Enough is enough.

Let’s be very clear:

(a) Kenneth R. Feinberg was BP’s defense attorney. He was not a “Fund Administrator.” BP paid Feinberg Rozen, LLP a sum of $1.25 million per month to have Ken Feinberg limit its liability;

(b) Kenneth R. Feinberg was appointed due to his political connections and his willingness to do whatever was necessary to limit BP’s liability; and

(c) Kenneth R. Feinberg is not the “Master of Disasters.” Kenneth is a “Master of Deception” and a “Master of Self-Promotion.”

Kenneth R. Feinberg’s latest self-promotional video is hosted by David Hammer on WWL-TV.

GM, Like BP, Will Use Multidistrict Litigation and the Fund Approach to Limit Its Liability

GM, Like BP, Will Use Multidistrict Litigation and the Fund Approach to Limit Its Liability

 

April 3, 2014

The Faulty GM Ignition Switch
Since February, 2014, General Motors (“GM”) has recalled 2.6 million cars – mostly Chevrolet Cobalts and Saturn Ions – over a faulty ignition switch, which can cause the engine to cut off in traffic, disabling the power steering, power brakes and air bags and making it difficult to control the vehicle.

Rep. Henry Waxman, D-Calif., said that House Energy and Commerce Committee staff members found 133 warranty claims filed with GM over 10 years detailing customer complaints of sudden engine stalling when they drove over a bump or brushed keys with their knees.

The claims were filed between June 2003 and June 2012. Waxman said that because GM didn’t undertake a simple fix when it learned of the problem, “at least a dozen people have died in defective GM vehicles.”

GM intends to handle its liability for failing to properly address its faulty ignition switch problem in the same manner that BP addressed its liability for the BP oil spill of 2010 in the Gulf of Mexico. It’s basically a simple two-pronged approach:

(a) The United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (“JPML”) will order that centralization of the GM faulty ignition switch cases will “eliminate duplicative discovery, prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, and conserve the resources of the parties, their counsel, and the judiciary; and serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the more just and efficient conduct of the cases.” In sum, all GM cases will be consolidated in one transferee federal court; and (b) GM retains Feinberg Rozen, LLP to manage a fund to allegedly compensate the GM victims for all “legitimate” claims.

GM ignition switch victims may find the following manner in which BP limited its liability for the BP oil spill of 2010 to be instructive.

Multidistrict Litigation (“MDL”) and the Fund Approach
Judicial economy is undoubtedly well-served by MDL consolidation when scores of similar cases are pending in the courts. Regrettably, for victims of the BP oil spill, the BP Oil Spill Multidistrict Litigation (“MDL 2179”) is a “faux” MDL – i.e., an MDL that limits the liability of the defendants, grants excessive compensation to the members of the Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee (“PSC”) and other counsel performing common benefit work, and fails to adequately compensate the plaintiffs.

MDL 2179 is a “faux” MDL primarily because of: (a) the manner in which Kenneth R. Feinberg was permitted by the JPML and the MDL 2179 Court to administer the BP compensation fund; and (b) the terms and conditions of the BP/PSC class settlement agreement.

MDL 2179 officially started on August 10, 2010. The Transfer Order issued on that date by JPML clearly states: “.. Centralization may also facilitate closer coordination with Kenneth Feinberg’s administration of the BP compensation fund.” The JPML made it clear from the very beginning that the purpose of centralization was not merely to eliminate duplicative discovery, prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, and conserve the resources of the parties, their counsel, and the judiciary; and serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the more just and efficient conduct of the BP oil spill cases. Here, the purpose of centralization was to maximize judicial economy via the creation of a “faux” class settlement wrapped in a “faux” MDL.

From the very beginning, the purpose of MDL 2179 was to replace democratic adversarial litigation with a fund approach to compensating victims of the BP oil spill. The vast majority of BP oil spill victims will never have their day in court. Judicial economy, rather than justice, is the primary objective.

The fund approach to resolving mass claims, i.e., those claims resulting from the BP oil spill incident, ought to be viewed with a significant degree of concern. The precedent established by the JPML and the MDL 2179 Court is clear: A “Responsible Party” under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (“OPA 90”) may now enter into a contract with a politically well-connected third party “Claims Administrator,” i.e., Kenneth R. Feinberg and Feinberg Rozen, LLP, d/b/a Gulf Coast Claims Facility (“GCCF”). This third party “Administrator / Straw Person,” directly and excessively compensated by the party responsible for the oil spill incident, may totally disregard OPA 90, operate the claims process of the responsible party as fraudulently and negligently as it desires for the sole purpose of limiting the liability of, and providing closure to, the responsible party, and the third party “Administrator / Straw Person” shall never be held accountable for its tortious acts.

The operation of the GCCF has allowed BP to control, manage, and settle its liabilities on highly preferential terms; has permitted members of the MDL 2179 PSC, who are directly appointed by Judge Barbier, to be excessively compensated for merely negotiating a collusive settlement agreement; and has enabled judges to clear their dockets of large numbers of cases. In sum, fund approaches to resolving massive liabilities shift power over claims resolution entirely into the hands of self-interested parties and largely evade judicial scrutiny and oversight.

As noted above, judicial economy is undoubtedly well-served by MDL consolidation when scores of similar cases are pending in the courts. Nevertheless, the excessive delay and marginalization of juror fact finding (i.e., dearth of jury trials) associated with traditional MDL practice are developments that cannot be defended. The appropriate focus for fund resolution of mass claims should be justice for the claimants, not merely judicial economy and closure for the corporate misfeasor.

Kenneth Feinberg’s Administration of the BP Compensation Fund
On August 23, 2010, Feinberg Rozen, LLP, doing business as GCCF, replaced the claims process which BP had established to fulfill its obligations as a responsible party pursuant to OPA 90.

Kenneth Feinberg used the fear of costly and protracted litigation to coerce victims of the BP oil spill to accept grossly inadequate settlements from GCCF. During town hall meetings organized to promote GCCF, Feinberg repeatedly told victims of the BP oil spill, “the litigation route in court will mean uncertainty, years of delay and a big cut for the lawyers.” “I am determined to come up with a system that will be more generous, more beneficial, than if you go and file a lawsuit.” “It is not in your interest to tie up you and the courts in years of uncertain protracted litigation when there is an alternative that has been created,” Feinberg said. He added, “I take the position, if I don’t find you eligible, no court will find you eligible.”

GCCF employed two strategies to limit BP’s liability:
(a) an “Expedited Emergency Advance Payment (“EAP”) Denial” strategy. This strategy is as follows: “Fail to verify, investigate, and appraise the amount of loss claimed by the claimant in the EAP claim and deny the EAP claim without ever requesting supporting documentation from the claimant;” and

(b) a “Delay, Deny, Defend” strategy against legitimate oil spill victims. This strategy, commonly used by unscrupulous insurance companies, is as follows: “Delay payment, starve claimant, and then offer the economically and emotionally-stressed claimant a miniscule percent of all damages to which the claimant is entitled. If the financially ruined claimant rejects the settlement offer, he or she may sue.”

The ultimate objective of Feinberg’s “Expedited EAP Denial” strategy and “Delay, Deny, Defend” strategy was to limit BP’s liability by obtaining a signed “Release and Covenant Not to Sue” from as many BP oil spill victims as possible.

The “Release and Covenant Not to Sue” requirement forces economically and emotionally-stressed victims of the BP oil spill to sign a release and covenant not to sue in order to receive a miniscule payment amount for all damages, including future damages, they incur as a result of the BP oil spill. Feinberg’s “Release and Covenant Not to Sue” requirement violates OPA 90, State contract law, and is contrary to public policy.

The “Expedited EAP Denial” strategy and “Delay, Deny, Defend” strategy, although unconscionable, have proven to be very effective for Feinberg and BP:

The GCCF data indicates that a total of 574,379 unique claimants filed claims with the GCCF during the period from approximately August 23, 2010 to March 7, 2012. The GCCF paid only 221,358 of these claimants. In sum, the GCCF denied payment to approximately 61.46% of the claimants who filed claims; the average total amount paid per claimant was $27,466.47.

The status report data further indicates that the GCCF paid a total of 230,370 claimants who filed claims with the GCCF during the “Phase II” period. Of these, 195,109 were either Quick Pay or Full Review Final payments; only 35,261 were Interim payments. In sum, the GCCF forced 84.68% of the claimants to sign a release and covenant not to sue in which the claimant agreed not to sue BP and all other potentially liable parties; only 15.31% of the claimants were not required to sign a release and covenant not to sue in order to be paid. Feinberg’s “Release and Covenant Not to Sue” excluded approximately 200,000 BP oil spill victims from the MDL 2179 Economic and Property Damages Class Settlement Agreement.

The BP/PSC Class Settlement Agreement
BP and the PSC reported settlement negotiations began “in earnest” in February 2011 for two distinct class action settlements: a Medical Benefits Settlement and an Economic and Property Damages Settlement.” In sum, the PSC initiated settlement negotiations “in earnest” merely four (4) months after Judge Barbier appointed members to the PSC. Clearly, the MDL 2179 class settlement was not achieved in the full context of adversarial litigation.

There is little doubt that any class settlement agreement which: (a) excludes approximately 200,000 claimants from the settlement benefits because they had been forced to sign an unconscionable “Release and Covenant Not to Sue;” and
(b) excessively compensates members of the PSC and other counsel performing common benefit work is neither “fair, adequate, and reasonable” nor “free from collusion.”

In sum, a faux class settlement wrapped in a faux MDL is not right for America because it:

(a) allows judicial economy to replace justice; and

(b) denies access to the courts by permitting the desires and influence of corporations with deep pockets, and politically well-connected defendants, to trump the legal rights of the individual.

GM victims and BP victims deserve better!

N.B. – BP paid Feinberg Rozen, LLP a sum of $1.25 million per month to limit its liability (“administer the BP oil spill victims’ compensation fund”).

UPDATE (April 25, 2014): Plaintiffs File Motion to Hold Kenneth R. Feinberg, et al. Accountable for Financially Ruining Them

CLICK HERE TO SIGN THE PETITION FOR GM VICTIMS

CLICK HERE TO SIGN THE PETITION FOR BP VICTIMS

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BP Oil Spill: Macondo Well Could Have Been Shut in Within 24 Days!

BP Oil Spill: Plaintiffs’ Phase Two Post-Trial Brief

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Had BP Prepared for a Deepwater Blowout, With a Capping Stack Available on April 20, 2010,

the Well Could Have Likely Been Shut in Within 24 Days or Less

Tampa, FL (December 22, 2013) – Phase Two was divided into two segments: the Source Control segment and the Quantification segment. The Source Control segment was tried as a bench trial before the MDL 2179 Court beginning on September 30, 2013, and concluding on October 3, 2013. The Quantification segment was tried as a bench trial before the MDL 2179 Court beginning on October 7, 2013, and concluding on October 17, 2013.

On December 20, 2013, Plaintiffs submitted their Post-Trial Brief to address specific legal and factual issues raised by the Court and by the Parties based on the evidence admitted during the Phase One and Phase Two Limitation and Liability Trial. The following are excerpts from this brief.

Plaintiffs contend, “It was established at trial that BP consciously disregarded the need to prepare for an uncontrolled deepwater blowout and willfully extended the capping of the Macondo Well by intentionally concealing material information and affirmatively misleading the U.S. Government and others regarding the volume of hydrocarbons escaping from the well after the blowout.”

The question is whether BP’s overall conduct – as evidenced by not only the Phase Two issues of post-spill lying to the Government and pre-spill lack of preparedness, but also the Phase One issues of fast and reckless drilling, establishing and maintaining a dysfunctional leadership team, proceeding with the cement job without reliable test results, proceeding with the displacement despite a failed negative pressure test, refusing to correct known and persistent maintenance failures, and recklessly selecting, configuring, and refusing to upgrade the BOP – demonstrates a willful, wanton and reckless disregard for the environment, the property rights of others, and/or public health and safety.

With respect to the Phase Two evidence in particular, BP did not dispute the fact that BP did absolutely nothing in advance of the Macondo incident on April 20, 2010 to develop source control plans and equipment in preparation for a possible deepwater blowout. BP simply attempts to muster, in its defense, an argument that the Government allegedly “approved” of its lack of preparation and that others in the industry allegedly failed to do the same.

Based on the law and on the evidence submitted in the Phase One and Phase Two Trial, BP’s corporate conduct associated with the Macondo Well explosion, fire, blowout and resulting spill was willful, wanton and reckless, and was a direct result of BP corporate policies and/or with the knowledge, approval and/or ratification of BP officers with policymaking authority.

A Finding of Willful, Wanton or Reckless Conduct Should Be Made on the Series and Accumulation of Acts and Omissions Established by the Evidence Admitted in the Phase One and Phase Two Trial

As set forth in Plaintiffs’ Phase One Post-Trial submissions, an accumulation or series of negligent acts or omissions are properly viewed together in order to determine whether the defendant has acted out of gross negligence, willful misconduct, or a wanton or reckless disregard.

Hence, the burden is not on Plaintiffs to show that BP’s pre-spill planning, in and of itself, rises to the level of wanton, willful or reckless conduct. Nor are the plaintiffs required to show that BP’s post-spill intentional misconduct, in and of itself, caused or contributed to the uncontrolled flowing of the well for 87 days.

Rather, it is only Plaintiffs’ burden to show that BP’s (i) pre-spill failure to plan, combined with BP’s (ii) post-spill intentional misrepresentations and concealment – combined with BP’s (iii) fast and reckless drilling, with little or no regard for the safe kick margin, despite multiple kicks, and in violation of the MMS Regulations requiring a safe drilling margin; (iv) creating, maintaining and largely ignoring a dangerously dysfunctional leadership team, which embraced the corporate culture of cutting costs and maximizing profits; (v) proceeding with the cement job without a set of reliable test results confirming the slurry’s stability; (vi) proceeding with the displacement despite a failed negative pressure test; (vii) selecting, configuring, sequencing, modifying, and refusing to upgrade the safety critical BOP, which was not sufficient or appropriate for the Macondo well; and (viii) knowingly refusing to correct the persistent maintenance failures of safety critical equipment on the Deepwater Horizon – evidences a willful and reckless disregard for the environment, the property rights of others, and/or public health and safety.

