The BP Oil Spill Multidistrict Litigation (“MDL 2179”) Is Not Right for America
MDL 2179 is a “Faux” Class Settlement Wrapped in a “Faux” MDL
Brian J. Donovan
Tampa, FL (August 12, 2013) – Robert Dudley, CEO of BP, recently told Bloomberg Businessweek he believes the deal BP made with the MDL 2179 plaintiffs’ steering committee to complete the process of paying legitimate victims of the oil spill is “not right for America.” Dudley stated, “… millions of dollars are going out to pay people who suffered, in many cases, no losses from the spill. And this is just not right. I don’t think it’s right for America. When you make an agreement and you don’t have the faith and the trust that agreement is going to be interpreted the way you expect, it’s not good for America.”
MDL 2179 is not right for America, but not for the reasons set forth by Dudley.
The “Faux” MDL 2179
Judicial economy is undoubtedly well-served by MDL consolidation when scores of similar cases are pending in the courts. Regrettably, for victims of the BP oil spill, MDL 2179 is a “faux” MDL – i.e., an MDL that limits the liability of the defendants, grants excessive compensation to the members of the Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee (“PSC”) and other counsel performing common benefit work, and fails to adequately compensate the plaintiffs.
MDL 2179 is a “faux” MDL primarily because of: (a) the manner in which Kenneth R. Feinberg was permitted by the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (“JPML”) and the MDL 2179 Court to administer the BP compensation fund; and (b) the terms and conditions of the BP/PSC class settlement agreement.
Feinberg’s Administration of the BP Compensation Fund
On August 10, 2010, the JPML formally established MDL 2179. In its Transfer Order, the JPML states, “Centralization may also facilitate closer coordination with Kenneth Feinberg’s administration of the BP compensation fund.” The JPML made it clear, from the very beginning, that the purpose of centralization was not merely to eliminate duplicative discovery, prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, and conserve the resources of the parties, their counsel, and the judiciary; and serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the more just and efficient conduct of the BP oil spill cases. Here, the purpose of centralization was to maximize judicial economy via the creation of a “faux” class settlement wrapped in a “faux” MDL.
On August 23, 2010, Feinberg Rozen, LLP, doing business as GCCF, replaced the claims process which BP had established to fulfill its obligations as a responsible party pursuant to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (“OPA”).
In violation of OPA, GCCF‘s approach to determining claimant eligibility was driven by two factors: (1) loss location; and (2) claimant business type.
GCCF employed two strategies to limit BP’s liability:
(a) an “Expedited Emergency Advance Payment (EAP) Denial” strategy. This strategy is as follows: “Fail to verify, investigate, and appraise the amount of loss claimed by the claimant in the EAP claim and deny the EAP claim without ever requesting supporting documentation from the claimant;” and
(b) a “Delay, Deny, Defend” strategy against legitimate oil spill victims. This strategy, commonly used by unscrupulous insurance companies, is as follows: “Delay payment, starve claimant, and then offer the economically and emotionally-stressed claimant a miniscule percent of all damages to which the claimant is entitled. If the financially ruined claimant rejects the settlement offer, he or she may sue.”
The ultimate objective of Feinberg’s “Expedited EAP Denial” strategy and “Delay, Deny, Defend” strategy was to limit BP’s liability by obtaining a signed “Release and Covenant Not to Sue” from as many BP oil spill victims as possible.
The “Release and Covenant Not to Sue” requirement forces economically and emotionally-stressed victims of the BP oil spill to sign a release and covenant not to sue in order to receive a miniscule payment amount for all damages, including future damages, they incur as a result of the BP oil spill. Feinberg’s “Release and Covenant Not to Sue” requirement violates OPA, State contract law, and is contrary to public policy.
