The Donovan Law Group

BP Oil Spill: Macondo Well Could Have Been Shut in Within 24 Days!

BP Oil Spill: Plaintiffs’ Phase Two Post-Trial Brief

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Had BP Prepared for a Deepwater Blowout, With a Capping Stack Available on April 20, 2010,

the Well Could Have Likely Been Shut in Within 24 Days or Less

Tampa, FL (December 22, 2013) – Phase Two was divided into two segments: the Source Control segment and the Quantification segment. The Source Control segment was tried as a bench trial before the MDL 2179 Court beginning on September 30, 2013, and concluding on October 3, 2013. The Quantification segment was tried as a bench trial before the MDL 2179 Court beginning on October 7, 2013, and concluding on October 17, 2013.

On December 20, 2013, Plaintiffs submitted their Post-Trial Brief to address specific legal and factual issues raised by the Court and by the Parties based on the evidence admitted during the Phase One and Phase Two Limitation and Liability Trial. The following are excerpts from this brief.

Plaintiffs contend, “It was established at trial that BP consciously disregarded the need to prepare for an uncontrolled deepwater blowout and willfully extended the capping of the Macondo Well by intentionally concealing material information and affirmatively misleading the U.S. Government and others regarding the volume of hydrocarbons escaping from the well after the blowout.”

The question is whether BP’s overall conduct – as evidenced by not only the Phase Two issues of post-spill lying to the Government and pre-spill lack of preparedness, but also the Phase One issues of fast and reckless drilling, establishing and maintaining a dysfunctional leadership team, proceeding with the cement job without reliable test results, proceeding with the displacement despite a failed negative pressure test, refusing to correct known and persistent maintenance failures, and recklessly selecting, configuring, and refusing to upgrade the BOP – demonstrates a willful, wanton and reckless disregard for the environment, the property rights of others, and/or public health and safety.

With respect to the Phase Two evidence in particular, BP did not dispute the fact that BP did absolutely nothing in advance of the Macondo incident on April 20, 2010 to develop source control plans and equipment in preparation for a possible deepwater blowout. BP simply attempts to muster, in its defense, an argument that the Government allegedly “approved” of its lack of preparation and that others in the industry allegedly failed to do the same.

Based on the law and on the evidence submitted in the Phase One and Phase Two Trial, BP’s corporate conduct associated with the Macondo Well explosion, fire, blowout and resulting spill was willful, wanton and reckless, and was a direct result of BP corporate policies and/or with the knowledge, approval and/or ratification of BP officers with policymaking authority.

A Finding of Willful, Wanton or Reckless Conduct Should Be Made on the Series and Accumulation of Acts and Omissions Established by the Evidence Admitted in the Phase One and Phase Two Trial

As set forth in Plaintiffs’ Phase One Post-Trial submissions, an accumulation or series of negligent acts or omissions are properly viewed together in order to determine whether the defendant has acted out of gross negligence, willful misconduct, or a wanton or reckless disregard.

Hence, the burden is not on Plaintiffs to show that BP’s pre-spill planning, in and of itself, rises to the level of wanton, willful or reckless conduct. Nor are the plaintiffs required to show that BP’s post-spill intentional misconduct, in and of itself, caused or contributed to the uncontrolled flowing of the well for 87 days.

Rather, it is only Plaintiffs’ burden to show that BP’s (i) pre-spill failure to plan, combined with BP’s (ii) post-spill intentional misrepresentations and concealment – combined with BP’s (iii) fast and reckless drilling, with little or no regard for the safe kick margin, despite multiple kicks, and in violation of the MMS Regulations requiring a safe drilling margin; (iv) creating, maintaining and largely ignoring a dangerously dysfunctional leadership team, which embraced the corporate culture of cutting costs and maximizing profits; (v) proceeding with the cement job without a set of reliable test results confirming the slurry’s stability; (vi) proceeding with the displacement despite a failed negative pressure test; (vii) selecting, configuring, sequencing, modifying, and refusing to upgrade the safety critical BOP, which was not sufficient or appropriate for the Macondo well; and (viii) knowingly refusing to correct the persistent maintenance failures of safety critical equipment on the Deepwater Horizon – evidences a willful and reckless disregard for the environment, the property rights of others, and/or public health and safety.

The Phase Two evidence, in this respect, cannot be untethered from the Phase One evidence, in making the overall determination of BP’s state of mind with respect to the damages and effects of the Macondo disaster.

Nevertheless, the Phase Two evidence, standing alone, establishes that BP was wanton and reckless in both its pre-spill lack of planning and in its post-spill lying to the Government and others regarding the flow rate and source control.

It is Undisputed that BP Willfully and Recklessly Refused to Prepare for an Uncontrolled Deepwater Blowout, the Largest Known Risk in the Gulf

There is no question that it was foreseeable to BP that a deepwater well in the Gulf of Mexico could experience a blowout. Indeed, BP Management had identified the risk of a deepwater blowout as one of the highest risks worldwide, and the number one risk in the Gulf of Mexico. And both BP and the industry generally knew, beginning in 1991, that it was necessary to engage in deepwater source control planning and to develop deepwater source control capping equipment and techniques. Yet, BP Management admittedly spent no time or money preparing for a deepwater source control effort.  BP Management did not direct or provide for any training in deepwater source control. Nor did BP Management develop or acquire any capping equipment. It is clear, in sum, that BP’s pre-spill preparation was nothing more than a plan to make a plan.

Both Legally and Factually, BP Has Failed to Establish a Defense Predicated on an Alleged “Industry Standard”

Mere compliance with industry standards does not preclude a finding of gross or egregious conduct.   In this particular case, the entire industry recognized the need to develop capping stack equipment as far back as 1991. Indeed, an industry study predicted and diagramed at that time an uncontrolled blowout strikingly similar to what would occur at Macondo almost twenty years later. To the extent that companies other than BP may have also failed to adequately prepare for a deepwater blowout, this reveals nothing more than laxness, inefficiency, and inattention to innovation by other companies. Yet BP, a self-proclaimed “leader” in the industry, refused to invest a single penny into developing or acquiring the necessary equipment for post-spill source control.

As a factual matter, BP came far from proving that there was an “industry standard” to develop no pre-spill capping stack or other source control plans, equipment or technology. See, e.g., Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 665 F.2d 1367, 1376 (5th Cir. 1982) (when considering whether a defendant has complied with an industry standard, “a district court must limit its consideration to evidence actually presented at trial”). Indeed, as noted, the industry was recognizing the need for such devices since 1991.

BP Knew For More Than Two Decades That Capping Devices Are The Best Available Technology For Controlling Deepwater Blowouts

Well capping techniques have been applied both on land and offshore locations and have historically proven successful in regaining well control in shorter durations and are preferred over the more time-consuming alternative of drilling a relief well. Capping devices have existed and been used in the industry for decades. Capping device technology is feasible, well proven and not novel. Indeed, the Macondo Capping Stack was assembled using current technology and “off-the-shelf” equipment.

Within a few days of April 20, 2010, representatives from BP, Transocean, Cameron and Wild Well Control, met at BP’s offices to discuss capping solutions. On April 27, 2010, Wild Well Control provided BP with a project memo that raised “Well Capping” and “Installation of Capping Stack on existing BOP” as options that should be considered. The memo also included a summary of procedures for installation of a capping stack onto the existing BOP.

Moreover, in response to U.S. Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar’s request for ideas from the industry after the Macondo event, Apache Corporation responded on April 30, 2010, “[i]f the LMRP can be removed from the BOP, conventional wisdom would suggest that another subsea BOP could be placed on top of the Horizon’s BOP in order to close the well in.”

There was evidence presented at trial that capping stack devices had, in fact, been developed, deployed and utilized by others in the industry, using existing technology. The evidence showed that Cameron’s own BOPs had been used as capping stack solutions as early as the 1980s, and were actually used to kill wells in Kuwait. BP itself, in 2001, adopted well capping devices in Alaska as the best available technology. Indeed, BP concluded and certified that a well capping solution could mitigate the overall duration and extent of an uncontrolled blowout by 50%.

With respect to deepwater operations, the evidence established that at least two capping-type solutions had been previously utilized in deep water: (1) a blowout in Malaysia in 1988, and (2) the JIM CUNNINGHAM incident in the eastern Mediterranean in 2004, where a BOP-on-BOP technique was used. There was also evidence that Shell and Senta Drilling had capping devices available for a deepwater project off the coast of Brazil. And BP itself recognized the potential use of capping stacks in deepwater environments, identifying them as a “Level 3: Phase 2” solution in the January 2010 Gulf of Mexico Deepwater SPU Well Control response guide.

BP Violated Regulatory Standards

As set forth in Plaintiffs’ Phase One Post-Trial submissions, a defendant’s compliance with regulatory standards does not preclude a finding of gross or egregious conduct. Moreover, in Phase Two as in Phase One: (a) The Government relied largely on information that was provided (or not provided) by BP; (b)The MMS and Coast Guard officials were frequently overtaxed, understaffed, and of limited training; (c) There were several instances where BP’s conduct (or failure to act) went beyond the scope of what was ostensibly permitted under the specific regulation, application, or approval in question; (d) There were several instances where BP provided insufficient, inaccurate or misleading information to the Government; and (e) BP clearly violated MMS regulations.