The Phase Two evidence, in this respect, cannot be untethered from the Phase One evidence, in making the overall determination of BP’s state of mind with respect to the damages and effects of the Macondo disaster.

Nevertheless, the Phase Two evidence, standing alone, establishes that BP was wanton and reckless in both its pre-spill lack of planning and in its post-spill lying to the Government and others regarding the flow rate and source control.

It is Undisputed that BP Willfully and Recklessly Refused to Prepare for an Uncontrolled Deepwater Blowout, the Largest Known Risk in the Gulf

There is no question that it was foreseeable to BP that a deepwater well in the Gulf of Mexico could experience a blowout. Indeed, BP Management had identified the risk of a deepwater blowout as one of the highest risks worldwide, and the number one risk in the Gulf of Mexico. And both BP and the industry generally knew, beginning in 1991, that it was necessary to engage in deepwater source control planning and to develop deepwater source control capping equipment and techniques. Yet, BP Management admittedly spent no time or money preparing for a deepwater source control effort.  BP Management did not direct or provide for any training in deepwater source control. Nor did BP Management develop or acquire any capping equipment. It is clear, in sum, that BP’s pre-spill preparation was nothing more than a plan to make a plan.

Both Legally and Factually, BP Has Failed to Establish a Defense Predicated on an Alleged “Industry Standard”

Mere compliance with industry standards does not preclude a finding of gross or egregious conduct.   In this particular case, the entire industry recognized the need to develop capping stack equipment as far back as 1991. Indeed, an industry study predicted and diagramed at that time an uncontrolled blowout strikingly similar to what would occur at Macondo almost twenty years later. To the extent that companies other than BP may have also failed to adequately prepare for a deepwater blowout, this reveals nothing more than laxness, inefficiency, and inattention to innovation by other companies. Yet BP, a self-proclaimed “leader” in the industry, refused to invest a single penny into developing or acquiring the necessary equipment for post-spill source control.

As a factual matter, BP came far from proving that there was an “industry standard” to develop no pre-spill capping stack or other source control plans, equipment or technology. See, e.g., Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 665 F.2d 1367, 1376 (5th Cir. 1982) (when considering whether a defendant has complied with an industry standard, “a district court must limit its consideration to evidence actually presented at trial”). Indeed, as noted, the industry was recognizing the need for such devices since 1991.

BP Knew For More Than Two Decades That Capping Devices Are The Best Available Technology For Controlling Deepwater Blowouts

Well capping techniques have been applied both on land and offshore locations and have historically proven successful in regaining well control in shorter durations and are preferred over the more time-consuming alternative of drilling a relief well. Capping devices have existed and been used in the industry for decades. Capping device technology is feasible, well proven and not novel. Indeed, the Macondo Capping Stack was assembled using current technology and “off-the-shelf” equipment.

Within a few days of April 20, 2010, representatives from BP, Transocean, Cameron and Wild Well Control, met at BP’s offices to discuss capping solutions. On April 27, 2010, Wild Well Control provided BP with a project memo that raised “Well Capping” and “Installation of Capping Stack on existing BOP” as options that should be considered. The memo also included a summary of procedures for installation of a capping stack onto the existing BOP.

Moreover, in response to U.S. Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar’s request for ideas from the industry after the Macondo event, Apache Corporation responded on April 30, 2010, “[i]f the LMRP can be removed from the BOP, conventional wisdom would suggest that another subsea BOP could be placed on top of the Horizon’s BOP in order to close the well in.”

There was evidence presented at trial that capping stack devices had, in fact, been developed, deployed and utilized by others in the industry, using existing technology. The evidence showed that Cameron’s own BOPs had been used as capping stack solutions as early as the 1980s, and were actually used to kill wells in Kuwait. BP itself, in 2001, adopted well capping devices in Alaska as the best available technology. Indeed, BP concluded and certified that a well capping solution could mitigate the overall duration and extent of an uncontrolled blowout by 50%.

With respect to deepwater operations, the evidence established that at least two capping-type solutions had been previously utilized in deep water: (1) a blowout in Malaysia in 1988, and (2) the JIM CUNNINGHAM incident in the eastern Mediterranean in 2004, where a BOP-on-BOP technique was used. There was also evidence that Shell and Senta Drilling had capping devices available for a deepwater project off the coast of Brazil. And BP itself recognized the potential use of capping stacks in deepwater environments, identifying them as a “Level 3: Phase 2” solution in the January 2010 Gulf of Mexico Deepwater SPU Well Control response guide.

BP Violated Regulatory Standards

As set forth in Plaintiffs’ Phase One Post-Trial submissions, a defendant’s compliance with regulatory standards does not preclude a finding of gross or egregious conduct. Moreover, in Phase Two as in Phase One: (a) The Government relied largely on information that was provided (or not provided) by BP; (b)The MMS and Coast Guard officials were frequently overtaxed, understaffed, and of limited training; (c) There were several instances where BP’s conduct (or failure to act) went beyond the scope of what was ostensibly permitted under the specific regulation, application, or approval in question; (d) There were several instances where BP provided insufficient, inaccurate or misleading information to the Government; and (e) BP clearly violated MMS regulations.

Specifically, it was clear that the Oil Spill Response Plan (OSRP) ostensibly approved by the Government was directed toward efforts to try to contain and collect the oil once it reached the surface. The Oil Spill Response Plan was not intended to be a source control plan, and the regulations concerning the plan requirements expressly state: “Nothing in this part relieves you from taking all appropriate actions necessary to immediately abate the source of a spill.” As a factual matter, moreover, the evidence is clear that the Government expected BP to be able to abate the source of an oil spill as soon as possible. “The federal government has neither the skilled personnel nor the appropriate equipment to respond independently to an oil blowout in deepwater and must rely wholly on the responsible party.”

The Phase Two evidence further establishes that the Federal Government was relying on BP to provide the Government with source control information. In addition to lying to the Government with respect to the flow rate (to which BP pleaded guilty), BP also failed to comply with its pre-spill representation to the MMS regarding the training of its employees in source control response.

Far from establishing some type of a defense based on the alleged “approval” of its OSRP by the Government, BP clearly violated the regulatory requirements to: (i) take necessary precautions to keep the well under control at all times, 30 C.F.R. ¶250.401; (ii) immediately abate the source of a spill, 30 C.F.R. ¶254.5(c); and (iii) use the Best Available and Safest Technology (BAST), 30 C.F.R. ¶¶250.105, 107 and 401(a). At the end of the day, BP certified to the Federal Government in its Initial Exploration Plan for the Macondo well that it was capable of responding at the source to a worst-case discharge of up to 162,000 barrels of oil per day. BP was clearly not in compliance with respect to that regulatory certification.

Advance Preparation Would Have Unquestionably Allowed BP to Mitigate the Length and Extent of the Spill, Irrespective of the Particular Circumstances Surrounding a Blowout

Aside from the fact that a similar post-spill situation was specifically predicted by the Drilling Engineers Association in 1991, the evidence is clear that efforts prior to the spill would have reduced the duration and extent of the post-blowout event. BP representatives admitted that “it’s much better to have a plan in place” than to “create a plan … in the middle of a crisis.” Former CEO Tony Hayward and the leaders of the post-spill source control effort, Charles Holt and James Dupree, all admitted that BP did not have the equipment it needed in place, and were essentially creating plans on how to kill the well as they went along. It is because BP “didn’t have the equipment to attack a Macondo-type event” that “we had to engineer so many things simultaneously on the fly.”

Cameron personnel similarly confirmed that the lack of pre-spill planning resulted in “paralysis by analysis,” “running this show like a game of Scrabble,” having “no clue what to do next,” and “running around like chickens with their heads cut off.”

In sum, the evidence establishes that, had BP prepared for a deepwater blowout, with a capping stack available on April 20, 2010, the well could have likely been shut in within 24 days or less.

BP’s Intentional Misrepresentations and Omissions Combined with Multiple Other Causative Factors – including BP’s Own Reckless Failure to Prepare for a Blowout and Post-Spill Miscalculations and Mistakes – to Extend the Duration and Expanse of the Spill

The General Maritime Law clearly recognizes that multiple causative factors can combine and contribute to a harmful series of results. And, as set forth in Plaintiffs’ Phase One Post-Trial submissions, an accumulation or series of negligent acts or omissions are properly viewed together in order to determine whether the defendant has acted out of gross negligence, willful misconduct, or a wanton or reckless disregard.

Plaintiffs allege that BP’s intentional misconduct in concealing material facts, overtly misstating facts it knew were not true, and otherwise misleading the Government, together with other factors, including BP’s own pre-spill failure to prepare for an uncontrolled blowout, as well as BP’s (and/or perhaps the Government’s) post-spill misjudgments and miscalculations, all conspired to significantly delay the capping of the well.

BP’s Willful Misconduct in Lying to the U.S. Government (and Others) After the Spill is Relevant to the Overall Question of BP’s State of Mind, Even If It Were Found Not to be a Direct Cause of Any Delay

The Phase Two evidence establishes that BP’s willful misconduct in lying to the Government after the spill extended the blowout by a number of weeks. Yet, even assuming arguendo that there were no causal relationship between BP’s lies and the length or extent of the spill, (which is denied), such intentional misconduct would nevertheless be relevant to the ultimate question of whether BP acted with a willful, wanton or reckless disregard. See, e.g., Clements v. Steele, 792 F.2d 515, 516-517 (5th Cir. 1986) (“the ‘mental attitude of the defendant’ is what turns ordinary negligence into gross negligence” and can be inferred from the totality of the circumstances).

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BP Oil Spill Litigation: The Compensation Paid to MDL 2179 Plaintiffs’ Attorneys is Excessive

BP Oil Spill Litigation: The Compensation Paid to MDL 2179 Plaintiffs’ Attorneys is Excessive

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In Order to be Awarded a Common Benefit Fee of $600 million

the MDL 2179  Honorable Court Would Have to Believe that

the PSC Attorneys Worked Two Million Hours

Tampa, FL (July 26, 2013) – The question is whether the BP Oil Spill Settlement grants excessive compensation to the PSC and other counsel performing common benefit work in MDL 2179. This issue can be determined by a simple two-prong comparison test: First, by comparing the common benefit fees received by attorneys in MDL 2179 with the average total payment amount received by the claimants; and Second, by comparing the common benefit fees received by attorneys in MDL 2179 with the common benefit fees received by attorneys in comparable MDLs.

(a)  The Average Total Payment Amount Received From GCCF by Claimants

GCCF Overall Program Statistics (Status Report as of March 7, 2012)

Total Amount Paid = $6,079,922,450.47

Total No. of Paid Claimants = 221,358

Average Total Amount Paid Per Claimant = $27,466.47

The GCCF data indicates that a total of 574,379 unique claimants filed claims with the GCCF during the period from approximately August 23, 2010 to March 7, 2012.  The GCCF paid only 221,358 of these Claimants. In sum, the GCCF denied approximately 61.46% of the claimants who filed claims. See “Gulf Coast Claims Facility Overall Program Statistics” (Status Report, Mar. 7, 2012).

On March 8, 2012, this Honorable Court terminated the GCCF claims process and appointed Patrick Juneau as the Claims Administrator of the Transition Process and the proposed Court Supervised Claims Program (“CSCP”). On May 2, 2012, Patrick Juneau was appointed as Claims Administrator to oversee the Claims Administration Vendors, who will process the claims in accordance with the Proposed Settlement. Under the CSCP, the evaluation and processing of claims shall continue to be performed by Garden City Group, Inc., BrownGreer, PLC, and PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP. Accordingly, there is no reason to believe that the percentage of claimants denied payment and the average total amount paid per claimant will change under the CSCP.

(b)  The Common Benefit Fees Received by Attorneys in Comparable MDLs

In order to determine an appropriate common benefit fee, this Court looks to comparable MDL set-aside assessments and awards of common benefit fees. E.g., In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 553 F. Supp. 2d at 442, 457-58, 491-96 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (describing 9% federal and 6% state assessments later reduced to 6% and 4%, respectively; awarding less than total fund created by assessments); In re Zyprexa, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 261-63 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2007)(1% and 3% of separate settlement amounts); In re Sulzer Hip Prosthesis & Knee Prosthesis Liab. Litig., 268 F. Supp. 2d at 907, 909, 919 n.19 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (awarding common benefit fees out of $50,000,000 fund created through assessment representing 4.8% of settlement value);

In re Protegen Sling & Vesica Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1387, 2002 WL 31834446, at *1, *3 (D. Md. Apr. 12, 2002) (9% federal, 6% coordinated state assessments); In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1348, 2002 WL 441342, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2002) (6% withholding in federal cases, 4% in participating state cases); See also William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Common Benefit Fee” Is, Is Not, and Should Be, 3 Class Action Att’y Fee Dig. at 87 (2009) (collecting cases and concluding that most common benefit assessments range from 4% to 6%); 4 Alba Conte & Herbert B. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions § 14:9 (4th ed. 2002) (“Most [MDL] courts have assessed common benefit fees at about a 4-6% level, generally 4% for a fee and 2% for costs.”); Paul D. Rheingold, Litigating Mass Tort Cases § 7:35 (2010) (“[P]ercentages awarded for common funds in recent MDLS … were in the 4-6% range.”) (citation omitted). In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 760 F. Supp. 2d 640 (E.D. La. 2010) (“October 19, 2010 Order and Reasons”).

The Court’s analysis in the Vioxx MDL case is instructive. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig. (“MDL 1657”) involves the prescription drug Vioxx. Merck, a New Jersey corporation, researched, designed, manufactured, marketed and distributed Vioxx to relieve pain and inflammation resulting from osteoarthritis, rheumatoid arthritis, menstrual pain, and migraine headaches. On September 20, 2004, Merck withdrew it from the market after data indicated that the use of Vioxx increased the risk of cardiovascular thrombotic events such as myocardial infarction (heart attack) and ischemic stroke. Thereafter, thousands of individual suits and numerous class actions were filed against Merck in state and federal courts throughout the country.

On February 16, 2005, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (“MDL”) conferred MDL status on Vioxx lawsuits filed in various federal courts throughout the country and transferred all such cases to this Court to coordinate discovery and to consolidate pretrial matters pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407. See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 360 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (J.P.M.L. 2005).