The “Expedited EAP Denial” strategy and “Delay, Deny, Defend” strategy, although unconscionable, have proven to be very effective for Feinberg and BP:
(a) GCCF forced 84.68% of the claimants to sign a “Release and Covenant Not to Sue” in which the claimant agreed not to sue BP and all other potentially liable parties;
(b) Only 15.32% of the claimants were not required to sign a “Release and Covenant Not to Sue” in order to be paid;
(c) GCCF denied payment to approximately 61.46% of the claimants who filed claims;
(d) The average total amount paid per claimant by GCCF was a paltry $27,466.47; and
In sum, BP is responsible for the oil spill incident; Feinberg, et al. (independent contractors), via employment of their “Expedited EAP Denial” strategy and “Delay, Deny, Defend” strategy, are responsible for not compensating and thereby financially ruining BP oil spill victims.
On March 8, 2012, the MDL 2179 Court terminated Feinberg and the GCCF claims process and appointed Patrick Juneau as the claims administrator for the transition to the court supervised claims program. On May 2, 2012, Juneau was appointed as Claims Administrator to oversee the claims administration vendors, that will process the claims in accordance with the class settlement agreement. Under Juneau, the evaluation and processing of claims shall continue to be performed by Garden City Group, Inc., BrownGreer, PLC, and PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP. Accordingly, there is little reason to believe that the percentage of claimants denied payment and the average total amount paid per claimant will change under Juneau.
Theoretically, the JPML does not have power over state courts. In reality, corporations with deep pockets, and politically well-connected defendants, are easily able to circumvent this slight inconvenience through procedural gamesmanship – i.e., the baseless removal of a case from state to federal court for the sole purpose of subsequently being able to immediately file a Notice of Tag-Along Case with the JPML for the transfer of the case to an MDL before any court has the opportunity to either rule on the jurisdiction of the action or reach the merits of Plaintiff’s claims in the action. The JPML’s facilitation of this type of procedural gamesmanship, although politically expedient and judicially efficient, is unjust and makes a mockery of the U.S. judicial system.
Refusal by the MDL 2179 Court and the PSC to Hold Feinberg Accountable
Kenneth R. Feinberg and Feinberg Rozen, LLP, D.B.A. GCCF are neither named Defendants in any master complaint in MDL 2179 nor on the list of “Released Parties” in the Economic and Property Damages Settlement Agreement.
In sum, the MDL 2179 Court concedes that it never contemplated Feinberg, et al. would be Defendants in MDL 2179. Nevertheless, the MDL 2179 Court and the PSC effectively ensure that Feinberg, et al. will not be held accountable in the near future by the following means:
(a) All pending and future motions to remand are continued without date in MDL 2179.
Pursuant to the MDL 2179 Court’s Pretrial Order No. 15 (Rec. Doc. 676), “Pending further orders of this Court, all pending and future motions, including Motions to Remand, are continued without date unless a motion is specifically excepted from the continuance by the Court.” Furthermore, pursuant to the MDL 2179 Court’s Pretrial Order No. 25 (Rec. Doc. 983), “All individual petitions or complaints that fall within Pleading Bundles B1, B3, D1, or D2, whether pre-existing or filed hereafter, are stayed until further order of the Court.”
In sum, any lawsuit filed against Feinberg, et al., in state or federal court, will be transferred to MDL 2179 and stayed (“warehoused”) indefinitely until Judge Barbier decides to remand the case to the transferor federal court.
(b) The MDL 2179 Court has declined to permit discovery on Feinberg or the GCCF.
On September 5, 2011, Stephen J. Herman, Plaintiffs’ Liaison Counsel in MDL 2179, stated, “please be advised that the [MDL 2179] Court has, thus far, declined to permit formal discovery on Feinberg or the GCCF.”
It is important to note that formal discovery on Feinberg and the GCCF, and the associated pressure of a trial, would have been required in order to have exerted sufficient pressure on the parties to negotiate a settlement which reflected the true value of the claims and not one which focuses on minimizing the liability of the defendants. This did not occur. Without formal discovery on Feinberg and the GCCF certain claims by private individuals and businesses for economic loss resulting from the operation of the GCCF may never be properly resolved.
Generally, Courts have held the excessive delay and “marginalization of juror fact finding” (i.e., dearth of jury trials) sometimes associated with traditional MDL practice are developments that cannot be defended. Delaventura v. Columbia Acorn Trust, 417 F. Supp. 2d at 153 (D. Mass. 2006). MDL 2179 is an exception.