Specifically, it was clear that the Oil Spill Response Plan (OSRP) ostensibly approved by the Government was directed toward efforts to try to contain and collect the oil once it reached the surface. The Oil Spill Response Plan was not intended to be a source control plan, and the regulations concerning the plan requirements expressly state: “Nothing in this part relieves you from taking all appropriate actions necessary to immediately abate the source of a spill.” As a factual matter, moreover, the evidence is clear that the Government expected BP to be able to abate the source of an oil spill as soon as possible. “The federal government has neither the skilled personnel nor the appropriate equipment to respond independently to an oil blowout in deepwater and must rely wholly on the responsible party.”

The Phase Two evidence further establishes that the Federal Government was relying on BP to provide the Government with source control information. In addition to lying to the Government with respect to the flow rate (to which BP pleaded guilty), BP also failed to comply with its pre-spill representation to the MMS regarding the training of its employees in source control response.

Far from establishing some type of a defense based on the alleged “approval” of its OSRP by the Government, BP clearly violated the regulatory requirements to: (i) take necessary precautions to keep the well under control at all times, 30 C.F.R. ¶250.401; (ii) immediately abate the source of a spill, 30 C.F.R. ¶254.5(c); and (iii) use the Best Available and Safest Technology (BAST), 30 C.F.R. ¶¶250.105, 107 and 401(a). At the end of the day, BP certified to the Federal Government in its Initial Exploration Plan for the Macondo well that it was capable of responding at the source to a worst-case discharge of up to 162,000 barrels of oil per day. BP was clearly not in compliance with respect to that regulatory certification.

Advance Preparation Would Have Unquestionably Allowed BP to Mitigate the Length and Extent of the Spill, Irrespective of the Particular Circumstances Surrounding a Blowout

Aside from the fact that a similar post-spill situation was specifically predicted by the Drilling Engineers Association in 1991, the evidence is clear that efforts prior to the spill would have reduced the duration and extent of the post-blowout event. BP representatives admitted that “it’s much better to have a plan in place” than to “create a plan … in the middle of a crisis.” Former CEO Tony Hayward and the leaders of the post-spill source control effort, Charles Holt and James Dupree, all admitted that BP did not have the equipment it needed in place, and were essentially creating plans on how to kill the well as they went along. It is because BP “didn’t have the equipment to attack a Macondo-type event” that “we had to engineer so many things simultaneously on the fly.”

Cameron personnel similarly confirmed that the lack of pre-spill planning resulted in “paralysis by analysis,” “running this show like a game of Scrabble,” having “no clue what to do next,” and “running around like chickens with their heads cut off.”

In sum, the evidence establishes that, had BP prepared for a deepwater blowout, with a capping stack available on April 20, 2010, the well could have likely been shut in within 24 days or less.

BP’s Intentional Misrepresentations and Omissions Combined with Multiple Other Causative Factors – including BP’s Own Reckless Failure to Prepare for a Blowout and Post-Spill Miscalculations and Mistakes – to Extend the Duration and Expanse of the Spill

The General Maritime Law clearly recognizes that multiple causative factors can combine and contribute to a harmful series of results. And, as set forth in Plaintiffs’ Phase One Post-Trial submissions, an accumulation or series of negligent acts or omissions are properly viewed together in order to determine whether the defendant has acted out of gross negligence, willful misconduct, or a wanton or reckless disregard.

Plaintiffs allege that BP’s intentional misconduct in concealing material facts, overtly misstating facts it knew were not true, and otherwise misleading the Government, together with other factors, including BP’s own pre-spill failure to prepare for an uncontrolled blowout, as well as BP’s (and/or perhaps the Government’s) post-spill misjudgments and miscalculations, all conspired to significantly delay the capping of the well.

BP’s Willful Misconduct in Lying to the U.S. Government (and Others) After the Spill is Relevant to the Overall Question of BP’s State of Mind, Even If It Were Found Not to be a Direct Cause of Any Delay

The Phase Two evidence establishes that BP’s willful misconduct in lying to the Government after the spill extended the blowout by a number of weeks. Yet, even assuming arguendo that there were no causal relationship between BP’s lies and the length or extent of the spill, (which is denied), such intentional misconduct would nevertheless be relevant to the ultimate question of whether BP acted with a willful, wanton or reckless disregard. See, e.g., Clements v. Steele, 792 F.2d 515, 516-517 (5th Cir. 1986) (“the ‘mental attitude of the defendant’ is what turns ordinary negligence into gross negligence” and can be inferred from the totality of the circumstances).

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Oil Spill Settlements, Especially the BP Oil Spill Settlement, Are Wrong For America!

The BP Oil Spill Settlement Is Wrong For America!

By

Brian J. Donovan

Tampa, FL (March 31, 2014) – Oil spill settlements, especially the BP oil spill settlement, are wrong for America!

The BP Oil Spill Multidistrict Litigation (“MDL 2179”) officially started on August 10, 2010. The Transfer Order issued on that date by the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (“JPML”) clearly states: “…. Centralization may also facilitate closer coordination with Kenneth Feinberg’s administration of the BP compensation fund.” From the very beginning, the purpose of MDL 2179 was to replace democratic adversarial litigation with a fund approach to compensating victims of the BP oil spill. The vast majority of BP oil spill victims would never have their day in court. Judicial economy, rather than justice, was the primary objective.

The fund approach to resolving mass claims, i.e., those claims resulting from the BP oil spill incident, ought to be viewed with a significant degree of concern. The precedent established by the JPML and the MDL 2179 Court is clear: A “Responsible Party” under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (“OPA 90”) may now enter into a contract with a politically well-connected third party “Claims Administrator,” i.e., Kenneth R. Feinberg and Feinberg Rozen, LLP, d/b/a Gulf Coast Claims Facility (“GCCF”). This third party “Administrator / Straw Person,” directly and excessively compensated by the party responsible for the oil spill incident, may totally disregard OPA 90, operate the claims process of the responsible party as fraudulently and negligently as it desires for the sole purpose of limiting the liability of, and providing closure to, the responsible party, and the third party “Administrator / Straw Person” shall never be held accountable for its tortious acts.

The operation of the GCCF has allowed BP to control, manage, and settle its liabilities on highly preferential terms; has permitted members of the MDL 2179 Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee, who are directly appointed by Judge Barbier, to be excessively compensated for merely negotiating a collusive settlement agreement; and has enabled judges to clear their dockets of large numbers of cases. In sum, fund approaches to resolving massive liabilities shift power over claims resolution entirely into the hands of self-interested parties and largely evade judicial scrutiny and oversight.

Judicial economy is undoubtedly well-served by MDL consolidation when scores of similar cases are pending in the courts. Nevertheless, the excessive delay and marginalization of juror fact finding (i.e., dearth of jury trials) associated with traditional MDL practice are developments that cannot be defended. The appropriate focus for fund resolution of mass claims should be justice for the claimants, not merely judicial economy and closure for the corporate misfeasor.

In sum, the major oil companies own Congress and the federal judicial system.

However, we can change that in regard to catastrophic oil spills by demanding that Congress holds responsible parties accountable. Proper enforcement of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (“OSLTF”) will eliminate the need for costly and protracted litigation.

Demand that Congress requires responsible parties to pay the full costs and damages resulting from an oil spill incident by defining the term “expenditure,” under the OSLTF, as “an expenditure that is not reimbursed by the responsible party.”

N.B. – BP paid Feinberg Rozen, LLP a sum of $1.25 million per month to limit its liability (“administer the BP oil spill victims’ compensation fund”).

Spread the word and sign the petition: The Intended Purpose of the OSLTF Is to Fully Compensate Oil Spill Victims via Subrogation

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BP Oil Spill: Reply to PSC’s Response to the Open Letter Dated December 21, 2012

December 31, 2012

VIA Email

Mr. Stephen J. Herman
Plaintiffs’ Liaison Counsel
Herman, Herman, Katz & Cotlar, LLP
820 O’Keefe Avenue
New Orleans, LA 70113

Re: Reply to PSC’s Response to the Open Letter Dated December 21, 2012

Dear Steve,

I refer to the open letter, dated December 21, 2012, wherein I requested the PSC’s answers to ten questions in regard to its representation of my clients and all similarly-situated BP oil spill and Gulf Coast Claims Facility (“GCCF”) victims in MDL 2179.

You promptly responded, via email, by stating, “I respectfully decline to respond to your questions, which seem argumentative and disingenuous. To the extent you sincerely seek answers to the questions you pose, I invite you to review the numerous pleadings, transcripts and orders which are available on PACER.”

As I have already explained, your decision not to address the issues raised in the open letter, although completely understandable, is disturbing.

On December 21, 2012, subsequent to your receipt of the open letter, Judge Barbier granted final approval to the E&PD class settlement agreement. Notwithstanding this fact, all victims of the BP oil spill and the “Delay, Deny, Defend” strategy employed by Kenneth R. Feinberg, et al. have a right to clearly understand how and why they were represented by the PSC in MDL 2179.

The PSC’s clients are not being “argumentative and disingenuous” when they demand to know why they have not been fully compensated for their damages. Furthermore, as you are well aware, the answers to the ten questions in the open letter are not available on PACER. Only the PSC is in a position to fully and properly respond to these questions.

On December 25, 2012, you further state via email, “I suppose that you are free to attack the PSC and/or the Court in whatever way you deem appropriate.”