On November 9, 2007, Merck and the NPC formally announced that they had reached a Settlement Agreement. The private Settlement Agreement established a pre-funded program for resolving pending or tolled state and federal Vioxx claims against Merck as of the date of the settlement, involving claims of heart attack (“MI”), ischemic stroke (“IS”), and sudden cardiac death (“SCD”), for an overall amount of $4.85 billion.

In Vioxx, Judge Fallon stated, “The Settlement Agreement created a $4.85 billion fund for the compensation of Vioxx claimants. The Court finds no reason to omit any portion of that settlement fund from consideration with respect to the reasonable amount of common benefit fees. Accordingly, $4.85 billion is the appropriate amount for calculation of a reasonable percentage of common benefit fees.”

The Vioxx Court awarded a common benefit fee of $315,250,000, which is equivalent to 6.5% of $4,850,000,000. In Vioxx, unlike MDL 2179, the attorneys came from states across the country. Accordingly, the Court found that an average hourly billable rate of $443.29 was reasonable.

There are significant two differences between MDL 1657 and MDL 2179:

(i)  The Time and Labor Required

The PSC and other counsel performing common benefit work in MDL 1657 documented and submitted over 560,000 hours of work during the course of this litigation. The PSC operated on many fronts, preparing pleadings and Master Class Action complaints, taking over 2,000 depositions, reviewing and compiling over 50,000,000 documents, briefing and arguing over 1,000 discovery motions, assembling a trial package, conducting bellwether trials, negotiating the global Settlement Agreement, and implementing the payout under the Agreement.

In contrast, “In the 20 months that have passed since the JPML’s centralization order, the parties [in MDL 2179] have engaged in extensive discovery and motion practice, including taking 311 depositions, producing approximately 90 million pages of documents, and exchanging more than 80 expert reports on an intense and demanding schedule……..BP and the PSC report that in February 2011 settlement negotiations began in earnest for two distinct class action settlements: a Medical Benefits Settlement and an Economic and Property Damages Settlement.”

In sum, the PSC and other counsel allegedly performing common benefit work in MDL 2179 only took 311 depositions and initiated settlement negotiations “in earnest” merely six (6) months after the JPML created MDL 2179.

The MDL 1657 Court conducted six Vioxx bellwether trials. During the same period that this Court was conducting six bellwether trials, approximately thirteen additional Vioxx-related cases were tried before juries in various state courts.

The MDL 2179 Court did not conduct a single bellwether trial.

(ii)  The Results Obtained

Attorneys doing common benefit work on behalf of Vioxx users in MDL 1657 achieved a favorable and meaningful global resolution. The Settlement Agreement ensured fair and comprehensive compensation to all qualified participants. In only 31 months, the parties to the Vioxx case were able to reach a global settlement and distribute $4,353,152,064 to 32,886 claimants, out of a pool of 49,893 eligible and enrolled claimants.

In contrast, attorneys doing common benefit work on behalf of BP oil spill victims in MDL 2179 did not remotely achieve “a favorable and meaningful global resolution.” The MDL 2179 Proposed Settlement does not ensure fair and comprehensive compensation to all qualified participants.

Average Total Amount Paid Per Claimant in MDL 1657 =  $132,370.98 Average Total Amount Paid Per Claimant in MDL 2179 =  $ 27,466.47

(c)  The Common Benefit Fees Received by Attorneys in MDL 2179

The PSC and other counsel allegedly performing common benefit work in MDL 2179 are not double-dipping; they are triple-dipping.

The known sources of compensation received by attorneys allegedly doing common benefit work on behalf of BP oil spill victims in MDL 2179 are:

(a) Six percent (6%) of the gross monetary settlements, judgments or other payments made on or after December 30, 2011 through June 3, 2012 to any other plaintiff or claimant-in-limitation;

(b) BP has agreed to pay any award for common benefit and/or Rule 23(h) attorneys’ fees, as determined by the Court, up to $600 million;

(c) Many attorneys doing common benefit work have their own clients and have also received or will also receive a fee directly from them. (N.B. – On June 15, 2012, the MDL 2179 Court ordered that “contingent fee arrangements for all attorneys representing claimants/plaintiffs that settle claims through either or both of the Settlements will be capped at 25% plus reasonable costs.”); and

(d) Co-counsel fees received by member firms of the PSC for serving as co-counsel to non-member firms of the PSC. For example, on March 13, 2012, Counsel for Plaintiff Salvesen received an unsolicited mass email from a member firm of the PSC. The email stated, “Co-Counsel Opportunity for BP Oil Spill Cases: News of the recent BP Settlement has caused many individuals and businesses along the Gulf Coast to contemplate either filing a new claim or amending a claim that has already been submitted. If you receive inquiries of this nature we would like you to consider a co-counsel relationship with our firm. Even if someone has already filed a claim it is advisable to retain legal counsel to analyze the impact of this settlement on claimants and maximize recovery. If you receive inquiries and are interested in co-counseling with us on the BP claims, please email…”

Over the years courts have employed various methods to determine the reasonableness of an award of attorneys’ fees. These methods include the “lodestar” method, which entails multiplying the reasonable hours expended on the litigation by an adjusted reasonable hourly rate, Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 624 F.2d 575, 583 & n.15 (5th Cir. 1980); the percentage method, in which the Court compensates attorneys who recovered some identifiable sum by awarding them a fraction of that sum; or, more recently, a combination of both methods in which a percentage is awarded and checked for reasonableness by use of the lodestar method.

(i)  The Percentage Method

As noted above, “percentages awarded for common funds in recent MDLS … were in the 4-6% range.” Given that the PSC and other counsel allegedly performing common benefit work in MDL 2179 only took 311 depositions and initiated settlement negotiations “in earnest” merely six (6) months after the JPML created MDL 2179, the appropriate percentage should be no greater than 4%.

BP has estimated the cost of the proposed settlement to be approximately $7.8 billion. A 4% award would yield $312 million for common funds.

(ii)  The Lodestar Cross-Check

The lodestar analysis is not undertaken to calculate a specific fee, but only to provide a broad cross check on the reasonableness of the fee arrived at by the percentage method.

This Court has previously used a range of $300 to $400 per hour for members of a Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee and $100 to $200 per hour for associates to “reasonably reflect the prevailing [billable time] rates in this jurisdiction.” Turner v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 2d at 868-69 (E.D. La. 2007).

Average Amount Awarded = $312,000,000.00

Billable Hourly Rate = $300/hr.

Hours Required to Have Been Expended on This Litigation = 1,040,000 hours

Average Amount Awarded = $600,000,000.00

Billable Hourly Rate = $300/hr.

Hours Required to Have Been Expended on This Litigation = 2,000,000 hours

In sum, in order to be awarded a common benefit fee of $312 million, the MDL 2179 Honorable Court would have to believe that the PSC attorneys worked more than one million hours; in order to be awarded a common benefit fee of $600 million, the MDL 2179  Honorable Court would have to believe that the PSC attorneys worked two million hours. Both of these fee amounts, which do not include the aforementioned (a), (c), and (d) known sources of compensation, fail the reasonableness test.

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BP Oil Spill: Reply to PSC’s Response to the Open Letter Dated December 21, 2012

December 31, 2012

VIA Email

Mr. Stephen J. Herman
Plaintiffs’ Liaison Counsel
Herman, Herman, Katz & Cotlar, LLP
820 O’Keefe Avenue
New Orleans, LA 70113

Re: Reply to PSC’s Response to the Open Letter Dated December 21, 2012

Dear Steve,

I refer to the open letter, dated December 21, 2012, wherein I requested the PSC’s answers to ten questions in regard to its representation of my clients and all similarly-situated BP oil spill and Gulf Coast Claims Facility (“GCCF”) victims in MDL 2179.

You promptly responded, via email, by stating, “I respectfully decline to respond to your questions, which seem argumentative and disingenuous. To the extent you sincerely seek answers to the questions you pose, I invite you to review the numerous pleadings, transcripts and orders which are available on PACER.”

As I have already explained, your decision not to address the issues raised in the open letter, although completely understandable, is disturbing.

On December 21, 2012, subsequent to your receipt of the open letter, Judge Barbier granted final approval to the E&PD class settlement agreement. Notwithstanding this fact, all victims of the BP oil spill and the “Delay, Deny, Defend” strategy employed by Kenneth R. Feinberg, et al. have a right to clearly understand how and why they were represented by the PSC in MDL 2179.

The PSC’s clients are not being “argumentative and disingenuous” when they demand to know why they have not been fully compensated for their damages. Furthermore, as you are well aware, the answers to the ten questions in the open letter are not available on PACER. Only the PSC is in a position to fully and properly respond to these questions.

On December 25, 2012, you further state via email, “I suppose that you are free to attack the PSC and/or the Court in whatever way you deem appropriate.”

Steve, as you are well aware, the open letter is not an attack on any individual or group of individuals involved in MDL 2179 anymore than it is “argumentative and disingenuous.” It is, however, an indictment of a judicial system in which: (a) multidistrict litigation has been allowed to devolve to the point where the “Lexecon Rule” has been supplanted by the “Heyburn Rule;” and (b) district courts permit settlement class actions to continue to erode the public’s faith in the federal judicial system.

A. Multidistrict Litigation

1. The “Lexecon Rule”

In In re: Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig. (“MDL 1657”), Judge Fallon’s analysis in regard to Lexecon is instructive.

“Traditionally, the cases in any given MDL originate from two sources.

First, cases are filed in, or removed to, federal courts across the country and transferred to the MDL court by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a). In these cases, the MDL court must apply the law of the transferor forum, that is, the law of the state in which the action was filed, including the transferor forum’s choice-of-law rules. See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 524 (1990). While the precise limits of the MDL court’s authority over such cases is currently subject to debate, it is clear that the court cannot try these cases, but rather must remand them to the transferor forum when pretrial discovery is complete. See Lexecon, Inc. v. Miberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998).

Second, a number of cases are often filed directly into the MDL by citizens who reside in the MDL court’s judicial district. In these cases, the MDL court must apply its own state law, that is, the law of the state in which it sits. It is undisputed that the MDL court has complete authority over every aspect of these cases.”

In re: Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., Case 2:05-md-01657 (E.D. La.) (“March 22, 2007 Order and Reasons”) (Rec. Doc. 10488).

2. The “Heyburn Rule”

The Heyburn Rule, in pertinent part, states, “To be sure, the Lexecon imperative does create severe inefficiencies in some cases as the transferor judge must re-familiarize himself or herself with the remanded action (perhaps many months after it was transferred out of the district under § 1407). However, the Heyburn Rule points out that “transferee judges are nothing if not resourceful where necessity dictates and several appropriate strategies are available by which the Lexecon conundrum may be avoided.”

Although Judge Barbier, the PSC, and BP refer to the MDL 2179 court’s “broad discretionary authority,” a “special-procedure” should not be crafted where a mandatory procedure already exists. It is important to remember that the very MDL procedures Judge Barbier, the PSC, and BP wish to circumvent were specifically enacted to reduce costs and promote judicial economy. Allowing the MDL 2179 trial plan is inconsistent with the clear statutory mandate of the multidistrict litigation enabling statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a), and the Supreme Court’s holding in Lexecon. While the need to promote efficiency in litigation is real, it cannot be accomplished by overriding the applicable provisions set forth by Congress. In re: FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Products Liability Litigation, 2009 WL 2390668 (E.D. La.).

The Heyburn Rule describes the Lexecon decision as a “conundrum” which may be avoided by “resourceful” transferee judges. My clients (who are now PSC’s clients) respectfully disagree. The Lexecon decision is not a conundrum. It is not an obstacle which judicial discretion may circumvent in the name of judicial efficiency/economy or political expediency. It is the law.

B. Settlement Class Actions

Settlement class actions are inherently flawed because they lack the “case” or “controversy” necessary to confer federal jurisdiction under Article III. The settlement class action court is asked not to resolve a real dispute between a litigant class and a party opposing that class, but rather merely to approve and implement a prearranged legal arrangement between the parties that was reached prior to the seeking of class certification.

While settlement class actions may have certain attractive aspects, such as reducing litigation expenses (MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, note 32, at § 21.612 (4th ed. 2004)), many of the traditional aspects of adversarial litigation are missing. As a result, the settlement class action is potentially the product of collusion among the parties: defendants who wish to rid themselves of the burden of litigation and plaintiffs’ counsel who wish to receive immediate compensation. Douglas G. Smith, The Intersection of Constitutional Law and Civil Procedure: Review of Wholesale Justice – Constitutional Democracy and the Problem of the Class Action Lawsuit, Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy, Vol. 104:319 (2010); See also, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 669, 714 (1986) (“Often, the plaintiffs’ attorneys and the defendants can settle on a basis that is adverse to the interests of the plaintiffs. At its worst, the settlement process may amount to a covert exchange of a cheap settlement for a high award of attorney’s fees.”). (Rec. Doc. 6902-1).

“BP and the PSC report that in February 2011 settlement negotiations began in earnest for two distinct class action settlements: a Medical Benefits Settlement and an Economic and Property Damages Settlement.” (p. 3, Rec. Doc. 6418).

In sum, the PSC and other counsel allegedly performing common benefit work in MDL 2179 initiated settlement negotiations “in earnest” merely four (4) months after Judge Barbier appointed members to the PSC. (See Rec. Doc. 6831-1). Clearly, the MDL 2179 settlement class action was not achieved in the full context of adversarial litigation.

Furthermore, after the Supreme Court‘s decisions in Amchem and Ortiz it has become exceedingly difficult to certify a class in the context of a mass tort. (See MANUAL, supra note 22, § 22.7, at 413–14 (“After experimentation with class treatment of some mass torts during the 1980s and 1990s, the courts have greatly restricted its use in mass torts litigation.”); RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 72 (2007) (“As embodied in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1966, the modern class action seemed on its face a device with little applicability to mass torts.”)).

The American Law Institute‘s draft Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation summarizes the state of the law: “As a doctrinal matter, the class action has fallen into disfavor as a means of resolving mass-tort claims. This development reflects many factors, including concerns about the quality of the representation received by members of settlement classes, difficulties presented by choice-of-law problems, and the need for individual evidence of exposure, injury, and damages.” A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION: PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, note 7, § 1.02, notes to cmt. b(1)(B), at 26 (Apr. 1, 2009).