The Supreme Court has held that a district court conducting pretrial proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1407(a) has no authority to invoke 28 U.S.C. §1404(a) to assign a transferred case to itself for trial. Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998).
Justice Souter, in delivering the opinion of the Court in Lexecon, explained “28 U. S. C. §1407(a) authorizes the JPML to transfer civil actions with common issues of fact ‘to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings,’ but imposes a duty on the Panel to remand any such action to the original district ‘at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings.’ ‘Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the Panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have been previously terminated.’ 28 U.S.C. §1407(a). The issue here is whether a district court conducting such ‘pretrial proceedings’ may invoke 28 U.S.C. §1404(a) to assign a transferred case to itself for trial. We hold it has no such authority.”
Justice Souter pointed out that “the Panel’s instruction comes in terms of the mandatory ‘shall,’ which normally creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion. Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U. S. 482, 485 (1947). In the absence of any indication that there might be circumstances in which a transferred case would be neither ‘terminated’ nor subject to the remand obligation, then, the statutory instruction stands flatly at odds with reading the phrase ‘coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings’ so broadly as to reach its literal limits, allowing a transferee court’s self-assignment to trump the provision imposing the Panel’s remand duty. If we do our job of reading the statute whole, we have to give effect to this plain command, see Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U. S. 469, 476 (1992), even if doing that will reverse the longstanding practice under the statute and the rule, see Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo (1995) (“Age is no antidote to clear inconsistency with a statute.” (quoting Brown v. Gardner, 513 U. S 115, 122 (1994))).”
While the need to promote efficiency in litigation is real, “age is no antidote” to the clear promotion and facilitation of “faux” MDLs by the JPML.
The BP/PSC Class Settlement Agreement
BP and the PSC reported settlement negotiations began “in earnest” in February 2011 for two distinct class action settlements: a Medical Benefits Settlement and an Economic and Property Damages Settlement.” In sum, the PSC initiated settlement negotiations “in earnest” merely four (4) months after Judge Barbier appointed members to the PSC. Clearly, the MDL 2179 class settlement was not achieved in the full context of adversarial litigation.
Professor Martin Redish of Northwestern University School of Law argues that settlement class actions undermine the important constitutional values underlying the requirement of adversary adjudication. In such classes, the parties expressly make class certification contingent on the entry of a settlement resolving the litigation. Thus, while settlement classes may have certain attractive aspects, such as reducing litigation expenses, many of the traditional aspects of adversarial litigation are missing. As a result, according to Professor Redish, the settlement class is potentially the product of collusion among the parties: defendants who wish to rid themselves of the burden of litigation and plaintiffs‘ counsel who wish to receive immediate compensation. Redish further argues settlement class actions are flat-out unconstitutional because there is no “case or controversy,” a constitutional requirement for making a federal case out of something. Since the lawyers are all on the same side, he says, the only losers are plaintiffs who are forever barred from suing over the matter again. This is precisely what has happened in MDL 2179.
The court in Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3rd Cir. 1996), noted that the presentation of class action cases in the form of negotiated settlements for approval by the courts under Rule 23(c) raises a constitutional issue whether there is a justiciable case or controversy. Such cases also raise practical concerns about potential collusion and inadequate representation, as well as the ability of the court to evaluate the merits of the settlement in a non-adversarial context. Georgine, 83 F.3d at 617.
Professor Redish also points out that the opt-out mechanism under Rule 23(b)(3) should be abandoned in favor of an opt-in mechanism that requires absent class members to take some affirmative action before being swept into a class action. Redish believes that allowing due process rights to be waived simply by inaction, as under the current version of the rule, does not sufficiently protect such constitutional rights.