Steve, as you are well aware, the open letter is not an attack on any individual or group of individuals involved in MDL 2179 anymore than it is “argumentative and disingenuous.” It is, however, an indictment of a judicial system in which: (a) multidistrict litigation has been allowed to devolve to the point where the “Lexecon Rule” has been supplanted by the “Heyburn Rule;” and (b) district courts permit settlement class actions to continue to erode the public’s faith in the federal judicial system.

A. Multidistrict Litigation

1. The “Lexecon Rule”

In In re: Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig. (“MDL 1657”), Judge Fallon’s analysis in regard to Lexecon is instructive.

“Traditionally, the cases in any given MDL originate from two sources.

First, cases are filed in, or removed to, federal courts across the country and transferred to the MDL court by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a). In these cases, the MDL court must apply the law of the transferor forum, that is, the law of the state in which the action was filed, including the transferor forum’s choice-of-law rules. See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 524 (1990). While the precise limits of the MDL court’s authority over such cases is currently subject to debate, it is clear that the court cannot try these cases, but rather must remand them to the transferor forum when pretrial discovery is complete. See Lexecon, Inc. v. Miberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998).

Second, a number of cases are often filed directly into the MDL by citizens who reside in the MDL court’s judicial district. In these cases, the MDL court must apply its own state law, that is, the law of the state in which it sits. It is undisputed that the MDL court has complete authority over every aspect of these cases.”

In re: Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., Case 2:05-md-01657 (E.D. La.) (“March 22, 2007 Order and Reasons”) (Rec. Doc. 10488).

2. The “Heyburn Rule”

The Heyburn Rule, in pertinent part, states, “To be sure, the Lexecon imperative does create severe inefficiencies in some cases as the transferor judge must re-familiarize himself or herself with the remanded action (perhaps many months after it was transferred out of the district under § 1407). However, the Heyburn Rule points out that “transferee judges are nothing if not resourceful where necessity dictates and several appropriate strategies are available by which the Lexecon conundrum may be avoided.”

Although Judge Barbier, the PSC, and BP refer to the MDL 2179 court’s “broad discretionary authority,” a “special-procedure” should not be crafted where a mandatory procedure already exists. It is important to remember that the very MDL procedures Judge Barbier, the PSC, and BP wish to circumvent were specifically enacted to reduce costs and promote judicial economy. Allowing the MDL 2179 trial plan is inconsistent with the clear statutory mandate of the multidistrict litigation enabling statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a), and the Supreme Court’s holding in Lexecon. While the need to promote efficiency in litigation is real, it cannot be accomplished by overriding the applicable provisions set forth by Congress. In re: FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Products Liability Litigation, 2009 WL 2390668 (E.D. La.).

The Heyburn Rule describes the Lexecon decision as a “conundrum” which may be avoided by “resourceful” transferee judges. My clients (who are now PSC’s clients) respectfully disagree. The Lexecon decision is not a conundrum. It is not an obstacle which judicial discretion may circumvent in the name of judicial efficiency/economy or political expediency. It is the law.

B. Settlement Class Actions

Settlement class actions are inherently flawed because they lack the “case” or “controversy” necessary to confer federal jurisdiction under Article III. The settlement class action court is asked not to resolve a real dispute between a litigant class and a party opposing that class, but rather merely to approve and implement a prearranged legal arrangement between the parties that was reached prior to the seeking of class certification.

While settlement class actions may have certain attractive aspects, such as reducing litigation expenses (MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, note 32, at § 21.612 (4th ed. 2004)), many of the traditional aspects of adversarial litigation are missing. As a result, the settlement class action is potentially the product of collusion among the parties: defendants who wish to rid themselves of the burden of litigation and plaintiffs’ counsel who wish to receive immediate compensation. Douglas G. Smith, The Intersection of Constitutional Law and Civil Procedure: Review of Wholesale Justice – Constitutional Democracy and the Problem of the Class Action Lawsuit, Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy, Vol. 104:319 (2010); See also, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 669, 714 (1986) (“Often, the plaintiffs’ attorneys and the defendants can settle on a basis that is adverse to the interests of the plaintiffs. At its worst, the settlement process may amount to a covert exchange of a cheap settlement for a high award of attorney’s fees.”). (Rec. Doc. 6902-1).

“BP and the PSC report that in February 2011 settlement negotiations began in earnest for two distinct class action settlements: a Medical Benefits Settlement and an Economic and Property Damages Settlement.” (p. 3, Rec. Doc. 6418).

In sum, the PSC and other counsel allegedly performing common benefit work in MDL 2179 initiated settlement negotiations “in earnest” merely four (4) months after Judge Barbier appointed members to the PSC. (See Rec. Doc. 6831-1). Clearly, the MDL 2179 settlement class action was not achieved in the full context of adversarial litigation.

Furthermore, after the Supreme Court‘s decisions in Amchem and Ortiz it has become exceedingly difficult to certify a class in the context of a mass tort. (See MANUAL, supra note 22, § 22.7, at 413–14 (“After experimentation with class treatment of some mass torts during the 1980s and 1990s, the courts have greatly restricted its use in mass torts litigation.”); RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 72 (2007) (“As embodied in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1966, the modern class action seemed on its face a device with little applicability to mass torts.”)).

The American Law Institute‘s draft Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation summarizes the state of the law: “As a doctrinal matter, the class action has fallen into disfavor as a means of resolving mass-tort claims. This development reflects many factors, including concerns about the quality of the representation received by members of settlement classes, difficulties presented by choice-of-law problems, and the need for individual evidence of exposure, injury, and damages.” A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION: PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, note 7, § 1.02, notes to cmt. b(1)(B), at 26 (Apr. 1, 2009).

Indeed, even before the Amchem and Ortiz decisions, courts had recognized that there was a national trend to deny class certification in drug or medical product liability/personal injury cases. This resistance to certification in such cases can be traced to the 1966 amendments to Rule 23, which specifically noted that the class action device was “ordinarily not appropriate” in a “mass accident” case where there would be “significant questions . . . affecting the individuals in different ways.” (See FED. R. CIV. P. 23, Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1966 Amend. See also In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 164 (2d Cir. 1987) (“The comment to Rule 23(b)(3) explicitly cautions against use of the class action device in mass tort cases. Moreover, most courts have denied certification in those circumstances.” (citation omitted)).

Presentment

In your email of December 25, 2012, you also state, “…….I would suggest that your clients not participating in the Economic Settlement will best be served if you: (i) ensure that you and/or they make Presentment of what you and/or they believe to be their full damages before January 18, 2013; and then, having made such presentment, (ii) file (or re-file) (and/or amend) suit on their behalf by April 20, 2013….”

I appreciate your advice and sudden concern for my clients. However, whenever our firm filed a claim on behalf of a client with GCCF, a copy of the claim was also filed directly with BP. In each case, BP provided a letter confirming its receipt of the claim. I understood that if a lawsuit was to be brought against BP, it should be brought under OPA and, therefore, the OPA Presentment requirement would have to be fulfilled.

GCCF Release and Covenant Not to Sue

In your email of December 25, 2012, you further advise, “…. (iii) with respect to any client whom you believe to have executed an invalid GCCF Release, assemble and prepare the best case you can to support the argument that such Release was procured under fraud, error or duress.”

As you are aware, our firm’s position is that every GCCF Release and Covenant Not to Sue violates federal law, State contract law, and is contrary to public policy. We shall address this matter at the proper time.

Steve, the PSC response generated the following additional questions.

QUESTION NO. 11

Why did the PSC wait until one month before the claim filing deadline to notify all BP oil spill and GCCF victims (its clients) of the OPA “Presentment” requirement?

On October 8, 2010, Judge Barbier appointed the members to the PSC (Rec. Doc. 506). The PSC sent a letter, dated December 13, 2012 and filed with LexisNexis on December 17, 2012, to all BP oil spill and GCCF victims wherein it finally advises its clients: “you must make ‘Presentment’ under the Oil Pollution Act for your Short Form Joinder, lawsuit or other claim to be valid…..before January 20, 2013. ”

The PSC should have notified all BP oil spill and GCCF victims (its clients) of the “Presentment” requirement in October, 2010, not in December, 2012.

QUESTION NO. 12

Why has the PSC failed to notify all BP oil spill and GCCF victims (its clients) that a lawsuit may be filed against Kenneth R. Feinberg, et al. without having to fulfill the OPA “Presentment” requirement?

GCCF victims may file an action alleging that Defendants Kenneth R. Feinberg, Feinberg Rozen, LLP, and GCCF misled them by employing a “Delay, Deny, Defend” strategy. This strategy, commonly used by unscrupulous insurance companies, is as follows: “Delay payment, starve claimant, and then offer the economically and emotionally-stressed claimant a miniscule percent of all damages to which the claimant is entitled. If the financially ruined claimant rejects the settlement offer, he or she may sue.” In sum, Plaintiffs would allege that BP is responsible for the oil spill incident; Feinberg, et al. (independent contractors), via employment of their “Delay, Deny, Defend” strategy, are responsible for not compensating and thereby financially ruining Plaintiffs. See Pinellas Marine Salvage, Inc., et al. v. Kenneth R. Feinberg, et al., 2:11-cv-01987 and Salvesen v. Feinberg, et al., 2:11-cv-02533. Motions to Remand for both cases remain pending in this Honorable Court.