Indeed, even before the Amchem and Ortiz decisions, courts had recognized that there was a national trend to deny class certification in drug or medical product liability/personal injury cases. This resistance to certification in such cases can be traced to the 1966 amendments to Rule 23, which specifically noted that the class action device was “ordinarily not appropriate” in a “mass accident” case where there would be “significant questions . . . affecting the individuals in different ways.” (See FED. R. CIV. P. 23, Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1966 Amend. See also In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 164 (2d Cir. 1987) (“The comment to Rule 23(b)(3) explicitly cautions against use of the class action device in mass tort cases. Moreover, most courts have denied certification in those circumstances.” (citation omitted)).

Presentment

In your email of December 25, 2012, you also state, “…….I would suggest that your clients not participating in the Economic Settlement will best be served if you: (i) ensure that you and/or they make Presentment of what you and/or they believe to be their full damages before January 18, 2013; and then, having made such presentment, (ii) file (or re-file) (and/or amend) suit on their behalf by April 20, 2013….”

I appreciate your advice and sudden concern for my clients. However, whenever our firm filed a claim on behalf of a client with GCCF, a copy of the claim was also filed directly with BP. In each case, BP provided a letter confirming its receipt of the claim. I understood that if a lawsuit was to be brought against BP, it should be brought under OPA and, therefore, the OPA Presentment requirement would have to be fulfilled.

GCCF Release and Covenant Not to Sue

In your email of December 25, 2012, you further advise, “…. (iii) with respect to any client whom you believe to have executed an invalid GCCF Release, assemble and prepare the best case you can to support the argument that such Release was procured under fraud, error or duress.”

As you are aware, our firm’s position is that every GCCF Release and Covenant Not to Sue violates federal law, State contract law, and is contrary to public policy. We shall address this matter at the proper time.

Steve, the PSC response generated the following additional questions.

QUESTION NO. 11

Why did the PSC wait until one month before the claim filing deadline to notify all BP oil spill and GCCF victims (its clients) of the OPA “Presentment” requirement?

On October 8, 2010, Judge Barbier appointed the members to the PSC (Rec. Doc. 506). The PSC sent a letter, dated December 13, 2012 and filed with LexisNexis on December 17, 2012, to all BP oil spill and GCCF victims wherein it finally advises its clients: “you must make ‘Presentment’ under the Oil Pollution Act for your Short Form Joinder, lawsuit or other claim to be valid…..before January 20, 2013. ”

The PSC should have notified all BP oil spill and GCCF victims (its clients) of the “Presentment” requirement in October, 2010, not in December, 2012.

QUESTION NO. 12

Why has the PSC failed to notify all BP oil spill and GCCF victims (its clients) that a lawsuit may be filed against Kenneth R. Feinberg, et al. without having to fulfill the OPA “Presentment” requirement?

GCCF victims may file an action alleging that Defendants Kenneth R. Feinberg, Feinberg Rozen, LLP, and GCCF misled them by employing a “Delay, Deny, Defend” strategy. This strategy, commonly used by unscrupulous insurance companies, is as follows: “Delay payment, starve claimant, and then offer the economically and emotionally-stressed claimant a miniscule percent of all damages to which the claimant is entitled. If the financially ruined claimant rejects the settlement offer, he or she may sue.” In sum, Plaintiffs would allege that BP is responsible for the oil spill incident; Feinberg, et al. (independent contractors), via employment of their “Delay, Deny, Defend” strategy, are responsible for not compensating and thereby financially ruining Plaintiffs. See Pinellas Marine Salvage, Inc., et al. v. Kenneth R. Feinberg, et al., 2:11-cv-01987 and Salvesen v. Feinberg, et al., 2:11-cv-02533. Motions to Remand for both cases remain pending in this Honorable Court.

Since Feinberg, et al is not a “Responsible Party” and therefore may not be sued under OPA, a lawsuit against Feinberg, et al. may be filed immediately because it does not require Presentment. The PSC would, however, need to advise all GCCF victims in regard to the statute of limitations and the associated tolling of the statute of limitations for class actions and fraudulent concealment or a misrepresentation by the defendant.

QUESTION NO. 13

Why does the PSC, which failed to adequately challenge the legality of the GCCF Release and Covenant Not to Sue for the past two years, suddenly advise non-PSC attorneys to “assemble and prepare the best case you can to support the argument that such Release was procured under fraud, error or duress?”

The ultimate objective of the “Delay, Deny, Defend” strategy of Feinberg, et al. was to obtain a signed “Release and Covenant Not to Sue” from as many BP oil spill victims as possible. Here, the GCCF Status Report as of March 07, 2012 is instructive. (See background information for “QUESTION NO. 8.”).

Feinberg, et al. cannot justify limiting payments under the Quick Payment Final Claim program to just $5,000 for individuals and $25,000 for businesses. There is no evidence that these amounts even remotely represent adequate consideration to compensate Claimants for the damages that Claimants did or will suffer as a result of the BP oil spill.

Steve, if the PSC had properly filed the B1 Master Complaint under OPA rather than alleging claims under admiralty law, Feinberg, et al. would never have been allowed to use the Release and Covenant Not to Sue to illegally exclude approximately 200,000 BP oil spill victims from the E&PD class settlement.

It has been, and remains, the responsibility of the PSC to “assemble and prepare the best case to support the argument that such Release was procured under fraud, error or duress.” On September 25, 2012, my clients filed their Motion to Nullify Each and Every Gulf Coast Claims Facility Release and Covenant Not to Sue. (See Rec. Doc. 7473-1). Please feel free to use the legal argument in this motion to assist with the preparation of the PSC case.

QUESTION NO. 14

Are you declining to answer these questions because you believe that an attorney-client relationship does not exist between the PSC and all BP oil spill and GCCF victims?

BP is extremely happy with the settlement. In a December 21, 2012 statement, BP said “it was pleased that the court approved the plaintiff steering committee’s settlement.” The PSC is ecstatic. Attorneys and CPA firms submitting claims for BP oil spill victims are giggling with delight over their new revenue stream. Unfortunately, the vast majority of BP oil spill victims are left scratching their heads over the entire MDL process and settlement class action. The numbers do not lie (See background information for “QUESTION NO. 8” and “QUESTION NO. 9”).

The combination of a settlement class action and MDL, which in this case appears to be “the product of collusion among the parties: defendants who wish to rid themselves of the burden of litigation and plaintiffs’ counsel who wish to receive immediate compensation,” has resulted in BP oil spill and GCCF victims receiving, if they are very fortunate, grossly inadequate compensation.

Steve, please understand that these fourteen questions are directed to the PSC by me on behalf of my clients (now PSC’s clients) and all similarly-situated BP oil spill and GCCF victims. These questions are not directed to the MDL 2179 Court. In sum, the PSC’s clients merely seek a better understanding of their representation by the PSC.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at 352-328-7469 or via e-mail at BrianJDonovan@verizon.net. Again, I would be happy to provide the PSC with any and all supporting documentation.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Brian J. Donovan

Brian J. Donovan

cc: James Parkerson Roy (jimr@wrightroy.com), Brian H. Barr (bbarr@levinlaw.com), Scott Summy (ssummy@baronbudd.com)

Click here to download a copy of this letter.

Click here to read the open letter.

BP Oil Spill: Is the MDL 2179 Trial Plan Unconstitutional?

Posted in BP, Cameron, Fifth Circuit, Judge Barbier, MDL 2179, OCSLA, OPA, OSLTF, responsible party, Seventh Amendment by renergie on January 3, 2012

BP Oil Spill: Is the MDL 2179 Trial Plan Unconstitutional?

_________________________

OCSLA and OPA, Not General Maritime Law, Govern MDL 2179

Tampa, FL (January 3, 2012) – On October 18, 2011, Cameron International Corporation (“Cameron”) filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

INTRODUCTION

Cameron believes there are two controversial facets of the trial plan proposed by Judge Carl Barbier for trial in the Gulf oil spill litigation:

1. Bench Trial vs. Trial by Jury

Judge Barbier proposes to dispense with trial by jury and instead to conduct a bench trial applying general maritime law. But the claims against Cameron are all governed by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”), 43 U.S.C. § 1331 et seq., which borrows the law of the adjacent state as surrogate federal law. Cameron is entitled under the Seventh Amendment to have those statutory tort claims for money damages tried before a jury.

2. “Allocation of Fault Issues” Without Reference to the Claim of Any Individual Plaintiff and in a Manner Contrary to the Federal Rules and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (“OPA”)

This bench trial will adjudicate “allocation of fault issues” without determining whether there is underlying liability to any individual plaintiff and, indeed, will proceed without the participation of any identified private plaintiff. That proposal is incompatible with the federal rules, the Fifth Circuit Court’s precedent, and the comprehensive scheme mandated by Congress in OPA, 33 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq.

CAMERON’S ARGUMENT

OCSLA

Cameron argues that the first false premise is that general maritime law, not OCSLA, governs the whole case. For some, the oil spill might be associated with images of the Deepwater Horizon on the surface of the ocean, rather than an oil well 5000 feet below the surface. But unlike other high-profile cases involving vessels (such as the Exxon Valdez), this litigation is not about an oil spill from a vessel; it is about a blowout and spill from an oil well erected on the seabed.

OCSLA extends federal sovereignty “to the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf and to all artificial islands, and all installations and other devices permanently or temporarily attached to the seabed, which may be erected thereon for the purpose of exploring for, developing or producing resources therefrom, .. .to the same extent as if the outer Continental Shelf were an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction located within a state.” 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1).

Recognition of OCSLA jurisdiction is decisive for the choice-of-law inquiry, because OCSLA acts “to define a body of law applicable” to activities on the outer continental shelf. Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 395 U.S. 352, 356 (1969). To do so, it mandates “adoption of state law as surrogate federal law.” OCSLA establishes the preemptive reach of federal law, 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1), then fills any gaps in federal law by borrowing the law “of each adjacent State.” 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(A).

The PLT Test

In Union Texas Petroleum Corp. v. PLT Engineering, Inc., 895 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1990), the Fifth Circuit set forth a three-part choice-of-law test for OCSLA:

(1) The controversy must arise on a situs covered by OCSLA (i.e. the subsoil, seabed, or artificial structures permanently or temporarily attached thereto).

(2) Federal maritime law must not apply of its own force.

(3) The state law must not be inconsistent with Federal law.

As in PLT, all of these conditions are met in the MDL 2179 case.

1. The situs test is satisfied.

This controversy arose on an OCSLA situs. The Fifth Circuit recently noted that the situs requirement is satisfied if the events took place on “a fixed platform or other structure attached to the seabed.” Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine, L.L.C., 589 F.3d 778, 784 (5th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (emphasis added). Thus, the district court correctly acknowledged that “the PLT test incorporates into § 1333(a)(2)(A) the locations referenced in § 1333(a)(1), specifically `temporarily attached’ structures.”

2. Maritime law does not apply of its own force.

Maritime law does not “apply of its own force.” PLT, 895 F.2d at 1047. Two separate lines of reasoning compel this conclusion.

In the first place, the Supreme Court has held consistently that drilling activities in water are not subject to maritime law. Over 100 years ago, the Court “specifically held that drilling platforms are not within admiralty jurisdiction.” Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 395 U.S. 352, 360 (1969) (citing Phoenix Constr. Co. v. The Steamer Poughkeepsie, 212 U.S. 558 (1908)).

This long-standing principle forecloses any competition between OCSLA and general maritime law. As the Court held in Rodrigue, when enacting OCSLA “Congress assumed that the admiralty law would not apply unless Congress made it apply, and then Congress decided not to make it apply.” The Court rested this conclusion on its “careful scrutiny” of OCSLA’s legislative history, which revealed that Congress had considered at length what body of law should govern the facilities identified in the statute; Congress understood that those exploration and production facilities “were not themselves to be considered within maritime jurisdiction” and therefore had “deliberately eschewed the application of admiralty principles.” Instead, Congress selected the law of the adjacent state.

Twice since Rodrigue, the Court has reiterated “the operative assumption underlying the statute: that admiralty jurisdiction generally should not be extended to accidents in areas covered by OCSLA.” Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 218 (1985); see Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 101 (1971) (“comprehensive admiralty law remedies [do not] apply under § 1333(a)(1)”). Thus, general maritime law does not apply “of its own force” to the federal enclave defined by OCSLA. If OCSLA applies, then general maritime law does not.

In any event, maritime law does not apply “of its own force” to this case for a second reason: Mineral production activities on the outer continental shelf are not “traditional maritime activities,” and as such are not subject to maritime law. At one time, this Court had suggested that offshore drilling is maritime commerce, but the Supreme Court decisively held otherwise in Herb’s Welding, v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414 (1985). In that case, the Court reiterated that “drilling platforms [are] not even suggestive of traditional maritime affairs” and stated explicitly that “exploration and development of the Continental Shelf are not themselves maritime commerce.

In PLT, therefore, this Court recognized that maritime law applies only if “the subject matter of the controversy bears significant relationship to traditional maritime activities.”

By the standard of PLT, general maritime law is inapplicable to the claims related to Cameron’s BOP, which is the subject of oil and gas exploration and production when attached to an exploration well.

This conclusion is best illustrated by Texaco Exploration & Production, Inc. v. AmClyde Engineered Production Co., 448 F.3d 760 (5th Cir. 2006), a case involving an accident during construction of a tower for an offshore drilling rig. Because the accident occurred on a vessel that was not itself attached to the seabed, the parties assumed that maritime law governed. But this Court did “not rely upon the parties’ bare conclusion that substantive maritime law applies.” Instead, it held that activities “connected with the development of the Outer Continental Shelf and an installation for the production of resources there … are insufficiently connected to traditional maritime activity to support the application of admiralty law.” Of special import here, the Court held that even the involvement of a vessel “in the accident and other elements of maritime activity that precede or surround the compliant tower’s construction on the Shelf are insufficient to support either admiralty jurisdiction or the application of substantive maritime law.” That holding fits this case like a glove. Maritime law does not apply “of its own force” to the claims against Cameron.

3. State law is not inconsistent with federal law.

With respect to the third prong of the test, Louisiana is the “adjacent State” within the meaning of § 1333(a)(2)(A), and neither the district court nor any party has suggested that the applicable substantive Louisiana tort law is inconsistent with federal law. The third prong of the PLT test is satisfied.