If a class is certified and the class representatives are unsuccessful, the absent class members’ claims will be “legally obliterated” by the result of the litigation, even though they did not actively participate in the suit. Likewise, as many have observed, a class action can reduce the input any particular plaintiff has in the conduct of the case. Where thousands are represented in a single lawsuit, it is simply impossible for them to have the same level of input regarding the prosecution of their claims. Moreover, conflicts among class members inevitably emerge, rendering the class action mechanism an imperfect means of resolving large-scale litigation.
The standard for reviewing a proposed settlement of a class action by courts is whether the proposed settlement is “fair, adequate, and reasonable” and whether it has been entered into without collusion between the parties. Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1331 (5th Cir. 1977); see also Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1027 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Settlement is the offspring of compromise; the question we address is not whether the final product could be prettier, smarter or snazzier, but whether it is fair, adequate, and free from collusion.”).
There is little doubt that any class settlement agreement which: (a) excludes approximately 200,000 claimants from the settlement benefits because they had been forced to sign an unconscionable “Release and Covenant Not to Sue;” and (b) excessively compensates members of the PSC and other counsel performing common benefit work is neither “fair, adequate, and reasonable” nor “free from collusion.”
Dudley is correct. Individuals and businesses that did not suffer damages resulting from the BP oil spill should not be paid. It is important to note, however, that fraudulent claims represent a very small percentage of the total number of claims.
MDL 2179 is “not right for America” because:
(a) it is a “faux” MDL;
(b) it approves a “faux” class settlement agreement which is neither “fair, adequate, and reasonable” nor “free from collusion;”
(c) attorneys, with impunity, are permitted to advise BP to tell Congress, the National Incident Command, and the public that the oil spill flow rate was 5,000 barrels of oil per day when BP engineers were performing internal analyses showing that the flow rate could be up to 20 times greater;
(d) it permits members of the PSC, who are directly appointed by the transferee judge, and other counsel performing common benefit work to be excessively compensated for merely negotiating a settlement agreement;
(e) it allows BP to retain a third-party “claims administrator” to limit its liability, with impunity, via an “Expedited EAP Denial” strategy and a “Delay, Deny, Defend” strategy; and
(f) the JPML, which does not have power over state courts, promotes and facilitates the gamesmanship of the legal system by defendants, i.e., the baseless removal of a case from state to federal court for the sole purpose of subsequently being able to immediately file a Notice of Tag-Along Case with the JPML for the transfer of the case to MDL 2179. The JPML’s facilitation of this type of procedural gamesmanship, although politically expedient and judicially efficient, is unjust and makes a mockery of the U.S. judicial system.
In sum, MDL 2179 is not right for America because it:
(a) allows judicial economy to replace justice; and
(b) denies access to the courts by permitting the desires and influence of corporations with deep pockets, and politically well-connected defendants, to trump the legal rights of the individual.
N.B. – BP paid Feinberg Rozen, LLP a sum of $1.25 million per month to limit its liability (“administer the BP oil spill victims’ compensation fund”).
Has the MDL 2179 Court Overreached Its Authority?
Supreme Court Decision Poses an Interesting Dilemma for the BP Oil Spill Trial Court
Tampa, FL (April 11, 2012) – The Supreme Court has held that a district court conducting pretrial proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1407(a) has no authority to invoke 28 U.S.C. §1404(a) to assign a transferred case to itself for trial. Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998).
On April 8, 2012, Selmer M. Salvesen, a clam farmer in Florida, filed a Motion to Vacate Order and Reasons [As to Motions to Dismiss the B1 Master Complaint] (Rec. Doc. 3830 dated August 26, 2011) with the MDL 2179 court. Mr. Salvesen’s Motion to Vacate poses an interesting dilemma for the BP Oil Spill trial court: (a) Does the court grant the motion to vacate the B1 order thereby derailing the MDL 2179 runaway train? or (b) Does the court ignore the Supreme Court decision in Lexecon in the name of judicial discretion, judicial efficiency, judicial economy and political expediency?
The Lexecon Rule
Justice Souter, in delivering the opinion of the Court in Lexecon, explained 28 U. S. C. §1407(a) authorizes the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (the “Panel”) to transfer civil actions with common issues of fact “to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings,” but imposes a duty on the Panel to remand any such action to the original district “at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings.” “Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have been previously terminated.” 28 U.S.C. §1407(a).