Since Feinberg, et al is not a “Responsible Party” and therefore may not be sued under OPA, a lawsuit against Feinberg, et al. may be filed immediately because it does not require Presentment. The PSC would, however, need to advise all GCCF victims in regard to the statute of limitations and the associated tolling of the statute of limitations for class actions and fraudulent concealment or a misrepresentation by the defendant.

QUESTION NO. 13

Why does the PSC, which failed to adequately challenge the legality of the GCCF Release and Covenant Not to Sue for the past two years, suddenly advise non-PSC attorneys to “assemble and prepare the best case you can to support the argument that such Release was procured under fraud, error or duress?”

The ultimate objective of the “Delay, Deny, Defend” strategy of Feinberg, et al. was to obtain a signed “Release and Covenant Not to Sue” from as many BP oil spill victims as possible. Here, the GCCF Status Report as of March 07, 2012 is instructive. (See background information for “QUESTION NO. 8.”).

Feinberg, et al. cannot justify limiting payments under the Quick Payment Final Claim program to just $5,000 for individuals and $25,000 for businesses. There is no evidence that these amounts even remotely represent adequate consideration to compensate Claimants for the damages that Claimants did or will suffer as a result of the BP oil spill.

Steve, if the PSC had properly filed the B1 Master Complaint under OPA rather than alleging claims under admiralty law, Feinberg, et al. would never have been allowed to use the Release and Covenant Not to Sue to illegally exclude approximately 200,000 BP oil spill victims from the E&PD class settlement.

It has been, and remains, the responsibility of the PSC to “assemble and prepare the best case to support the argument that such Release was procured under fraud, error or duress.” On September 25, 2012, my clients filed their Motion to Nullify Each and Every Gulf Coast Claims Facility Release and Covenant Not to Sue. (See Rec. Doc. 7473-1). Please feel free to use the legal argument in this motion to assist with the preparation of the PSC case.

QUESTION NO. 14

Are you declining to answer these questions because you believe that an attorney-client relationship does not exist between the PSC and all BP oil spill and GCCF victims?

BP is extremely happy with the settlement. In a December 21, 2012 statement, BP said “it was pleased that the court approved the plaintiff steering committee’s settlement.” The PSC is ecstatic. Attorneys and CPA firms submitting claims for BP oil spill victims are giggling with delight over their new revenue stream. Unfortunately, the vast majority of BP oil spill victims are left scratching their heads over the entire MDL process and settlement class action. The numbers do not lie (See background information for “QUESTION NO. 8” and “QUESTION NO. 9”).

The combination of a settlement class action and MDL, which in this case appears to be “the product of collusion among the parties: defendants who wish to rid themselves of the burden of litigation and plaintiffs’ counsel who wish to receive immediate compensation,” has resulted in BP oil spill and GCCF victims receiving, if they are very fortunate, grossly inadequate compensation.

Steve, please understand that these fourteen questions are directed to the PSC by me on behalf of my clients (now PSC’s clients) and all similarly-situated BP oil spill and GCCF victims. These questions are not directed to the MDL 2179 Court. In sum, the PSC’s clients merely seek a better understanding of their representation by the PSC.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at 352-328-7469 or via e-mail at BrianJDonovan@verizon.net. Again, I would be happy to provide the PSC with any and all supporting documentation.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Brian J. Donovan

Brian J. Donovan

cc: James Parkerson Roy (jimr@wrightroy.com), Brian H. Barr (bbarr@levinlaw.com), Scott Summy (ssummy@baronbudd.com)

Click here to download a copy of this letter.

Click here to read the open letter.

BP Oil Spill: An Open Letter to the MDL 2179 Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee (“PSC”)

December 21, 2012

VIA Email

Mr. Stephen J. Herman
Plaintiffs’ Liaison Counsel
Herman, Herman, Katz & Cotlar, LLP
820 O’Keefe Avenue
New Orleans, LA 70113

Re: An Open Letter to the MDL 2179 Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee (“PSC”)

Dear Steve,

I am writing this open letter on behalf of my clients and all similarly-situated BP oil spill and Gulf Coast Claims Facility (“GCCF”) victims.

Background

On August 10, 2010, the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (“JPML”) issued its Transfer Order (Rec. Doc. 1) wherein it clearly states:

“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, the actions listed on Schedule A and pending outside the Eastern District of Louisiana are transferred to the Eastern District of Louisiana and, with the consent of that court, assigned to the Honorable Carl J. Barbier for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings with the actions pending in that district and listed on Schedule A.” (Emphasis added)

In order to efficiently manage MDL 2179, Judge Barbier consolidated and organized the various types of claims into several “pleading bundles” for the purpose of the filing of complaints, answers and any Rule 12 motions. The “B1” pleading bundle includes all claims for private or non-governmental economic loss and property damages.

On December 15, 2010, the PSC filed a “B1” Master Complaint.

On January 12, 2011, the MDL 2179 Court issued PTO No. 25, in order to clarify “the scope and effect” of the “B1” Master Complaint. The Court held that any individual plaintiff who is a named plaintiff in a case that falls within pleading bundle “B1” “is deemed to be a plaintiff in the “B1” Master Complaint.” Also, “the allegations, claims, theories of recovery and/or prayers for relief contained within the pre-existing petition or complaint are deemed to be amended, restated, and superseded by the allegations, claims, theories of recovery, and/or prayers for relief in the respective “B1” Master Complaint(s) in which the Defendant is named.”

In sum, my clients were forced to be represented by the PSC. Accordingly, since you have stepped into my shoes, I, and all similarly-situated attorneys representing BP oil spill and GCCF victims, hold the PSC strictly accountable to zealously advocate on behalf of all MDL 2179 Plaintiffs.

I look forward to receiving the PSC’s answers to the following 10 questions.

QUESTION NO. 1

Why did the PSC designate the “B1” Master Complaint as an admiralty or maritime case, and request a non-jury trial pursuant to Rule 9(h), rather than properly allege claims under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (“OPA”), a strict liability statute, and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”)?

On February 9, 2011, the PSC filed a First Amended Master Complaint. Rather than allege claims under the OPA (which governs the MDL 2179 cases alleging economic loss due to the BP oil spill) and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”) (which governs the MDL 2179 personal injury and wrongful death actions and borrows the law of the adjacent state as surrogate federal law), the PSC made the unfathomable decision to allege claims under admiralty law. In the “B1” First Amended Master Complaint, the PSC clearly states, “The claims presented herein are admiralty or maritime claims within the meaning of Rule 9(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs hereby designate this case as an admiralty or maritime case, and request a non-jury trial, pursuant to Rule 9(h).”

QUESTION NO. 2

Why has the PSC failed to inform Judge Barbier that the honorable MDL 2179 Court has overreached its authority?

The Supreme Court has held that a district court conducting pretrial proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1407(a) has no authority to invoke 28 U.S.C. §1404(a) to assign a transferred case to itself for trial. Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998).

Justice Souter, in delivering the opinion of the Court in Lexecon, explained 28 U. S. C. §1407(a) authorizes the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (the “Panel”) to transfer civil actions with common issues of fact “to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings,” but imposes a duty on the Panel to remand any such action to the original district “at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings.”

QUESTION NO. 3

Why has the PSC failed to inform Judge Barbier that the E&PD class settlement violates the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (“OPA”)?

In violation of the OPA and contrary to the intent of Congress, the E&PD class settlement defines “Class Members” by geographic bounds and certain business activities while requiring proof of a heightened, vague standard of causation.

QUESTION NO. 4

Why has the PSC failed to inform Judge Barbier that the honorable MDL 2179 Court has illegally excluded approximately 200,000 BP oil spill victims from the E&PD class settlement thereby greatly decreasing the bargaining power of the remaining class members?

GCCF’s “Release and Covenant Not to Sue” violates the OPA:

(a) by requiring the release of future damages as requirement for receiving a payment from the GCCF claims process, in contravention of 33 U.S.C. § 2705(a) and 33 U.S.C. §§ 2715(b)(1) and (2); and

(b) by allowing Feinberg, et al. to intentionally fail to provide a process for presenting, processing and paying interim, short-term damages, in contravention of 33 U.S.C. § 2705(a) and 33 U.S.C. §§ 2715(b)(1) and (2).

The text and the legislative history of the OPA statute are clear. OPA expressly prohibits Responsible Parties from engaging in a “Delay, Deny, Defend” strategy wherein the victims of an oil spill are starved and ultimately forced to sign a release and covenant not to sue in order to receive a miniscule payment amount for all damages, including future damages, they incur as a result of the oil spill.

Furthermore, GCCF’s “Release and Covenant Not to Sue” violates State contract law because it:

(a) was obtained through the use of economic duress;

(b) was obtained without free consent (Claimants did not consent to the release by choice, because the only option for receiving payment required Claimants to sign a release, the terms of which they had no opportunity to negotiate.);

(c) was obtained through fraud;

(d) requires Claimants to discharge, waive and release future claims (including those resulting from gross negligence) for costs and damages (including punitive damages) that are unknown and have not yet arisen;

(e) was obtained in exchange for inadequate consideration; and

(f) has as its objective the circumvention of the OPA.

Accordingly, GCCF’s “Release and Covenant Not to Sue” is void ab initio.