The District Court’s Effort to Evade OCSLA Is Unsound

The district court apparently determined that general maritime law applies “of its own force” to the claims against Cameron under the second prong of the PLT test. The court reasoned that (i) the discharge of oil emanated from the Deepwater Horizon; (ii) the fact that the Deepwater Horizon was a “vessel” was independently sufficient to invoke admiralty jurisdiction; and (iii) admiralty jurisdiction supports the application of maritime law. Id. at 4-8. There are many flaws in this chain of logic, but the fundamental error rests in the district court’s assumption that the Deepwater Horizon’s status as a “vessel” is legally dispositive of any significant issue in this case.

First, as a matter of law, this Court has held explicitly that “vessel” status is not dispositive of either the OCSLA situs or maritime activity issues. Demette v. Falcon Drilling Co., 280 F.3d 492, 497-98 (5th Cir. 2002) (OCSLA situs not controlled by vessel status); AmClyde, 448 F.3d at 775 (involvement of vessel does not make petroleum exploration a traditional maritime activity). The district court relied on Demette and suggested that this Court “rejected the very same argument that Cameron makes in this case,” but that is precisely backwards. Actually, this Court acknowledged vessel status yet it still proceeded to hold that the situs requirement was satisfied – following the same statutory construction that Cameron has advocated in this case. See Demette, 280 F.3d at 497-98.

Second, as a matter of indisputable fact, Cameron’s BOP was affixed to the wellhead on the seafloor and was being used for mineral resource development. The claims against Cameron all revolve around that BOP erected on the seabed. Therefore, with respect to the claims against Cameron, this is a classic case for OCSLA jurisdiction.

The district court dismissed this point summarily, noting that the BOP was “part of the vessel’s gear or appurtenances” and declaring that “[m]aritime law ordinarily treats an `appurtenance’ attached to a vessel in navigable waters as part of the vessel itself”‘ (citing Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 535 (1995)). But Grubart was not even an OCSLA case; it involved the Admiralty Extension Act, and it simply reaffirmed the principle that an injury caused by an appurtenance attached to a vessel (there, a crane) is caused “by a vessel” within the meaning of that Act. Grubart, 513 U.S. at 535. That rationale is irrelevant here, because the fact that the BOP was attached to the vessel does not alter the fact that it was a “fixed structure” and “attached to the seabed” within the meaning of OCSLA.

Indeed, this fact also exposes the district court’s error as to the drilling rig. The district court’s discussion of “vessel status” is founded on the premise that the oil spill emanated from the drilling unit instead of the well, but that is not the case. This is not a case like the Exxon Valdez litigation, where oil was spilling out of a grounded tanker; here, the oil was gushing out of a well and well equipment affixed to the seabed. Under these circumstances, vessel status is wholly irrelevant.

Furthermore, that the drilling unit was a “vessel” does not, standing alone, have any jurisdictional or choice-of-law significance. A basic requirement of admiralty jurisdiction is “that the wrong have a significant connection with traditional maritime activity.” Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 674 (1982). Grubart itself reiterated that admiralty jurisdiction may be invoked only “if the general character of the activity giving rise to the incident shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity.” Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534; see also Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 364 (1990) (same).

At the time of the Macondo well blowout, the Deepwater Horizon “was stationary and physically attached to the seabed by means of 5,000 feet of drill pipe.” It was engaged in well completion, not maritime navigation. Well completion is not a traditional maritime activity and thus does not satisfy the essential requirement for admiralty jurisdiction. That conclusion is supported and affirmed by a line of Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit cases. Even with its fixation on the Deepwater Horizon, therefore, the district court reached the wrong conclusion. The claims against Cameron are governed entirely by OCSLA, so there is no room for the district court’s sweeping conclusion that “‘the case is to be governed by maritime law.”‘

The district court sidestepped all these authorities by quoting, out of context, this Court’s observation 25 years ago that “‘oil and gas drilling on navigable waters aboard a vessel is recognized to be maritime commerce.”‘ (quoting Theriot v. Bay Drilling Corp., 783 F.2d 527, 538-39 (5th Cir. 1986)). That misreads Theriot, which was carefully written to avoid being misunderstood. In the cited passage, Theriot distinguished a Supreme Court case on the basis that “the Court’s holding must be read in the context of the opinion.” The district court should have heeded that same advice.

Before finalizing plans for the bench trial, the district court ruled on motions to dismiss the private oil pollution claims. Those motions raised choice-of-law issues that impact the right to a jury trial. Although the court had “already held in this MDL that it has OCSLA jurisdiction,” it declined to follow OCSLA’s choice-of-law provisions. Instead, the court chose to apply general maritime law to Cameron.

Application of OCSLA rather than general maritime law is crucial because it forecloses the MDL 2179 court’s effort to try all the liability questions in a bench trial. The district court’s trial plan is founded on the tradition that maritime claims are tried to the bench. But money damage claims governed by Louisiana law as borrowed federal law trigger the right to a jury under the Seventh Amendment. Thus, the trial plan violates the Seventh Amendment, and it is settled that mandamus will lie to correct this constitutional error.

OPA

Unlike the personal injury and wrongful death actions, the cases alleging economic loss due to the oil spill are governed by OPA. Moreover, all actions were consolidated solely for “pretrial proceedings” before the Hon. Carl Barbier. see 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (MDL consolidation only for “pretrial proceedings”).

The MDL 2179 court did rule that OPA displaces general maritime law for the oil pollution claims, but only as to procedure. The MDL 2179 court correctly noted that “OPA clearly requires that OPA claimants must first `present’ their OPA claim to the Responsible Party before filing suit.” But the court decided that it “would be impractical, time-consuming, and disruptive to the orderly conduct of this MDL and the current scheduling orders if the Court or the parties were required to sort through in excess of 100,000 individual B1 claims” to resolve whether any one of them had satisfied the statutory requirement of presentment. It explained that “[n]o matter how many of the individual B1 claims might be dismissed without prejudice” for lack of presentment, “the trial scheduled in February would still go forward with essentially the same evidence.”

The vast majority of the claims (both numerically and financially) arise under OPA, but with respect to the choice-of-law question it is only necessary to know that Cameron is not a statutorily defined “responsible party” made liable under OPA. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701(32), 2702(a). Instead, OPA subjects Cameron only to claims brought by responsible parties in subrogation or for contribution, and those claims are governed not by OPA but by “other law.” 33 U.S.C. §§ 2715(a), 2709. Here, that “other law” is dictated by OCSLA. Consequently, borrowing adjacent state law is not “inconsistent with federal law;” it is called for by OPA.

The Trial Plan

Pursuant to the court’s trial plan, which “applies to all cases,” the trial will address “bases of liability,” not actual liability to any individual claimant. This novel approach to an aggregate trial of “allocation of fault issues” will entail a staged investigation that focuses on the chronology of events, rather than the claims of particular litigants:

Phase I “will address issues arising out of the well blowout and spill “initiation” as of April 22, 2010;

Phase II “will address Source Control and Quantification of Discharge issues” from April 22, 2010 and thereafter; and

Phase III “will address issues” pertaining to the efforts to contain the spill.

The MDL 2179 court’s trial plan, when read together with its previous orders, provides for a bench trial to address issues related to allocation of fault among all defendants in this litigation (who are alleged to have caused, in any way, the deaths, injuries, property damages, or economic losses resulting from the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon and the spill from the Macondo well) based on the false premise that general maritime law governs this case. This judicial determination is to be made apart from any finding of an actual injury suffered by any plaintiff. In short, this “trial” of liability for monetary damages will not include a plaintiff, nor will it include a jury. It is squarely contrary to the federal rules and/or federal statutes and the Constitution in each respect.

Cameron manufactured and sold equipment that was later affixed to the wellhead on the seafloor on the outer continental shelf; the claims against it have nothing to do with general maritime law. Instead, the claims against Cameron arise under and are subject to OCSLA. That conclusion is dictated by controlling decisions of the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit’s own precedent. OCSLA, in turn, adopts the law of the adjacent state (here, Louisiana) as surrogate federal law. In short, all the injury, death, property damage, and economic loss claims against Cameron are governed by OCSLA, and thus by the substantive standards of Louisiana tort law.

The trial plan suffers from a second set of serious procedural flaws, which also have constitutional implications.

First, in divorcing the claims of individual plaintiffs from the questions of “liability” and “allocation of fault,” this plan departs from the most cherished traditions of the Anglo-American adversarial system, which are embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules Enabling Act. It is impossible to adjudicate “allocation of fault” in a vacuum without adjudicating the underlying claim of an individual plaintiff. The Fifth Circuit’s Fibreboard and Castano decisions, and the Rhone-Poulenc decision from the Seventh Circuit, forbid “innovations” that exceed the rules and alter substantive rights. Indeed, this trial plan goes so far afield that it crosses the boundaries of Article III.

Second, this plan radically departs from OPA’s carefully structured and comprehensive remedial scheme. As a condition precedent to suit, OPA requires presentment to a designated “responsible party” of all claims for response costs and economic losses caused by the discharge of oil in navigable waters. If the responsible party settles the claim, it may seek recovery from third parties like Cameron as subrogee of the paid claim. If it cannot settle a claim and is then sued, it may then seek contribution from third parties like Cameron. But the trial plan inverts the Congressional order, dispensing with presentment entirely, deferring compensation of verifiable claims, and forcing Cameron’s potential liability to be determined in the abstract and in the first instance.

The District Court Cannot Try All the Plaintiffs’ Claims Without Violating Rule 23, Lloyd’s Leasing, and Lexecon

The order of proceedings envisioned by the trial plan is extremely curious. To begin the trial, “the Claimants, through the Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee” (along with counsel for the governmental parties) will offer “evidence in support of those parties’ claims against all defendants” in the aggregate. Later, defendants will present “evidence in support of their defenses to plaintiffs’ claims” in the aggregate. Yet the trial plan does not actually propose to adjudicate those claims in the aggregate. The district court has structured the trial in this way because it cannot actually try all of the claimants’ claims in this limitation action, for three reasons.

First, the only device that would permit a trial of all the claimants’ claims in the aggregate would be a class action under Rule 23, but the district court has stayed all class action proceedings and has not appointed a class representative. As such, trying all plaintiffs’ claims in the aggregate would be a blatant violation of Rule 23 by permitting a class-wide adjudication without establishing the mandatory prerequisites for a class action.

Second, the court could not have certified a class in the limitation action even if it had wanted to do so, because it would contravene this Court’s holding in Lloyds Leasing Ltd. v. Bates, 902 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1990), that class actions are not permitted in limitation proceedings.

The Supreme Court has explained that a core purpose of the limitation action under Admiralty Rule F is to “marshal[] claims,” which can then be adjudicated. Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 448 (2001). In that context, the Fifth Circuit has held that “the entire thrust of Supplemental Rule F is that each claimant must appear individually.” In re Lloyd’s Leasing, 902 F.2d 368, 370 (5th Cir. 1990). Each claim must be prosecuted “individually” and liability must be resolved on the basis of individual claims.

Third, trying all the plaintiffs’ claims in the aggregate would violate the rule of Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998), which holds that an MDL judge may not try the actions transferred from other judicial districts under 28 U.S.C. § 1407. When the JPML transfers a matter to a MDL judge, “[e]ach action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have been previously terminated.” 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a). In Lexecon, the Supreme Court read that language strictly and reversed a judgment entered after trial of a matter that the JPML had transferred pursuant to § 1407. The Court held that “considerations of ‘finality, efficiency and economy”‘ do not justify “defiance of the congressional condition” that such an action be remanded to the transferor court for trial.

In this case the JPML has transferred over 300 cases filed in other districts. Those actions, which include the claims of thousands of plaintiffs, were transferred to Judge Barbier for “coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.” Because Judge Barbier cannot try the cases transferred for “pretrial proceedings,” he could not try all of the plaintiffs’ claims in the aggregate in this proceeding. Nor can the rule of Lexecon be circumvented by the device of permitting claimants to file “short-form joinders” injecting themselves into the limitation action on the theory that it was transferred to the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 for trial. That would make a mockery of Lexecon.

The district judge, a seasoned and able jurist, recognized that he was not free to fashion a trial plan that is flawed in these fundamental respects. For that reason, the trial plan does not seek to adjudicate all the plaintiffs’ claims in the aggregate. Instead, it plans a trial of “issues” related to “allocation of fault” in the abstract. Unable to try all the plaintiffs’ claims, the judge has chosen to try none of them. This proposal is still defective, as a trial of “issues” would try parts of actions that under Lexecon the MDL judge must not try and would amount to a class action in a limitations proceeding contrary to Rule 23 and Lloyd’s Leasing. Indeed, such a trial would resemble an unsanctioned class action in almost everything but name. But even on its own terms, this plan exceeds the boundaries of the federal rules and contravenes the prior decisions of the Fifth Circuit.

The District Court’s Plan to Try “Issues” Without Trying Any Plaintiffs’ Claims Violates Rule 42, Fibreboard, and Article III

The district court evidently grounded its decision to order a trial of “issues” in Rule 42. But that trial plan cannot be sustained under the Fifth Circuit’s precedent. The Fifth Circuit recognizes that “separation of issues is not the usual course that should be followed.” Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 750 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., 573 F.2d 309, 318 (5th Cir. 1978)). When a district court proposes to depart from the usual practice, “the issue to be tried must be so distinct and separable from the others that a trial of it alone may be had without injustice.”

Here, the “allocation of fault issues” that the district court intends to try are not “distinct and separable” from the underlying claims of individual plaintiffs. Just the opposite. It is impossible to decide “allocation of fault” in the abstract; these questions cannot be decided without addressing liability, proximate cause, and comparative fault with reference to the claims of an individual plaintiff. Castano rejected a trial plan “to divide core liability from other issues such as comparative negligence,” Castano, 84 F.3d at 749, and this plan suffers from the same flaw. Rule 42(b) does not permit a separate trial on those issues in a vacuum, and the effort to use it in this way violates the Rules Enabling Act: “Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2072.

In a series of decisions, the Fifth Circuit (and others) has emphasized that courts cannot order separate trials of “issues” that aggregate individualized questions, such as causation, simply because it would be “convenient” or “efficient.” E.g., Castano, 84 F.3d at 751; In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1302-04 (7th Cir. 1995); In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 709-12 (5th Cir. 1990). Fibreboard was a seminal case, rejecting a trial plan that proposed to try the claims of 41 representative plaintiffs as a means to secure percentage findings that would then be extrapolated to an entire class of plaintiffs. By this device, the claims of the plaintiffs were to be aggregated and “the claim of a unit of 2,990 persons will be presented.” This procedure would mean the defendants “are exposed to liability not only in 41 cases actually tried with success to the jury, but in 2,990 additional cases whose claims are indexed to those tried.” “[E]ach plaintiff will be present in a theoretical, if not practical, sense.”