Justice Souter pointed out that the Panel’s instruction comes in terms of the mandatory “shall,” which normally creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion. Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U. S. 482, 485 (1947).
Moreover, the Supreme Court found that neither the statute’s language nor legislative history can unsettle §1407’s straightforward language imposing the Panel’s responsibility to remand, which bars recognizing any self-assignment power in a transferee court and consequently entails the invalidity of the Panel’s Rule 14(b).
The legislative history tends to confirm that self-assignment is beyond the scope of the transferee court’s authority. Justice Souter noted that the same House Report that spoke of the continued vitality of §1404 in §1407 cases also said this:
“The proposed statute affects only the pretrial stages in multidistrict litigation. It would not affect the place of trial in any case or exclude the possibility of transfer under other Federal statutes…..The subsection requires that transferred cases be remanded to the originating district at the close of coordinated pretrial proceedings. The bill does not, therefore, include the trial of cases in the consolidated proceedings.” H. R. Rep. No.1130, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 4 (1968) (Emphasis added)
The comments of the bill’s sponsors further suggest that application of 28 U.S.C. §1407 would not affect the place of trial. See, e.g., Multidistrict Litigation: Hearings on S. 3815 and S. 159 before the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. Pt. 2, p. 110 (1967) (Sen. Tydings) (“[W]hen the deposition and discovery is completed, then the original litigation is remanded to the transferor district for trial”). Both the House and the Senate Reports stated that Congress would have to amend the statute if it determined that multidistrict litigation cases should be consolidated for trial. S. Rep. No. 454, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 5 (1967). (Emphasis added)
In order to efficiently manage MDL 2179, the court consolidated and organized the various types of claims into several “pleading bundles.” The “B1” pleading bundle includes all claims for private or “non-governmental” economic loss and property damages. There are between 100,000 – 130,000 individual claims encompassed within the “B1” pleading bundle.
Rather than allege claims under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (“OPA”) (which governs the MDL 2179 cases alleging economic loss due to the BP oil spill) and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”) (which governs the MDL 2179 personal injury and wrongful death actions and borrows the law of the adjacent state as surrogate federal law), the PSC made the unfathomable decision to allege claims under a hodgepodge of statutes.
In the B1 First Amended Master Complaint, the PSC states, “The claims presented herein are admiralty or maritime claims within the meaning of Rule 9(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs hereby designate this case as an admiralty or maritime case, and request a non-jury trial, pursuant to Rule 9(h).”
Under general maritime law, the PSC alleges claims for negligence, gross negligence and willful misconduct, and strict liability for manufacturing and/or design defect. Under various state laws, the PSC alleges claims for nuisance, trespass, and fraudulent concealment. Under the Florida Pollutant Discharge Prevention and Control Act, Fla. Stat. § 376.011, et seq., PSC alleges a claim for strict liability. The PSC also seeks: (a) punitive damages under all claims; and (b) a declaration by the Court that the conduct of BP and its agents and representatives, including the Gulf Coast Claims Facility (“GCCF”), in obtaining releases and/or assignments of claims against other parties, persons, or entities is not an obligation of BP under OPA.
The PSC appears to be more interested in ensuring significant economy and efficiency in the judicial administration of the MDL 2179 court rather than in obtaining justice for the MDL 2179 plaintiffs. As noted above, in its B1 First Amended Master Complaint, the PSC alleges claims under general maritime law, not under OPA and OCSLA, thereby assisting the court in expeditiously being able to:
(a) Find, “The Deepwater Horizon was at all material times a vessel in navigation.”
(b) Find, “Admiralty jurisdiction is present because the alleged tort occurred upon navigable waters of the Gulf of Mexico, disrupted maritime commerce, and the operations of the vessel bore a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity. With admiralty jurisdiction comes the application of substantive maritime law.”
(c) Find, “State law, both statutory and common, is preempted by maritime law, notwithstanding OPA’s savings provisions. All claims brought under state law are dismissed.”