In sum, GCCF’s “Release and Covenant Not to Sue” and the class settlement’s “Release and Covenant Not to Sue” violate federal law, State contract law, and are contrary to public policy. Illegally excluding approximately 200,000 Claimants from the E&PD class settlement also greatly decreases the bargaining power of the “Class Members” and results in an increased loss of faith in the federal judicial system.

As Judge Barbier aptly stated in his Order of August 26, 2011, “The long term effects [of the BP oil spill] on the environment and fisheries may not be known for many years.”(p. 31, Rec. Doc. 3830).

Requiring BP oil spill victims, PSC’s clients, to prematurely waive their right to sue in exchange for a miniscule single final settlement payment is unconscionable.

QUESTION NO. 5

Why has the PSC failed to inform Judge Barbier that the E&PD class settlement is not “fair, reasonable, and adequate” and has not been entered into without collusion between the parties?

For the following reasons, the E&PD class settlement is not “fair, adequate, and reasonable” (at least not for the “Class Members”) and has not been entered into without collusion between the parties:

(a) Prior to the class action settlements, the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust had a balance of approximately $13.8 billion from which BP oil spill victims believed they would be compensated by the GCCF for all “legitimate” claims.

(b) After the class action settlements, the proposed “Settlement Trust” has only a balance of $7.8 billion from which BP oil spill victims are being told they will be compensated by the DHCC “so long as they execute an individual release.”

(c) As noted above, under the class action settlements, BP will receive a refund of approximately $6 billion; the PSC and other counsel allegedly performing common benefit work will receive $600 million.

(d) The E&PD class action settlement doesn’t actually provide for funds to be distributed to Class Members; it merely gives BP oil spill victims the right to submit, yet again, a claim for economic and property damages. The PSC and BP oil spill victims have to ask, “Where’s the settlement?

(e) “……within 15 days after the end of each calendar quarter, the BP Parties shall irrevocably pay into the Common Benefit Fee and Costs Fund an amount equal to 6 % (six percent) of the aggregate Settlement Payments paid under the Economic Agreement in respect of Claimants that have executed an Individual Release.” In sum, the PSC and other counsel allegedly performing common benefit work are financially motivated to have as many Claimants execute an Individual Release as expeditiously as possible regardless of whether the negotiated settlements reflect the true value of the claims.

QUESTION NO. 6

Why has the PSC failed to inform Judge Barbier that a class action may not be brought in a limitation proceeding?

The MDL 2179 Court may not certify a class in the limitation action because it would contravene the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Lloyds Leasing Ltd. v. Bates, 902 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1990). In Lloyds Leasing, the Fifth Circuit squarely held that a class action may not be brought in a limitation proceeding. Id. at 370. In affirming the district court’s denial of class certification, the Fifth Circuit reasoned as follows: First, the class action interferes with the concursus contemplated by the limitation of liability proceeding. . . . Second, the notice requirements of the limitation proceeding are more restrictive than the notice requirements of the class action. . . . Third, the entire thrust of Supplemental Rule F is that each claimant must appear individually and this is obviously inconsistent with the class action. Staring, Limitation Practice and Procedure, 53 Tul.L.Rev. 1134, 1150 (1979). In sum, “[t]he two rules are incompatible, and class representation in the sense of Rule 23 should therefore not be allowed in limitation proceedings.” Id.

Following Lloyd’s Leasing, courts in this district have routinely stricken class action allegations when they are filed within a limitation proceeding or dismissed class action complaints when they are filed after a limitation proceeding has been instituted. See, e.g., In re: Ingram Barge Co., No. 05-4419, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79403, 2006 WL 5377855, at *1 (E.D. La. Oct. 19, 2006) (striking class allegations pursuant to Lloyd’s Leasing); In re: River City Towing Servs., Inc., 204 F.R.D. 94, 97 (E.D. La. 2001) (same); Humphreys v. Antillen, N.V., Nos. 93-3799, 93-3714, 1994 WL 682811, at *3 (E.D. La. Jan. 31, 1994) (dismissing class action complaint filed after limitation proceeding). The limitation proceedings need not be resolved and limitation of liability upheld in order to dismiss class action allegations. For example, Judge Berrigan in Ingram Barge and Judge Feldman in Humphreys struck or dismissed class action allegations before deciding the limitation issue. See Gabarick v. Laurin Mar. (America), Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27180.

QUESTION NO. 7

Why has the PSC allowed the MDL 2179 Court to decline to permit formal discovery on Feinberg, et al?

On June 15, 2011, Plaintiff Salvesen, one of my clients, filed his action against Defendants Kenneth R. Feinberg, Feinberg Rozen, LLP, GCCF, and William G. Green, Jr. in the Circuit Court of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit in and for Lee County, Florida asserting claims for gross negligence, negligence, negligence per se, fraud, fraudulent inducement, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment under Florida state law. The case was subsequently transferred by the JPML to the MDL 2179 Court on October 6, 2011. See Salvesen v. Feinberg, et al., 2:11-cv-02533.

Once the Salvesen case was transferred to the MDL 2179 Court, not only was the case automatically stayed, but the Salvesen claims, as explained supra, were inexplicably deemed “amended, restated, and superseded” by the allegations and claims of the Master Complaint in Pleading Bundle B1 (See Pre-Trial Order No. 25, Para. 5, Jan. 12, 2011).

It is important to note that Kenneth R. Feinberg and Feinberg Rozen, LLP, d/b/a Gulf Coast Claims Facility, are not named Defendants in any Master Complaint or Class Action Complaint in MDL 2179.

On August 29, 2011, I emailed a letter to James Parkerson Roy wherein I informed Mr. Roy that the Pinellas Marine Salvage, Inc., et al. v. Kenneth R. Feinberg, et al. case had been transferred to MDL 2179. The letter, in pertinent part, stated “I would like to commence discovery as soon as possible. Since this action does not involve common questions of fact with actions previously transferred to MDL No. 2179, please advise as to how we may most expeditiously initiate and coordinate discovery……I look forward to working with you on this case.”

On September 5, 2011, I received an email from you wherein you stated, “please be advised that the Court has, thus far, declined to permit formal discovery on Feinberg or the GCCF.

Judge Barbier writes, “…the PSC has actively lobbied and argued for increased supervision and monitoring of the GCCF and Kenneth Feinberg/Feinberg Rozen, LLP. These efforts have met with at least partial success. For instance, on February 2, 2011 the Court granted the PSC’s motion (in part) and ordered the GCCF and BP to:

(1) Refrain from contacting directly any claimant that they know or reasonably should know is represented by counsel, whether or not said claimant has filed a lawsuit or formal claim.

(2) Refrain from referring to the GCCF, Ken Feinberg, or Feinberg Rozen, LLP (or their representatives), as “neutral” or completely “independent” from BP. It should be clearly disclosed in all communications, whether written or oral, that said parties are acting for and on behalf of BP in fulfilling its statutory obligations as the “responsible party” under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.

(3) Begin any communication with a putative class member with the statement that the individual has a right to consult with an attorney of his/her own choosing prior to accepting any settlement or signing a release of legal rights.

(4) Refrain from giving or purporting to give legal advice to unrepresented claimants, including advising that claimants should not hire a lawyer.

(5) Fully disclose to claimants their options under OPA if they do not accept a final payment, including filing a claim in the pending MDL 2179 litigation.

(6) Advise claimants that the “pro bono” attorneys and “community representatives” retained to assist GCCF claimants are being compensated directly or indirectly by BP.” (Rec. Doc. 1098 at 14).

Judge Barbier further writes, “The PSC has advocated for a full and transparent audit of the GCCF and its claims handling practices, and together with the U.S. Department of Justice, has persuaded Mr. Feinberg to agree to such an audit which is now in progress. The PSC has advocated, again with some success, for the GCCF to employ a more liberal causation standard in evaluating claims and has advanced similar causation arguments in this MDL proceeding.” See Order of Aug. 26, 2011, Rec. Doc. 3830 at 32-33. (pp. 4-5, Rec. Doc. 5022).

Again, and please correct me if I am wrong, the PSC represents all plaintiffs in MDL 2179. These plaintiffs deserve more than the PSC merely: (a) “lobbying” for increased supervision and monitoring of Feinberg, et al.; (b) trying to “persuade” Mr. Feinberg to agree to an audit; and (c) “advocating,” again with some success, for the GCCF to employ a more liberal causation standard in evaluating claims.

The JPML believes, “Centralization may also facilitate closer coordination with Kenneth Feinberg’s administration of the BP compensation fund.” However, formal discovery on Feinberg and the GCCF, and the associated pressure of a trial, are required in order exert pressure on the parties to negotiate a settlement which reflects the true value of the claims and not one which focuses on minimizing the liability of the defendants. Certainly, as has occurred in MDL 2179, without formal discovery on Feinberg and the GCCF, certain claims by private individuals and businesses for economic loss resulting from the operation of the GCCF may never be properly resolved.

QUESTION NO. 8

Why does the PSC allow its BP oil spill victim clients to receive grossly inadequate compensation?

The Gulf Coast Claims Facility (“GCCF”)

The GCCF data indicates that a total of 574,379 unique claimants filed claims with the GCCF during the period from approximately August 23, 2010 to March 7, 2012. The GCCF paid only 221,358 of these Claimants. In sum, the GCCF denied payment to approximately 61.46% of the claimants who filed claims; the average total amount paid per claimant was $27,466.47.