The Fifth Circuit held that such an aggregate trial plan “cannot focus upon such issues as individual causation,” and as a result, it would not permit a trial of individual claims. “This is the inevitable consequence of treating discrete claims as fungible claims.” Such a plan could proceed “only by lifting the description of the claims to a level of generality that tears them from their substantively required moorings to actual causation and discrete injury.” This, the Court held, was “alteration of substantive principle.”

The innovative plan proposed by the district court violates these principles. By planning a “trial” of all defendants’ “bases of liability” and “allocation of fault” in the abstract, without reference to any individual plaintiff’s claim, this trial plan goes even further than the one rejected by Fibreboard. In the name of efficiency, it alters Cameron’s substantive rights in precisely the way the Fifth Circuit has forbidden. “There is a point … where cumulative changes in procedure work a change in the very character of a trial.” Id. at 711. This plan has crossed that line.

This conclusion is inescapable regardless of the controlling substantive law. The claims against Cameron all turn on allegations that its product was defective, and Cameron cannot be liable on such a claim without proof that an alleged defect proximately caused some plaintiffs injury. Under Louisiana law, borrowed as surrogate federal law under OCSLA, Cameron could be “liable to a claimant” only “for damage proximately caused by” its product. LA. REV. STAT. 9:2800.54.A. Likewise, even if the district court were correct that general maritime law governs, “there is properly no application of comparative fault where there is an absence of proximate causation.” Exxon Co. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 838 (1996). Thus, the causation inquiry cannot proceed without reference to some plaintiff’s claim. See United States v. Atlantic Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331, 2337-38 (2007) (statutory claims for contribution, like the cross-claims here, require a finding that the parties are “responsible for the same tort”).

Furthermore, no liability can be imposed on Cameron under Louisiana or maritime product liability law, and therefore no fault can be allocated to Cameron, unless a plaintiff satisfies the “economic loss” rule by proving an injury to either person or property. See Wiltz v. Bayer Cropscience, Inc., 645 F.3d 690, 695-703 (5th Cir. 2011) (Louisiana law); East River SS Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 867-75 (1986) (maritime law).

In short, regardless of the choice-of-law ruling, the notion that a court can adjudicate “allocation of fault issues” in a vacuum, divorced from the claims of any individual plaintiff, alters Cameron’s substantive rights in violation of Rule 42 and the Castano and Fibreboard decisions. This plan is a violation of due process. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2560-61 (2011).

At bottom, the trial plan goes so far in seeking to adjudicate abstract issues without reference to any individual claim that it violates Article III. A plaintiff with standing to sue is the “irreducible constitutional minimum” under Article III. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1998). Individual standing is “the core of Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement,” Id. at 104, and it “must be supported adequately by the evidence adduced at trial.”‘ LuJan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 ( 1992) . Because this trial plan would adjudicate “issues” in the abstract, not the claims of individual claimants who seek redress for identifiable injuries, it violates Article III.

The Trial Plan Does Not Accord With the Congressionally Mandated Remedial Scheme Prescribed by OPA

It should not escape notice that the district court’s effort to achieve a global “allocation of fault” is not only irreconcilable with the ordinary rules of procedure, but also with the specific scheme fashioned by Congress for oil pollution claims – by far the most numerous and financially significant claims in this litigation.

OPA establishes a comprehensive remedial scheme governing claims arising from the discharge of oil into navigable waters. The OPA scheme focuses on statutorily designated “responsible parties.” 33 U.S.C. § 2701(32). In this case, the designated “responsible parties” are the vessel owner or operator (Transocean) and the Macondo well lessees (BP, Anadarko, and MOEX). Cameron is not a statutorily designated “responsible party.”

OPA makes the responsible parties strictly liable for specific categories of removal costs and damages “[n]otwithstanding any other provision or rule of law.” 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a); § 2702(b) (specifying the recoverable costs and damages). It sets forth a streamlined process to facilitate prompt payment of verifiable claims. First, as a means of expediting payment and minimizing litigation, OPA imposes a presentment requirement: “[A]11 claims for removal costs or damages shall be presented first to the responsible party.” 33 U.S.C. § 2713(a). Only if a claim is not paid within 90 days may “the claimant … elect to commence an action in court against the responsible party ….” Id. § 2713(c).

OPA does not authorize claimants to sue third persons like Cameron who are not statutorily designated responsible parties. Instead, the statute interposes the responsible parties between claimants and third persons. Once a responsible party “pays compensation pursuant to this chapter to any claimant for removal costs or damages,” the responsible party becomes “subrogated to all rights, claims, and causes of action that the claimant has under any other law.” 33 U.S.C. § 2715(a); see also Id. § 2702(d)(1)(B). Alternatively, a responsible party may bring an “action for contribution against any other person who is liable or potentially liable under this Act or another law.” Id. § 2709.

In short, OPA prescribes a streamlined procedure providing for payment of damages first, litigation of liability later. Responsible parties must promptly compensate all claimants who present verifiable claims; ultimate financial liability is then resolved in separate litigation to which the claimants are not even parties. The legislative history makes this two-stage process explicit: “Whenever possible, the burden is to be on the discharger to first bear the costs of removal and provide compensation for any damages. . . . [L]itigation or lengthy adjudicatory proceedings over liability, defenses, or the propriety of claims should be reserved for subrogation actions ….” S. Rep. 101-94, 101″ Cong., 0 Sess. 1989, 1990 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 722, 732.

First, failure to enforce the presentment requirement delays indefinitely the verification and satisfaction of claims advanced by individual plaintiffs (if any) who have presented claims and been denied compensation by a responsible party; under the proposed trial plan those plaintiffs now will be lumped together with the “large numbers of … plaintiffs who have completely bypassed the OPA claim presentation requirement,” and will sit back to await the outcome of what Congress presciently called “lengthy adjudicatory proceedings over liability.” This is precisely contrary to the prompt payment of compensation that lies at the heart of the OPA remedial scheme.

Second, by proceeding directly to matters of liability instead of resolving the claims of individual plaintiffs, the trial plan invites the PSC to participate in a potentially riotous free-for-all over fault on behalf of an undifferentiated mass of unidentified plaintiffs. The PSC will play this role even though (a) those plaintiffs have not been demonstrated to have satisfied OPA’s prerequisite for bringing suit, (b) those plaintiffs do not need to prove fault to secure compensation under OPA, and (c) those plaintiffs have no statutory right to sue third persons like Cameron who are not statutorily designated responsible parties.

The district court may have believed that its multiple departures from the OPA remedial scheme were justified under the Limitation Act, but that is not so. The Limitation Act’s procedures for marshaling claims and allocating fault cannot be used to circumvent the orderly OPA scheme. As the First Circuit correctly held, “claims arising under the OPA (for pollution removal costs and damages) are not subject to the substantive or procedural law of the Limitation Act or to the concursus of claims [allowed by the Limitation Act].” In re Metlife Capital Corp.,132 F.3 d 818, 819 (1st Cir. 1997). “OPA repealed the Limitation Act with respect to removal costs and damages claims against responsible parties.” Id. at 821. Congress stated that OPA “completely supersedes”‘ the Limitation Act. M. at 822 (quoting legislative history). Thus, after careful evaluation, the First Circuit held “the OPA’s scheme is in irreconcilable conflict with the Limitation Act.”

The plaintiffs’ OPA claims should be adjudicated in the manner deliberately chosen by Congress, i.e., only plaintiffs satisfying the presentment requirement may have their day in court; plaintiffs who do satisfy the presentment requirement are entitled to compensation for all verified claims without awaiting litigation over fault or ultimate financial responsibility, but those plaintiffs may not proceed against third persons who are not statutorily designated responsible parties. Instead, the district court has inverted the congressional order by confusing Transocean’s limitation action with the OPA claims that this case is mainly about. This has become a case of the caboose driving the train, and it needs to be put back on the tracks.

When viewed as a whole, the proceeding envisioned by the MDL 2179 court’s plan is not a “trial” as it is known in Anglo-American law. Its three phases are reminiscent of the procedures followed by European courts in which the judges are active prosecutors in search of justice while the litigants are virtually bystanders. But this procedure is a novelty in American law. It should not be allowed.

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT ORDER

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit chose not to address the issues raised in Cameron’s Petition for Writ of Mandamus. On December 26, 2011, the three-judge panel (Judges Higginbotham, Davis, and Elrod) issued the following three-sentence Order:

“The application for mandamus is denied. The district court did not clearly err in concluding that the limitation proceeding is within the court’s admiralty jurisdiction. The remaining issues fail the demands for mandamus review.”

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BP Oil Spill: Plaintiffs Oppose Class Action Lawsuits in MDL 2179

Posted in BP, class action, Feinberg, Feinberg Rozen, GCCF, Gulf Coast Claims Facility, Mass Tort by renergie on December 5, 2011

BP Oil Spill: Plaintiffs Oppose Class Action Lawsuits in MDL 2179

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Plaintiffs Are Entitled to Receive the True Value of Their Claims

Tampa, FL (December 5, 2011) – Plaintiffs in Pinellas Marine Salvage, Inc., et al. v. Kenneth R. Feinberg, et al. and Salvesen v. Kenneth R. Feinberg, et al. have each filed a motion in opposition to class certification of any action in MDL 2179. The motions were filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana for the following three reasons:

I. Defendants Feinberg, et al. Have No Incentive to Settle Claims  

Defendants Feinberg, et al. have established a claims process with the primary function of convincing claimants that the only compensation available is a minimal set amount that comes with a full release attached. The MDL 2179 Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee states, “The delay in responding to interim claims, the near-complete failure to pay interim claims, and the skewed final payment calculation delivers the message to over 112,000 putative class members: the only way to ever get any more compensation is to take the quick payment amount and sign a release.”

On August 26, 2011, in the Court’s Order and Reasons [As to Motions to Dismiss the B1 Master Complaint], Judge Barbier found,

“…. that nothing prohibits Defendants from settling claims for economic loss. While OPA does not specifically address the use of waivers and releases by Responsible Parties, the statute also does not clearly prohibit it. In fact, as the Court has recognized in this Order, one of the goals of OPA was to allow for speedy and efficient recovery by victims of an oil spill.”

In the same Order, the MDL 2179 Court also found,

“State law, both statutory and common, is preempted by maritime law, notwithstanding OPA’s savings provisions. All claims brought under state law are dismissed.”

II. Plaintiffs Are Entitled to Receive the True Value of Their Claims

The true value of a claim submitted to the Gulf Coast Claims Facility (“GCCF”) for lost earnings or profits is approximately the amount equal to the average monthly loss in earnings or profits for the period from May 1, 2010 through April 30, 2011 multiplied by fifty (50) months. In other words, if the average monthly loss in earnings or profits for the period from May 1, 2010 through April 30, 2011 is $5,000.00, the true value of the claim submitted to GCCF is calculated as follows:

True Value of Claim = ($5,000/month)(50 months) = $250,000.00

The Fifth Circuit has noted, “In addition to skewing trial outcomes, class certification creates insurmountable pressure on defendants to settle, whereas individual trials would not. The risk of facing an all-or-nothing verdict presents too high a risk, even when the probability of an adverse judgment is low. These settlements have been referred to as judicial blackmail.” Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996) (citations and footnote omitted). This generalization is not applicable to class certification in MDL 2179. Here, the class certification would be in a mass tort context within the context of a multidistrict litigation. Given that “all individual petitions or complaints that fall within Pleading Bundles B1, B3, D1, or D2, whether pre-existing or filed hereafter, are stayed until further order of the Court” (Pretrial Order No. 25, Para. 8), certification of pending class actions would most probably not be decided until the conclusion of the limitation and liability trial which does not commence until February, 2012. “It was reported that one attorney has approximately 23,000 claimants and inquiry was made as to whether the attorney may produce the information in the form in which it is maintained rather than complete individual PPFs.” (Rec. Doc. 642 at Page 2). As of November 16, 2011, there are 523 actions, which encompass approximately 130,000 total individual claims, pending in MDL 2179. In other words, tens of thousands of potential class members are in legal limbo. This hardly “creates insurmountable pressure on defendants to settle.”

In the context of one of the largest mass tort cases in United States history, the damages suffered by the vast majority of individual potential plaintiffs as a result of the BP oil spill of April, 2010, and the subsequent “Delay, Deny, Defend” strategy of Feinberg, et al., are potentially so great that class treatment would not be necessary to permit effective litigation of the claims. Here, when the amount of damages suffered by the individual is so great, the filing of an individual lawsuit should be economically feasible and would be in the best interests of the plaintiffs.

The associated cost, consumption of time, and ongoing negative publicity of numerous trials, rather than a few class action lawsuits, are required in order exert the proper amount of pressure on Feinberg, et al. to negotiate a settlement which reflects the true value of the claim and not one which focuses on minimizing the liability of Feinberg Rozen, LLP, Feinberg/GCCF, and the responsible parties.

III. MDL 2179 Plaintiffs Are Not Able to Prove That Class Certification is Appropriate Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23

MDL 2179 Plaintiffs in proposed class actions are not able to meet their heavy burden of proving that class certification is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 for the reasons which are thoroughly discussed in the memorandum of law which is filed with the motion.

BACKGROUND

Pinellas Marine Salvage, Inc., et al. v. Kenneth R. Feinberg, et al. and Salvesen v. Feinberg, et al. are the only two cases of their kind filed in any court in the country. Each complaint alleges, in part, that Defendants Kenneth R. Feinberg, Feinberg Rozen, LLP, GCCF, and (in Salvesen) William G. Green, Jr. misled Plaintiffs by employing a “Delay, Deny, Defend” strategy against them. This strategy, commonly used by unscrupulous insurance companies, is as follows: “Delay payment, starve claimant, and then offer the economically and emotionally-stressed claimant a miniscule percent of all damages to which the claimant is entitled. If the financially ruined claimant rejects the settlement offer, he or she may sue.” Each action, originally filed in Florida state court, is brought by Plaintiff under the following seven causes of action: (a) Gross Negligence; (b) Negligence; (c) Negligence Per Se; (d) Fraud; (e) Fraudulent Inducement; (f) Promissory Estoppel; and (g) Unjust Enrichment.