(d) Find, “General maritime law claims that do not allege physical damage to a proprietary interest are dismissed under the Robins Dry Dock rule, unless the claim falls into the commercial fishermen exception.”
(e) Find, “…. That nothing prohibits Defendants from settling claims for economic loss. While OPA does not specifically address the use of waivers and releases by Responsible Parties, the statute also does not clearly prohibit it. In fact, as the Court has recognized in this Order, one of the goals of OPA was to allow for speedy and efficient recovery by victims of an oil spill.”
In re Oil Spill by the Rig Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, – F. Supp. 2d -, 2011 WL 3805746 (Aug. 26, 2011 E.D. La.).
Since the PSC requests a non-jury trial pursuant to Rule 9(h) and alleges claims under general maritime law, rather than OPA and OCSLA, the MDL 2179 court has formulated a trial plan that dispenses with trial by jury and instead conducts a bench trial applying general maritime law.
The Heyburn Rule
The Honorable John G. Heyburn II, Chair of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, addressed the Lexecon decision in his article, “A View From the Panel: Part of the Solution,” 82 Tulane L. Rev. 2225 (2008). The following is an excerpt from Judge Heyburn’s article.
Judge Heyburn points out that five appropriate strategies are available by which the Lexecon conundrum may be avoided:
(a) Provided the plaintiff is amenable and venue lies in the transferee district, the action could be refiled there.
(b) The parties could also agree to waive objections to venue.
(c) Alternatively, the transferee court could try a “Bellwether” case that was originally filed in the transferee district, the result of which may promote settlement of the transferred actions in the MDL.
(d) Another option, suggested in the Lexecon opinion itself, is for the transferor court to transfer the action back to the transferee court under § 1404(a).
(e) Still another option would be for the transferee judge to follow the action to the transferor court after obtaining an intracircuit or intercircuit assignment.
The MDL 2179 court has failed to avail itself of any of these “appropriate” strategies.
A “Bellwether” trial is sui generis; a “walks like a duck, quacks like a duck, it must be a duck” analysis cannot be used. Judge Barbier cannot try the cases transferred for “pretrial proceedings.” Judge Barbier certainly cannot try all of the plaintiffs’ claims in the aggregate in this proceeding. Nor can the Lexecon decision be circumvented by the device of permitting claimants to file “short-form joinders” injecting themselves into the limitation action. Accordingly, Judge Barbier, at the request of the PSC, formulated a non-jury trial plan which does not seek to adjudicate all the plaintiffs’ claims in the aggregate. Instead, it plans a non-jury trial of “issues” related to “allocation of fault” in the abstract. This novel proposal is still defective, as a trial of “issues” would try parts of actions that under Lexecon the MDL judge must not try and would amount to a class action in a limitations proceeding contrary to Rule 23. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit has held that class actions are not permitted in limitation proceedings. Lloyds Leasing Ltd. v. Bates, 902 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1990). Indeed, such a trial resembles an unsanctioned class action in almost everything but name. It does not remotely resemble a “Bellwether” trial.
Although Judge Barbier and the PSC refer to the MDL 2179 court’s “broad discretionary authority,” a “special-procedure” should not be crafted where a mandatory procedure already exists. It is important to remember that the very MDL procedures Judge Barbier and the PSC wish to circumvent were specifically enacted to reduce costs and promote judicial economy. Allowing the MDL 2179 trial plan would be inconsistent with the clear statutory mandate of the multidistrict litigation enabling statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a), and the Supreme Court’s holding in Lexecon. While the need to promote efficiency in litigation is real, it cannot be accomplished by overriding the applicable provisions set forth by Congress. In re: FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Products Liability Litigation, 2009 WL 2390668 (United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana).
Judge Heyburn describes the Lexecon decision as a “conundrum” which may be avoided by “resourceful” transferee judges. Plaintiff Salvesen respectfully disagrees. The Lexecon decision is not a conundrum. It is not an obstacle which judicial discretion may circumvent in the name of judicial efficiency, judicial economy or political expediency. It is the law.