The status report data further indicates that the GCCF paid a total of 230,370 claimants who filed claims with the GCCF during the “Phase II” period. Of these, 195,109 were either Quick Pay or Full Review Final payments; only 35,261 were Interim payments. In sum, the GCCF forced 84.68% of the claimants to sign a release and covenant not to sue in which the claimant agreed not to sue BP and all other potentially liable parties; only 15.31% of the claimants were not required to sign a release and covenant not to sue in order to be paid. See “Gulf Coast Claims Facility Overall Program Statistics” (Status Report, Mar. 7, 2012, p. 1).

The Deepwater Horizon Claims Center (“DHCC”)

The DHCC and the GCCF are virtually identical. Under the GCCF, the evaluation and processing of claims were performed by Garden City Group, Inc., BrownGreer, PLC, and PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP {“PwC”). Under the DHCC, the evaluation and processing of claims shall continue to be performed by Garden City Group, Inc., BrownGreer, PLC, and PwC. Accordingly, although Patrick Juneau has replaced Ken Feinberg, there is no reason to believe that the percentage of claimants denied payment and the average total amount paid per claimant will change under the DHCC.

The DHCC Data

The DHCC data indicates that a total of 36,468 claimants filed Individual and Business claims with the DHCC during the period from approximately June 4, 2012 to October 5, 2012. The DHCC paid only 71 of these claimants. In sum, the DHCC paid only 0.19% of the claimants who filed claims. Of the 19,338 Individual Economic Loss claims submitted, 79 claimants have received payment offers totaling $860,968, resulting in 6 payments totaling $38,173. This equates to an average payment of only $6,362.17 per Individual Economic Loss Claimant! (DHCC Status Report, Oct. 5, 2012).

The DHCC data, dated October 26, 2012, indicates that a total of 41,235 claimants have filed the above types of claims with the DHCC. The DHCC paid only 407 of these claimants. In sum, the DHCC paid only 0.99% of the claimants who filed claims. Of the 21,058 Individual Economic Loss claims submitted, 204 claimants have received payment offers totaling $2,190,404, resulting in 43 payments totaling $599,428. This equates to an average payment of only $13,940.19 per Individual Economic Loss Claimant!

The DHCC data, dated November 16, 2012, indicates that a total of 46,159 claimants have filed the above types of claims with the DHCC. The DHCC paid only 996 of these claimants. In sum, the DHCC paid only 2.16% of the claimants who filed claims. Of the 22,571 Individual Economic Loss claims submitted, 354 claimants have received payment offers totaling $3,893,028, resulting in 143 payments totaling $1,777,080. This equates to an average payment of only $12,427.13 per Individual Economic Loss Claimant!

“I think it’s a tribute to the GCCF that all the people we used have been retained [by the DHCC],” Feinberg said. “I take great satisfaction in that fact.” David Hammer, Louisiana lawyer set to take Kenneth Feinberg’s role in BP oil spill claims process, The Times-Picayune (March 9, 2012).

My clients and all similarly-situated BP oil spill and GCCF victims do not share Feinberg’s great satisfaction.

QUESTION NO. 9

Why does the PSC allow for the E&PD class settlement to provide for a refund of approximately $6 billion to BP while granting excessive compensation to the PSC and other counsel allegedly performing “common benefit” work?

(a) The Refund

Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust                                                                             $20  Billion

(Amount set aside by BP to allegedly pay economic

damage claims to individuals and businesses affected

by the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.)

Approximate Amount Paid to Claimants by GCCF                                                 $ 6.2 Billion

Cost of the Proposed Settlement                                                                                 $ 7.8 Billion

Amount to be Refunded to BP                                                                         $6.0 Billion

(b) The Excessive Compensation

The PSC and other counsel allegedly performing common benefit work in MDL 2179 are not double-dipping; they are triple-dipping. The known sources of compensation received by attorneys allegedly doing common benefit work on behalf of BP oil spill victims in MDL 2179 are:

(a) Six percent (6%) of the gross monetary settlements, judgments or other payments made on or after December 30, 2011 through June 3, 2012 to any other plaintiff or claimant-in-limitation;

N.B. – Plaintiffs’ Counsel received a Final Payment Offer from GCCF on behalf of Plaintiff Pinellas Marine Salvage, Inc. This offer, dated June 3, 2012 and postmarked June 8, 2012, was received by Plaintiffs’ Counsel on June 11, 2012. This offer, along with probably hundreds of other offers made to Claimants by GCCF, is dated one day before Claimants are no longer required to pay six percent (6%) of the gross monetary settlement they receive to the MDL 2179 common benefit fund. Plaintiffs respectfully point out to the Court that June 3, 2012 was a Sunday. These offers were dated June 3rd in order to ensure that the PSC received the maximum amount of payment from the 6% hold-back provision.

(b) BP has agreed to pay any award for common benefit and/or Rule 23(h) attorneys’ fees, as determined by the Court, up to $600 million. In order to be awarded a common benefit fee of $600 million, the MDL 2179 Court would have to believe that the PSC attorneys worked two million hours;

(c) Many attorneys doing common benefit work have their own clients and have also received or will also receive a fee directly from them. (N.B. – On June 15, 2012, the MDL 2179 Court ordered that “contingent fee arrangements for all attorneys representing claimants/plaintiffs that settle claims through either or both of the Settlements will be capped at 25% plus reasonable costs.”); and

(d) Co-counsel fees received by member firms of the PSC for serving as co-counsel to non-member firms of the PSC. For example, on March 13, 2012, Counsel for Plaintiff Salvesen received an unsolicited mass email from a member firm of the PSC. The email stated, in pertinent part, “Co-Counsel Opportunity for BP Oil Spill Cases: News of the recent BP Settlement has caused many individuals and businesses along the Gulf Coast to contemplate either filing a new claim or amending a claim that has already been submitted. If you receive inquiries of this nature we would like you to consider a co-counsel relationship with our firm. Even if someone has already filed a claim it is advisable to retain legal counsel to analyze the impact of this settlement on claimants and maximize recovery. If you receive inquiries and are interested in co-counseling with us on the BP claims, please email…”

The Court has been fully briefed in regard to the excessive compensation being paid to the PSC and other counsel performing common benefit work in MDL 2179. (Rec. Doc. 6831-1)

QUESTION NO. 10

Given the above-referenced was not merely the result of poor legal strategy, do you believe the MDL 2179 PSC’s actions constitute legal malpractice?

Since April 8, 2012, our firm has filed: (a) a Motion to Vacate Order and Reasons [As to Motions to Dismiss the B1 Master Complaint]; (b) three Motions to Vacate Preliminary Approval Order [As to the Proposed Economic and Property Damages Class Action Settlement]; and (c) a Motion to Nullify Each and Every Gulf Coast Claims Facility (“GCCF”) “Release and Covenant Not to Sue.”

In contrast, as noted supra, the PSC appears to be more interested in maximizing its compensation and ensuring significant economy and efficiency in the judicial administration of the MDL 2179 Court rather than in obtaining justice for the MDL 2179 plaintiffs.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at 352-328-7469 or via e-mail at BrianJDonovan@verizon.net. I would be happy to provide the PSC with any and all supporting documentation.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Brian J. Donovan

Brian J. Donovan

cc:        James Parkerson Roy (jimr@wrightroy.com), Brian H. Barr (bbarr@levinlaw.com), Scott Summy (ssummy@baronbudd.com)

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BP Oil Spill Victims Opt-Out of the Deepwater Horizon Class Action Settlements

BP Oil Spill Victims Opt-Out of the Deepwater Horizon Class Action Settlements

__________________

DHCC Status Report Proves that the Only Beneficiaries Are BP, the Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee, and Other “Common Benefit” Attorneys

Tampa, FL (October 15, 2012) – Victims of the BP oil spill have elected to opt-out of the Deepwater Horizon Economic and Property Damages Class Action Settlement and the Deepwater Horizon Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement. These victims, represented by The Donovan Law Group, Tampa, FL, decided not to be held as class action hostages by settlements which will never adequately compensate them for their losses.

REASONS TO OPT-OUT

The following is a partial list of reasons why these Claimants/Plaintiffs/Class Action Hostages decided to opt-out. The list will be updated daily until November 1, 2012. After that date, the list will no longer matter.

(1) BP oil spill victims receive grossly inadequate compensation.

The Gulf Coast Claims Facility (“GCCF”) data indicates that a total of 574,379 unique claimants filed claims with the GCCF during the period from approximately August 23, 2010 to March 7, 2012. The GCCF paid only 221,358 of these Claimants. In sum, the GCCF denied payment to approximately 61.46% of the claimants who filed claims; the average total amount paid per claimant was $27,466.47.

The status report data further indicates that the GCCF paid a total of 230,370 claimants who filed claims with the GCCF during the “Phase II” period. Of these, 195,109 were either Quick Pay or Full Review Final payments; only 35,261 were Interim payments. In sum, the GCCF forced 84.68% of the claimants to sign a release and covenant not to sue in which the claimant agreed not to sue BP and all other potentially liable parties; only 15.31% of the claimants were not required to sign a release and covenant not to sue in order to be paid. See “Gulf Coast Claims Facility Overall Program Statistics” (Status Report, Mar. 7, 2012, p. 1).