The MDL Panel ordered each action transferred to MDL No. 2179 on the erroneous grounds that “[These] action[s], similar to other actions already in the MDL, arise from alleged injury to plaintiffs’ business resulting from the oil spill.”

The clarity of the analysis of the scope of OCSLA by Judge Carlton W. Reeves in State of Mississippi v. Gulf Coast Claims Facility, et al., C.A. No. 3:11-00509 (S.D. Miss. 2011) is both refreshing and instructive. On July 12, 2011, Attorney General Jim Hood (“Hood”) filed suit on behalf of the State of Mississippi against the GCCF and Kenneth Feinberg in Hinds County Chancery Court. On August 11, 2011, the GCCF removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi (“MSSD”) claiming that original jurisdiction lies with the MSSD by virtue of the OCSLA. Hood moved to remand the case to state court on September 12, 2011. On November 15, 2011, Judge Reeves granted Hood’s motion to remand.

Judge Reeves found, “GCCF’s argument that Hood has unwittingly stated a claim under OCSLA is likewise not compelling. According to OCSLA, federal courts enjoy subject-matter jurisdiction ‘of cases and controversies arising out of, or in connection with (A) any operation conducted on the outer Continental Shelf which involves exploration, development, or production of the minerals, of the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf . . . .’ The Fifth Circuit has written that it “applies a broad ‘but-for’ test to determine whether a cause of action arises under OCSLA.” Hufnagel v. Omega Serv. Indust., Inc., 182 F.3d 340, 350 (5th Cir. 1999). “And in GCCF’s view, because it would not exist but for the Deepwater Horizon’s explosion, this case (and, presumably, any other case to which it could ever be a party) necessarily implicates OCSLA.” State of Mississippi v. Gulf Coast Claims Facility, et al., C.A. No. 3:11-00509 (S.D. Miss. 2011), Order of Remand at Page 10.

“GCCF is correct that the Fifth Circuit views ‘the jurisdictional grant contained in U.S.C. § 1349(b)(1) as very broad.’ But to view OCSLA’s scope so far-reaching as does GCCF would render GCCF’s every potentially actionable decision a federal case, be it related to the claims process at hand or a GCCF employee’s car wreck en route to the office.” (Emphasis added)

Neither OCSLA’s plain language nor the Fifth Circuit’s decisions interpreting it contain any indication that matters so far removed as these – occurring not on the outer Continental Shelf but doing business in Dublin, Ohio, and aimed not at the “exploration, development, or product of . . . minerals” but rather at “developing and publishing standards for recoverable claims” related to the Deepwater Horizon spill – fall within the purview of Section 1349(b)(1), which addresses “any operation conducted on the outer Continental Shelf . . . .” Plainly, although GCCF’s activities amount [to] an operation, that operation is not conducted “on the outer Continental Shelf.” Therefore, OCSLA does not apply and is not a proper basis for federal jurisdiction. (Emphasis added)

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs continue to suffer damages from three separate sources:

(a) once from the oil spill, the environmental and economic damages of which have devastated their way of life;

(b) again by being left in financial ruin as a direct result of Feinberg’s “Delay, Deny, Defend” strategy; and

(c) a third time for daring to demand justice, which will consume their time, energy and hopes for years to come if they are held hostage by protracted litigation.

If motions for class certification pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 are granted in MDL 2179, Defendants Feinberg, et al. will continue to have no incentive to settle claims and Plaintiffs will never receive the true value of their claims.

Second Lawsuit Filed Against Kenneth R. Feinberg, Feinberg Rozen, LLP and Gulf Coast Claims Facility

Second Lawsuit Filed Against Kenneth R. Feinberg, Feinberg Rozen, LLP and
Gulf Coast Claims Facility
__________________

Complaint Alleges Gross Negligence, Fraud, Fraudulent Inducement and Unjust Enrichment

Tampa, FL (June 21, 2011) – A second lawsuit has been filed in state court in Florida against Kenneth R. Feinberg, Feinberg Rozen, LLP and Gulf Coast Claims Facility (“GCCF”). The 38-page complaint was filed on June 15, 2011 in the Circuit Court of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit in and for Lee County, Florida by Tampa attorney Brian J. Donovan on behalf of Mr. Selmer M. Salvesen. The complaint alleges, in part, gross negligence, fraud, fraudulent inducement and unjust enrichment on the part of the defendants (Case No. 11-CA-002008).

Mr. Salvesen is the sole proprietor of a business engaged in aquaculture, specifically the growing of farm-raised hard-shell clams on sovereignty submerged land leased from the State of Florida. As a result of the actions of the defendants, Mr. Salvesen’s aquaculture business is struggling to survive.

Feinberg, acting through and as Managing Partner of Feinberg Rozen, established GCCF to independently administer and where appropriate settle and authorize the payment of certain claims asserted against BP as a result of the explosion at the Deepwater Horizon rig and consequent spillage of oil into the Gulf of Mexico.

The complaint alleges, in part, that Defendants misled Mr. Salvesen by employing a “Delay, Deny, Defend” strategy against him. This strategy, commonly used by unscrupulous insurance companies, is as follows: “Delay payment, starve claimant, and then offer the economically and emotionally-stressed claimant a miniscule percent of all damages to which the claimant is entitled. If the financially ruined claimant rejects the settlement offer, he or she may sue.”

On April 22, 2011, 274 days after Mr. Salvesen presented a claim for damages to BP, GCCF finally denied his claim. This is in keeping with the “Delay, Deny, Defend” strategy alleged by Mr. Salvesen in his complaint – delay 274 days, deny compensation, then say to the claimant, “sue us.”

Mr. Salvesen is not able to sue Defendants under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (“OPA”) because his damages did not “result from” the oil spill and Defendants are not “responsible parties.” Defendants are independent contractors that administer, settle and authorize the payment of certain claims asserted against BP, the “responsible party.” Here, Defendants’ “Delay, Deny, Defend” strategy and associated tortious acts, not acts by BP, resulted in the financial ruin of Mr. Salvesen.

Donovan believes GCCF, without any legal authority for doing so, circumvents many of the rights provided to victims of the BP oil spill under the OPA. Under OPA, responsible parties for an oil spill are strictly liable for the payment of claims for specified damages. In order to recover damages, a claimant merely needs to show that his or her damages “resulted from” the oil spill. OPA states, “The responsible party for a vessel or a facility from which oil is discharged, or which poses the substantial threat of a discharge of oil, into or upon the navigable waters or adjoining shorelines or the exclusive economic zone is liable for the removal costs and damages that result from such incident.” These damages include, but are not limited to: “Damages equal to the loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity due to the injury, destruction, or loss of real property, personal property, or natural resources, which shall be recoverable by any claimant.”

Defendants, who cannot cite to a single authority, statutory provision, or fragment of legislative history supporting their position, argue that (a) “OPA imposes no duty on responsible parties other than to establish and advertise a process for receiving claims, not that they actually settle claims;” and (b) “OPA says nothing about how a claims process should work. It simply requires that the claimant and the responsible party have a chance to consider a settlement before the claimant may sue.”

“The overarching purpose of OPA’s mandatory alternative dispute resolution process is ‘to encourage settlement and avoid litigation.'” Boca Ciega Hotel, Inc. v. Bouchard Trans. Co., 51 F. 3d 235, 240 (11th Cir. 1995).

Defendants’ “Delay, Deny, Defend” strategy avoids settlement and encourages litigation. In addition to Mr. Salvesen’s lawsuit, this strategy by GCCF has resulted in more than 130,000 BP oil spill victims being forced to become Plaintiffs in MDL 2179.

Mr. Salvesen seeks economic and compensatory damages, in amounts to be determined at trial, and punitive damages.

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Lawsuit Filed in State Court Against Kenneth R. Feinberg, Feinberg Rozen, LLP and Gulf Coast Claims Facility

Posted in BP, Feinberg, Fraud, GCCF, Gross Negligence, Gulf Coast Claims Facility, lawsuit by renergie on March 2, 2011

Lawsuit Filed Against Kenneth R. Feinberg, Feinberg Rozen, LLP and
Gulf Coast Claims Facility
__________________

Complaint Alleges Gross Negligence, Fraud, Fraudulent Inducement and Unjust Enrichment

Tampa, FL (March 2, 2011) – A first-of-its-kind lawsuit has been filed in state court in Florida against Kenneth R. Feinberg, Feinberg Rozen, LLP and Gulf Coast Claims Facility (“GCCF”). The 42-page complaint, filed by Attorney Brian J. Donovan on behalf of Pinellas Marine Salvage, Inc. and Mr. John Mavrogiannis alleges, in part, gross negligence, fraud, fraudulent inducement and unjust enrichment on the part of the defendants.

Pinellas Marine Salvage, Inc., a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Florida, is a full-service marine salvage facility on the west coast of Florida serving the Gulf Coast states of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida. The company was founded in January, 1997 by Mavrogiannis for the purpose of addressing a strong market need for used and refurbished marine parts, supplies and vessels. As a result of the actions of the defendants, the company is struggling to survive.

Feinberg, acting through and as Managing Partner of Feinberg Rozen, established GCCF to independently administer and where appropriate settle and authorize the payment of certain claims asserted against BP as a result of the explosion at the Deepwater Horizon rig and consequent spillage of oil into the Gulf of Mexico.

In their lawsuit, the plaintiffs allege, in part: (a) the defendants, without any legal authority for doing so, circumvent many of the  rights provided to victims of the BP oil spill under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990; (b) the defendants employ a “Delay, Deny, Defend” strategy against claimants. This strategy, commonly used by unscrupulous insurance companies, is as follows: Delay payment, starve claimant, and then offer the economically and emotionally-stressed claimant a miniscule percent of all damages to which the claimant is entitled. If the financially ruined claimant rejects the settlement offer, he or she may sue; (c) the defendants delay payment by telling claimants, “claims will be paid within 90 days after substantiation.” Unbeknownst to the claimants, substantiation means “the claim has been received and reviewed by GCCF.” This definition of substantiation allows a claim to be received and held “under review” indefinitely by GCCF. When GCCF finally “substantiates” the claim, the claimant is told he or she will be paid within 90 days; (d) Feinberg uses the fear of costly and protracted litigation to coerce claimants to accept grossly inadequate settlements from GCCF.  During widely-reported town hall meetings organized to promote GCCF, Feinberg repeatedly tells victims of the BP oil spill: “The litigation route in court will mean uncertainty, years of delay and a big cut for the lawyers.” and “I take the position, if I don’t find you eligible, no court will find you eligible;” and (e) Feinberg misleads claimants by advising during well-reported town hall meetings, on a number of occasions, potential claimants that the fund which he administers is fully funded in the amount of $20 billion. At the end of 2010, the most the fund would have had in its escrow account would have been $5 billion.

Pinellas Marine Salvage, Inc. and Mavrogiannis seek economic and compensatory damages, in amounts to be determined at trial, and punitive damages.

Brian J. Donovan can be reached at BrianJDonovan@verizon.net.

UPDATE

A very different perspective is provided in the following excerpt from an article titled “Pinellas Marine Salvage sues Feinberg over oil spill claim” which appeared in the Tampa Bay Business Journal on March 11, 2011:

Carl Nelson, a shareholder at Fowler White in Tampa, represents 450 businesses – including national companies with nearly 2000 locations – bringing claims related to the spill. His experiences are counter to those outlined in the Mavrogiannis complaint.

“We’ve been treated quite nicely,” Nelson said. “We know how to do it. We’re using economists and forensic accountants.”

Under OPA, the party responsible for a spill is obligated to set up a claims process and to pay claimants that satisfy the conditions set up in the process, Nelson said. The remedy allowed in the law for claimants that satisfy the requirements but are not paid is to sue the responsible party.

“If my clients are not satisfied, then we’ll sue BP,” he said. “Feinberg has no duty to pay anybody.

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BP Oil Spill Victims: Kenneth Feinberg Should Not be the Sole Focus of Anger

BP Oil Spill Victims: Kenneth Feinberg Should Not be the Sole Focus of Anger

By Brian J. Donovan

December 30, 2010

The Gulf Coast Claims Facility (GCCF) was meant to replace the inefficient claims process which BP had established to fulfill its obligations as a responsible party pursuant to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA). BP and the Obama administration agreed to appoint Kenneth Feinberg, a Washington lawyer and Democratic Party supporter who administered the claims process for victims of 9/11, to run the allegedly independent GCCF. Unfortunately, in lieu of ensuring that BP oil spill victims are made whole, the primary goal of GCCF and Feinberg is the limitation of BP’s liability via the systematic postponement, reduction and denial of claims against BP.

Feinberg has been both admired and vilified as the administrator of GCCF. An article in the January issue of the ABA Journal refers to Feinberg as a “Master of Disasters.” Conversely, on December 21, 2010, members of the plaintiffs’ bar filed a Motion in federal court asking Judge Carl J. Barbier to intervene and ensure Feinberg’s comments to GCCF claimants who may be able to sue “are neither confusing nor misleading.” The Motion also questions Feinberg’s independence from BP.

Feinberg is neither a “Master of Disasters” nor the personification of evil. “Administrator” Feinberg is merely a defense attorney zealously advocating on behalf of his client BP.

Anger can be wasted energy which overwhelms and debilitates victims. However, anger, properly channeled, can also serve to motivate victims to take action. In the case of the BP oil spill, victims should not focus their anger on Feinberg but should properly channel their anger by focusing on: (a) an administration that ignores the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and refuses to hold BP accountable; (b) a Congress that introduces unnecessary, and potentially unconstitutional, retroactive legislation in response to the BP oil spill; and (c) a plaintiffs’ bar that values profit over justice.

THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION

Failure of President Obama to Partially Federalize the BP Oil Spill Incident
“Under OPA, BP, the responsible party, has the primary responsibility to clean up its oil spill” had been repeated, in one form or another, so many times by President Obama that it became the truth. The truth is that President Obama, under OPA, had the primary responsibility to “ensure effective and immediate removal of a discharge, and mitigation or prevention of a substantial threat of a discharge, of oil.”

Simply stated, Section 4201 of OPA provided President Obama with three options:
(1) perform cleanup immediately (“federalize” the spill);
(2) monitor the response efforts of the spiller; or
(3) direct the spiller’s cleanup activities.

Pursuant to OPA Section 4201, and given that the BP oil spill was a “discharge posing substantial threat to public health or welfare,” President Obama should have federalized the collection of the oil that was released into the sea and the restoration of the coastal areas impacted by the oil. Both of these activities could have been done without having to federalize the operational priority of stopping the flow of oil from the well.

The failure of President Obama to partially federalize the BP oil spill incident, allowed BP to:
(a) use an excessive and unprecedented amount of dispersant both on the surface and underwater. This toxic “out-of-sight, out-of-mind” strategy resulted in tiny dispersed droplets of oil sinking or remaining suspended in deep water rather than floating to the surface and collecting in a continuous slick. Rather than being collected, the dispersed oil is now on the seabed, where it is toxic food for microscopic organisms at the bottom of the food chain and will eventually wind up in shellfish and other organisms; and
(b) prohibit independent measurement of the amount of oil being released into the Gulf of Mexico by unbiased third party scientists and engineers. BP, with the full support of the federal government, knowingly and systematically underestimated the size of the gusher to limit the financial impact on the company. Under the Clean Water Act (CWA), BP faces fines of up to $4,300 for each barrel spilled. Furthermore, pursuant to Section 2702 of OPA 90, BP should be required to pay royalties (18.75%) owed to the federal government for the oil gushing from the well.

Negotiation of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust
On June 16, 2010, President Obama announced that BP agreed to set aside $20 billion to pay economic damage claims to individuals and businesses affected by the Deepwater Horizon incident. The White House press release stated, “BP will provide assurance for these commitments by setting aside $20 billion in U.S. assets.”

BP created the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust on August 6, 2010. The Trust Agreement provides, “To secure the payment and performance of its obligations to make the contributions to the Trust hereunder, BP hereby agrees to grant, convey, and/or assign to the Trust first priority perfected security interests in production payments pertaining to BP’s U.S. oil and natural gas production.”

The fact that future production payments pertaining to BP’s U.S. oil and natural gas production, rather than hard U.S. assets, are being used as collateral by BP guarantees BP’s continued long-term operation in the offshore Gulf of Mexico E&P sector. Ironically, the federal government has acquired a vested interest in ensuring the financial well-being of BP.

Given that BP’s financial health and its ability to meet its obligations under GCCF are now tied together, CWA fines and OPA royalty payments for each barrel of oil spilled will most likely be kept to a minimum.

Failure of President Obama to Block BP’s Tax Credit
Adding insult to injury, on July 27, 2010, BP revealed that it is taking a charge of $32.2 billion (and thereby claiming a $9.9 billion tax credit) to reflect the impact of the Gulf of Mexico oil spill, including costs to date of $2.9 billion for the response and a charge of $29.3 billion for future costs, including the funding of the $20 billion escrow fund.

During negotiations with BP in regard to creating the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust, President Obama failed to even mention that BP should not claim a tax credit. As a result, BP is allowed to substantially offset the amount it is paying to meet its responsibilities for cleanup and compensating victims. In short, President Obama has permitted BP to shift these costs indirectly to U.S. taxpayers.

Failure of President Obama to Fully Utilize the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF)
During town hall meetings organized to promote GCCF, Feinberg repeatedly tells victims of the BP oil spill, “the litigation route in court will mean uncertainty, years of delay and a big cut for the lawyers.” “I am determined to come up with a system that will be more generous, more beneficial, than if you go and file a lawsuit.” “It is not in your interest to tie up you and the courts in years of uncertain protracted litigation when there is an alternative that has been created,” Feinberg says. He adds, “I take the position, if I don’t find you eligible, no court will find you eligible.” Feinberg and the Obama administration intentionally fail to mention that litigation is not the only alternative to GCCF. A financially viable OSLTF is a better alternative.

Under OPA, claims for damages must be presented first to the responsible party. 33 U.S.C. § 2713(a) In the event that a claim for damages is either denied or not paid by the responsible party within 90 days, the claimant may elect to commence an action in court against the responsible party or to present the claim to OSLTF. 33 U.S.C. § 2713(c)

Although Congress created OSLTF in 1986, Congress did not authorize its use or provide taxing authority to support it until after the Exxon Valdez incident in 1989. OPA, signed into law on August 18, 1990, provided the statutory authorization and funding necessary for OSLTF. The National Pollution Funds Center (NPFC), an administrative agency of USCG, manages OSLTF and acts as the implementing agency of OPA. Since 2003, USCG has operated in the Department of Homeland Security.

A primary purpose of OSLTF is to compensate persons for removal costs and damages resulting from an oil spill incident. In essence, OSLTF is an insurance policy, or backstop, for victims of an oil spill incident who are not fully compensated by the responsible party.

As Representative Lent explained in urging passage of OPA, “The thrust of this legislation is to eliminate, to the extent possible, the need for an injured person to seek recourse through the litigation process.” Prior to OPA, federal funding for oil spill damage recovery was difficult for private parties. To address this issue, Congress established OSLTF under section 9509 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C. 9509).

OSLTF is currently funded by: a per barrel tax of 8 cents on petroleum products either produced in the United States or imported from other countries, reimbursements from responsible parties for costs of removal and damages, fines and penalties paid pursuant to various statutes, and interest earned on U.S. Treasury investments. On September 30, 2010, the unaudited OSLTF balance was approximately $1.69 billion.

OSLTF: The Issue of Subrogation
Any person, including OSLTF, who pays compensation pursuant to OPA to any claimant for damages shall be subrogated to all rights, claims, and causes of action that the claimant has under any other law. 33 U.S.C. § 2715(a) Moreover, at the request of the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, the Attorney General shall commence an action on behalf of OSLTF  to recover any compensation paid by OSLTF to any claimant pursuant to OPA, and all costs incurred by OSLTF by reason of the claim, including interest (including prejudgment interest), administrative and adjudicative costs, and attorney’s fees. Such an action may be commenced against any responsible party or guarantor, or against any other person who is liable, pursuant to any law, to the compensated claimant or to OSLTF, for the cost or damages for which the compensation was paid. 33 U.S.C. § 2715(c)

CONGRESS

Proposed Retroactive OPA Legislation
The maximum amount which may be paid from OSLTF with respect to any single incident shall not exceed $1 billion. 26 U.S.C. § 9509(c)(2)(A) Furthermore, except in the case of payments of removal costs, a payment may be made from OSLTF only if the amount in OSLTF after such payment will not be less than $30,000,000. 26 U.S.C. § 9509(c)(2)(B)

The cost of this catastrophic BP oil spill will far exceed the current OSLTF per incident expenditure limit. In response, since the BP oil spill disaster of April, 2010, several bills have been introduced in Congress to amend OPA to increase the liability limit of the responsible party and OSLTF’s per incident expenditure limit for oil spills. For example, H.R. 4213, the American Jobs and Closing Tax Loopholes Act, passed by the House on May 28, 2010, includes provisions that would raise the per barrel tax used to fund OSLTF to 34 cents and increases the per incident expenditure limit to $5 billion, including up to $2.5 billion in natural resource damage claims.

An important question is whether this legislation can and should be applied retroactively to the BP oil spill disaster of April, 2010. The constitutional issues that may be raised from retroactive application of this legislation are based on the Ex Post Facto Clause, Substantive Due Process, the Takings Clause, the Bill of Attainder Clause, and the Impairment of Contracts Clause.

OSLTF: The Need to Properly Define “Expenditure”
This is an incident of first impression for OSLTF. The BP oil spill of April 22, 2010, a catastrophic oil spill incident, represents the first time that the viability of OSLTF has been threatened. Federal statutes and relevant regulations neither specifically address such a scenario nor provide authority for further compensation. However, OPA legislative history and statements from OPA drafters indicate that drafters intended OSLTF to cover “catastrophic spills.”

The question is if an expenditure is reimbursed, is it still an expenditure? OSLTF is established under Internal Revenue Code. 26 U.S.C § 9509 Under the Internal Revenue Code, a reimbursed expenditure is not deductible. It is not considered to be an expenditure. Therefore, under OSLTF, why should an expenditure, reimbursed by the responsible party, be defined as an expenditure?

Legislative history and the Internal Revenue Code strongly support the conclusion that, in the case of a catastrophic oil spill, the proper definition of the term “expenditure,” under OSLTF, means “an expenditure that is not reimbursed by the responsible party.”

The advantage of defining an expenditure, under OSLTF, as “an expenditure that is not reimbursed by the responsible party,” is twofold:
(a) It eliminates, without the need to pass retroactive legislation, the $1 billion cap which may be paid from the OSLTF with respect to any single incident and allows OSLTF to maintain a balance of at least $1 billion for the purpose of paying claims for damages resulting from other oil spill incidents. As the OSLTF pool of $1 billion is depleted by payments made to oil spill claimants, it is replenished, by virtue of subrogation, by reimbursements made to OSLTF by the responsible party; and
(b) It ensures that the cost of a catastrophic oil spill incident shall be borne by the responsible party, not the federal taxpayer.

THE PLAINTIFFS’ BAR

Class Action Lawsuits
On December 21, 2010, attorneys representing victims of the BP oil spill of April, 2010 filed a Motion in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana requesting Judge Carl J. Barbier to issue an order governing ex parte communication between the BP Defendants and putative class members.

Specifically, the plaintiffs’ attorneys seek to ensure that Feinberg’s communications with putative class members are neither “confusing nor misleading.”

The Motion notes, in part, that “Feinberg has, in various ways, communicated the following messages to both represented parties and putative class members:
• Don’t seek the advice of a lawyer;
• If you litigate, it will take years;
• If you hire a lawyer, he or she will take 40% of your recovery;
• I, and the GCCF, are “independent;”
• We are making “independent” findings or determinations regarding the merits of your claims;
• I will give you more money than you will get (with another lawyer) in litigation; and
• My offer will be based upon the best available independent scientific evidence.”

This Motion filed by the plaintiffs’ attorneys is disingenuous and self-serving. If Feinberg is ordered to ensure that his communications are neither “confusing or misleading,” then the BP plaintiffs’ attorneys should also be ordered to inform their potential clients of the following:

I. A class action lawsuit, brought pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, was never intended to address mass torts. The Supreme Court observed that, while the text of Rule 23(b)(3) does not preclude certification in cases with significant damages, the drafters “had dominantly in mind” the use of the class action to aggregate relatively small individual recoveries into a case that would be worthwhile for an attorney to litigate. Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S.Ct. at 2244.

II. Given that the damages suffered by the vast majority of individual potential plaintiffs as a result of the BP oil spill of April, 2010 are potentially so great, it should be economically feasible for many individual plaintiffs to file individual lawsuits. Here, class treatment would not be necessary to permit effective litigation of the claim. An individual lawsuit will: (a) ensure the plaintiff that the plaintiff’s attorney has his or her best interests in mind; (b) protect the plaintiff’s due process rights; (c) ensure that the plaintiff is not a victim of a so-called “faux” class action case, i.e., a case in which individual class members receive little or no compensation and only plaintiffs‘ counsel stand to benefit from class certification; (d) give the plaintiff control over the prosecution of the case; (e) allow the plaintiff to present evidence of exposure, injury, and damages relating to his or her particular claim; and (f) allow the plaintiff to make the decision on whether or when to settle.

III. BP, the responsible party, is a powerful and well-funded defendant, does not lack imagination or incentive to pose innumerable legal barriers, and will aggressively assert its legal rights and otherwise use the law, the courts and the judicial system to serve its interests. BP can afford to stall, and actually benefits from delay, but its victims cannot afford to wait for years to be fully compensated for their losses.

IV. In the event that a claim for damages is either denied or not paid by GCCF within 90 days, the claimant should immediately present the claim to OSLTF prior to commencing an action in court against BP, et al.

CONCLUSION

As of the date of this article, it has been 254 days since the blowout of the BP offshore well in the Gulf of Mexico.

In lieu of ensuring that BP oil spill victims are made whole, the primary goal of GCCF and Feinberg is the limitation of BP’s liability via the systematic postponement, reduction and denial of claims against BP. Victims of the BP oil spill must understand that “Administrator” Feinberg is merely a defense attorney zealously advocating on behalf of his client BP.

Victims of the BP oil spill should not focus their anger on Feinberg but should properly channel their anger by focusing on: (a) an administration that refuses to hold BP accountable and ensure that victims of the BP oil spill are fully compensated via OSLTF; (b) a Congress that introduces unnecessary, and potentially unconstitutional, retroactive legislation in response to the BP oil spill; and (c) a plaintiffs’ bar that values profit over justice.

The question is whether victims of the BP oil spill will have to pay three times: (a) once for the massive BP oil spill, the environmental and economic damages of which will devastate their way of life and leave many in financial ruin; (b) again by being mislead by the Obama administration and undercompensated by GCCF; and (c) a third time for daring to demand justice, which will consume their time, energy and hopes for years to come if they are held hostage by protracted class action or individual lawsuits.

It is the Obama administration’s duty to guarantee the claims process established by BP provides at least the same protections and rights mandated by OPA. The Secretary of DHS is uniquely positioned, and has a duty pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 2715(c), to ensure that victims of the BP oil spill are: (a) not victimized by BP/GCCF; (b) not forced into joining class action lawsuits by the Plaintiffs’ Bar; and (c) made whole by the OSLTF.

The primary focus of anger for BP oil spill victims should center on the fact that there is no need to be held hostage by GCCF. A victim of the BP oil spill may merely present a claim for damages to BP/GCCF and wait 90 days. If BP/GCCF does not pay the claim, the victim may present the claim to OSLTF. At that point, OSLTF may pay the victim and then the U.S. Attorney General may commence an action on behalf of OSLTF against BP and collect the amount from BP. “Any person, including OSLTF, who pays compensation pursuant to OPA to any claimant for damages shall be subrogated to all rights, claims, and causes of action that the claimant has under any other law.” Moreover, once “expenditure” is properly defined,  it eliminates, without the need to pass retroactive legislation, the $1 billion cap which may be paid from OSLTF with respect to any single incident. As the OSLTF pool of $1 billion is depleted by payments made to oil spill claimants, it is replenished, by virtue of subrogation, by reimbursements made to OSLTF by the responsible party.

Brian J. Donovan can be reached at BrianJDonovan@verizon.net.

UPDATE

Second Lawsuit Filed Against Kenneth R. Feinberg, Feinberg Rozen, LLP and Gulf Coast Claims Facility

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