The Deepwater Horizon Claims Center (“DHCC”) and the GCCF are virtually identical. Under the GCCF, the evaluation and processing of claims were performed by Garden City Group, Inc., BrownGreer, PLC, and PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP. Under the DHCC, the evaluation and processing of claims shall continue to be performed by Garden City Group, Inc., BrownGreer, PLC, and PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP. Accordingly, although Patrick Juneau has replaced Ken Feinberg, there is no reason to believe that the percentage of claimants denied payment and the average total amount paid per claimant will change under the DHCC.

The DHCC data indicates that a total of 36,468 claimants filed Individual and Business claims with the DHCC during the period from approximately June 4, 2012 to October 5, 2012. The DHCC paid only 71 of these claimants. In sum, the DHCC paid only 0.19% of the claimants who filed claims. Of the 19,338 Individual Economic Loss claims submitted, 79 claimants have received payment offers totaling $860,968, resulting in 6 payments totaling $38,173. This equates to an average payment of only $6,362.17 per Individual Economic Loss Claimant! (DHCC Status Report, Oct. 5, 2012).

“I think it’s a tribute to the GCCF that all the people we used have been retained,” Feinberg said. “I take great satisfaction in that fact.” David Hammer, Louisiana lawyer set to take Kenneth Feinberg’s role in BP oil spill claims process, The Times-Picayune (March 9, 2012). It is unlikely that BP oil spill victims will share Feinberg’s satisfaction.

(2) The class action settlements provide for a refund of approximately $6 billion to BP while granting excessive compensation to the PSC and other counsel allegedly performing “common benefit” work.

(a) The Refund

Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust                                                                                                               $20  Billion

(Amount set aside by BP to allegedly pay economic

damage claims to individuals and businesses affected

by the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.)

Approximate Amount Paid to Claimants by GCCF                                                                                   $6.2 Billion

Cost of the Proposed Settlement                                                                                                                   $7.8 Billion

Amount to be Refunded to BP                                                                                                                       $6.0 Billion

(b) The Excessive Compensation

The PSC and other counsel allegedly performing common benefit work in MDL 2179 are not double-dipping; they are triple-dipping. The known sources of compensation received by attorneys allegedly doing common benefit work on behalf of BP oil spill victims in MDL 2179 are:

(a) Six percent (6%) of the gross monetary settlements, judgments or other payments made on or after December 30, 2011 through June 3, 2012 to any other plaintiff or claimant-in-limitation;

N.B. – Plaintiffs’ Counsel received a Final Payment Offer from GCCF on behalf of Plaintiff Pinellas Marine Salvage, Inc. This offer, dated June 3, 2012 and postmarked June 8, 2012, was received by Plaintiffs’ Counsel on June 11, 2012. This offer, along with probably hundreds of other offers made to Claimants by GCCF, is dated one day before Claimants are no longer required to pay six percent (6%) of the gross monetary settlement they receive to the MDL 2179 common benefit fund. Plaintiffs respectfully point out to the Court that June 3, 2012 was a Sunday. These offers were dated June 3rd in order to ensure that the PSC received the maximum amount of payment from the 6% hold-back provision.

(b) BP has agreed to pay any award for common benefit and/or Rule 23(h) attorneys’ fees, as determined by the Court, up to $600 million. In order to be awarded a common benefit fee of $600 million, the MDL 2179 Court would have to believe that the PSC attorneys worked two million hours;

(c) Many attorneys doing common benefit work have their own clients and have also received or will also receive a fee directly from them. (N.B. – On June 15, 2012, the MDL 2179 Court ordered that “contingent fee arrangements for all attorneys representing claimants/plaintiffs that settle claims through either or both of the Settlements will be capped at 25% plus reasonable costs.”); and

(d) Co-counsel fees received by member firms of the PSC for serving as co-counsel to non-member firms of the PSC. For example, on March 13, 2012, Counsel for Plaintiff Salvesen received an unsolicited mass email from a member firm of the PSC. The email stated, in pertinent part, “Co-Counsel Opportunity for BP Oil Spill Cases: News of the recent BP Settlement has caused many individuals and businesses along the Gulf Coast to contemplate either filing a new claim or amending a claim that has already been submitted. If you receive inquiries of this nature we would like you to consider a co-counsel relationship with our firm. Even if someone has already filed a claim it is advisable to retain legal counsel to analyze the impact of this settlement on claimants and maximize recovery. If you receive inquiries and are interested in co-counseling with us on the BP claims, please email…”

Click here for a list of the attorneys appointed to the PSC by Judge Barbier.

(3)  These class action settlements are not “fair, reasonable, and adequate” and have not been entered into without collusion between the parties.

For the following reasons, these class action settlements are not “fair, adequate, and reasonable” (at least not for the “Class Members”) and have not been entered into without collusion between the parties:

(a) Prior to the class action settlements, the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust had a balance of approximately $13.8 billion from which BP oil spill victims believed they would be compensated by the GCCF for all “legitimate” claims.

(b) After the class action settlements, the proposed “Settlement Trust” has only a balance of $7.8 billion from which BP oil spill victims are being told they will be compensated by the DHCC “so long as they execute an individual release.”

(c) As noted above, under the class action settlements, BP will receive a refund of approximately $6 billion; the PSC and other counsel allegedly performing common benefit work will receive $600 million.

(d) The E&PD class action settlement doesn’t actually provide for funds to be distributed to Class Members; it merely gives BP oil spill victims the right to submit, yet again, a claim for economic and property damages. BP oil spill victims have to ask, “Where’s the settlement?

(e) “……within 15 days after the end of each calendar quarter, the BP Parties shall irrevocably pay into the Common Benefit Fee and Costs Fund an amount equal to 6 % (six percent) of the aggregate Settlement Payments paid under the Economic Agreement in respect of Claimants that have executed an Individual Release.” In sum, the PSC and other counsel allegedly performing common benefit work are financially motivated to have as many Claimants execute an Individual Release as expeditiously as possible regardless of whether the negotiated settlements reflect the true value of the claims.

Click here to read the PSC’s INCOMPREHENSIBLE Reply in Response to Objections and in Further Support of Final Approval of the E&PD Class Settlement (Dated: October 22, 2012). 

(4) Judicial efficiency has replaced justice in MDL 2179.

In order to efficiently manage MDL 2179, Judge Barbier consolidated and organized the various types of claims into several “pleading bundles” for the purpose of the filing of complaints, answers and any Rule 12 motions. The “B1” pleading bundle includes all claims for private or “non-governmental” economic loss and property damages.”

On December 15, 2010, the PSC filed a B1 Master Complaint. On January 12, 2011, the MDL 2179 Court issued PTO No. 25, in order to clarify “the scope and effect” of the “B1″ Master Complaint. The Court held that any individual plaintiff who is a named plaintiff in a case that falls within pleading bundle “B1″ “is deemed to be a plaintiff in the “B1″ Master Complaint.” Also, “the allegations, claims, theories of recovery and/or prayers for relief contained within the pre-existing petition or complaint are deemed to be amended, restated, and superseded by the allegations, claims, theories of recovery, and/or prayers for relief in the respective “B1″ Master Complaint(s) in which the Defendant is named.”

On February 9, 2011, the PSC filed a First Amended Master Complaint. Rather than allege claims under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (“OPA”) (which governs the MDL 2179 cases alleging economic loss due to the BP oil spill) and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”) (which governs the MDL 2179 personal injury and wrongful death actions and borrows the law of the adjacent state as surrogate federal law), the PSC made the unfathomable decision to allege claims under admiralty law. In the B1 First Amended Master Complaint, the PSC clearly states, “The claims presented herein are admiralty or maritime claims within the meaning of Rule 9(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs hereby designate this case as an admiralty or maritime case, and request a non-jury trial, pursuant to Rule 9(h).”

The PSC appears to be more interested in ensuring significant economy and efficiency in the judicial administration of the MDL 2179 court rather than in obtaining justice for the MDL 2179 plaintiffs.

As noted above, in its B1 First Amended Master Complaint, the PSC alleges claims under general maritime law, not under OPA and OCSLA, thereby assisting the MDL 2179 Court in expeditiously being able to:

(a) Find, “State law, both statutory and common, is preempted by maritime law, notwithstanding OPA’s savings provisions. All claims brought under state law are dismissed.”

(b) Find, “…. That nothing prohibits Defendants from settling claims for economic loss. While OPA does not specifically address the use of waivers and releases by Responsible Parties, the statute also does not clearly prohibit it. In fact, as the Court has recognized in this Order, one of the goals of OPA was to allow for speedy and efficient recovery by victims of an oil spill.”

(5) As Judge Barbier aptly stated in his Order of August 26, 2011, “The long term effects [of the BP oil spill] on the environment and fisheries may not be known for many years.” (p. 31, Rec. Doc. 3830).

Requiring Class Members to prematurely waive their right to sue in exchange for a miniscule single final settlement payment is unconscionable.

(6) The E&PD class action settlement violates the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (“OPA”).

BP and the PSC cherry-pick OPA’s provisions for their benefit at the detriment to Plaintiffs. Contrary to the intent of Congress, the E&PD class action settlement defines “Class Members” by geographic bounds and certain business activities while requiring proof of a heightened, vague standard of causation.

(7) The “Plaintiffs'” Steering Committee (“PSC”) misleads “Class Members.”

(a) Statute of Limitations

The PSC intentionally fails to counsel those claimants who may opt-out of the Proposed Settlements that a lawsuit brought against BP and/or a non- Responsible Party, e.g., a lawsuit asserting claims for gross negligence, fraud, etc. against Kenneth R. Feinberg, et al, may be barred by the statute of limitations.

Under OPA, an action for damages shall be barred unless the action is brought within three years after the date on which the loss and the connection of the loss with the discharge in question are reasonably discoverable with the exercise of due care. 33 U.S.C. § 2717(f)(1)(A).

In federal question cases, the federal court will apply the specific statute of limitations period established by the federal statute under which the plaintiff is seeking relief. Federal courts that are hearing a controversy based on diversity of citizenship of the parties must apply the applicable state law of the forum state. In this case, a lawsuit which could be brought against a non-Responsible Party may be barred by the statute of limitations.

(b) The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (“OSLTF”)

The PSC intentionally fails to counsel those claimants who may opt-out of the Proposed Settlements that they will not be able to pursue their claims via the OSLTF.

The OPA provides the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (“OSLTF”) to pay for oil spill costs when the responsible party cannot or does not pay. The OSLTF, administered by the U.S. Coast Guard through its National Pollution Funds Center (“NPFC”), is primarily financed through a tax on petroleum products, and is subject to a $1 billion cap on the amount of expenditures from the OSLTF per incident. For any one oil pollution incident, the OSLTF may pay up to $1 billion. Victims of the BP oil spill are at risk as a result of this cap. The cap is for total expenditures. This $1 billion expenditure limit applies even if the OSLTF is fully reimbursed by the responsible party and net expenditures are zero. OSLTF expenditures for natural resource damage assessments and claims in connection with a single incident are limited to $500 million of that $1 billion. NPFC administers the OSLTF by disbursing funds to government agencies to reimburse them for their oil spill cleanup costs (cost reimbursements), monitoring the sources and uses of funds, adjudicating claims submitted by individuals and businesses to the OSLTF for payment (claims), and pursuing reimbursement from the responsible party for costs and damages paid from the OSLTF (billing the responsible party).

On March 9, 2012, Mr. Craig A. Bennett, Director – NPFC, provided the following OSLTF status report in regard to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill incident:

Deepwater Horizon OSLTF Costs = $619 million

Deepwater Horizon Pending Claims = $410 million (for 1,659 claims received)

On March 9, 2012, total OSLTF expenditures (paid + pending claims) in regard to the Deepwater Horizon was $1.019 billion. In sum, since the OSLTF has exceeded, or will very shortly exceed, its $1 billion expenditure cap for the Deepwater Horizon oil spill incident, the OSLTF cannot pay valid individual or business claims which are not paid by BP.

(8) The MDL 2179 Court has inexplicably reaffirmed its ruling that the E&PD class action settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate” and “free of collusion.”

Since April 8, 2012, our firm has filed: (a) a Motion to Vacate Order and Reasons [As to Motions to Dismiss the B1 Master Complaint]; (b) three Motions to Vacate Preliminary Approval Order [As to the Proposed Economic and Property Damages Class Action Settlement]; and (c) a Motion to Nullify Each and Every Gulf Coast Claims Facility (“GCCF”) “Release and Covenant Not to Sue.”

Click here to read the memorandum in support of Motion (a).

Click here to read the first memorandum in support of Motion (b).

Click here to read the second memorandum in support of Motion (b).

On October 10, 2012, Judge Barbier issued the following two-sentence Order:

“Before the Court are Plaintiffs’ Motions to Nullify Each and Every Gulf Coast Claims Facility “Release and Covenant Not to Sue” and Vacate Preliminary Approval Order [As to the Proposed Economic and Property Damages Class Action Settlement]. (Rec. Docs. 7473, 6902, 6831). Having considered the motion, the applicable law, and the relevant record, IT IS ORDERED that the Motions (Rec. Docs. 7473, 6902, 6831) are DENIED.”

(9) The MDL 2179 Court has overreached its authority.

The Supreme Court has held that a district court conducting pretrial proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1407(a) has no authority to invoke 28 U.S.C. §1404(a) to assign a transferred case to itself for trial. Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998).

(10) Illegally excluding approximately 200,000 claimants from the proposed settlement greatly decreases the bargaining power of the “Class Members.”

GCCF’s “Release and Covenant Not to Sue” violates OPA: (a) by requiring the release of future damages as requirement for receiving a payment from the GCCF claims process, in contravention of 33 U.S.C. § 2705(a) and 33 U.S.C. §§ 2715(b)(1) and (2); and (b) Feinberg, et al. intentionally failed to provide a process for presenting, processing and paying interim, short-term damages, in contravention of 33 U.S.C. § 2705(a) and 33 U.S.C. §§ 2715(b)(1) and (2).

The text and the legislative history of the OPA statute are clear. OPA expressly prohibits Responsible Parties from engaging in a “Delay, Deny, Defend” strategy wherein the victims of an oil spill are starved and ultimately forced to sign a release and covenant not to sue in order to receive a miniscule payment amount for all damages, including future damages, they incur as a result of the oil spill.

GCCF’s “Release and Covenant Not to Sue” violates State contract law because it: (1) was obtained through the use of economic duress; (2) was obtained without free consent (Claimants did not consent to the release by choice, because the only option for receiving payment required Claimants to sign a release, the terms of which they had no opportunity to negotiate.); (3) was obtained through fraud; (4) requires Claimants to discharge, waive and release future claims (including those resulting from gross negligence) for costs and damages (including punitive damages) that are unknown and have not yet arisen; (5) was obtained in exchange for inadequate consideration; and (6) has as its objective the circumvention of the OPA.

Accordingly, GCCF’s “Release and Covenant Not to Sue” is void ab initio.

In sum, GCCF’s “Release and Covenant Not to Sue” and the Proposed Settlement’s “Release and Covenant Not to Sue” violate federal law, State contract law, and are contrary to public policy. Illegally excluding approximately 200,000 Claimants from the Proposed Settlement also greatly decreases the bargaining power of the Class Members and results in an increased loss of faith in the federal judicial system.

Click here to read the Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Nullify Each and Every Gulf Coast Claims Facility (GCCF”) “Release and Covenant Not to Sue.”

(11) A class action may not be brought in a limitation proceeding.

The MDL 2179 Court may not certify a class in the limitation action because it would contravene the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Lloyds Leasing Ltd. v. Bates, 902 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1990). In Lloyds Leasing, the Fifth Circuit squarely held that a class action may not be brought in a limitation proceeding. Id. at 370. In affirming the district court’s denial of class certification, the Fifth Circuit reasoned as follows: First, the class action interferes with the concursus contemplated by the limitation of liability proceeding. . . . Second, the notice requirements of the limitation proceeding are more restrictive than the notice requirements of the class action. . . . Third, the entire thrust of Supplemental Rule F is that each claimant must appear individually and this is obviously inconsistent with the class action. Staring, Limitation Practice and Procedure, 53 Tul.L.Rev. 1134, 1150 (1979). In sum, “[t]he two rules are incompatible, and class representation in the sense of Rule 23 should therefore not be allowed in limitation proceedings.” Id.

Following Lloyd’s Leasing, courts in this district have routinely stricken class action allegations when they are filed within a limitation proceeding or dismissed class action complaints when they are filed after a limitation proceeding has been instituted. See, e.g., In re: Ingram Barge Co., No. 05-4419, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79403, 2006 WL 5377855, at *1 (E.D. La. Oct. 19, 2006) (striking class allegations pursuant to Lloyd’s Leasing); In re: River City Towing Servs., Inc., 204 F.R.D. 94, 97 (E.D. La. 2001) (same); Humphreys v. Antillen, N.V., Nos. 93-3799, 93-3714, 1994 WL 682811, at *3 (E.D. La. Jan. 31, 1994) (dismissing class action complaint filed after limitation proceeding). The limitation proceedings need not be resolved and limitation of liability upheld in order to dismiss class action allegations. For example, Judge Berrigan in Ingram Barge and Judge Feldman in Humphreys struck or dismissed class action allegations before deciding the limitation issue. See Gabarick v. Laurin Mar. (America), Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27180.

(12) The DHCC Data

The DHCC data, dated October 26, 2012, indicates that a total of 41,235 claimants have filed Individual Economic Loss, Individual Periodic Vendor or Festival Vendor Economic Loss, Business Economic Loss, Start-Up Business Economic Loss, and Failed Business Economic Loss claims with the DHCC. The DHCC paid only 407 of these claimants. In sum, the DHCC paid only 0.99% of the claimants who filed claims.

Of the 21,058 Individual Economic Loss claims submitted, 204 claimants have received payment offers totaling $2,190,404, resulting in 43 payments totaling $599,428. This equates to an average payment of only $13,940.19 per Individual Economic Loss Claimant!

What is life worth? According to BP and Feinberg, et al., the life of an individual BP oil spill victim wasn’t worth very much. According to BP/PSC and Juneau, et al., the life of an individual BP oil spill victim is worth even less!

CONCLUSION

The opt-out deadline for the Deepwater Horizon class action settlements is November 1, 2012. After that date, the game is over; BP has won, BP oil spill victims who do not opt-out are left out in the cold, and the PSC and other “common benefit” attorneys are extremely well-compensated.

___________

HOW TO OPT-OUT

Not surprisingly, the Class Action Settlement Notices do not provide “Class Members” with an “Opt-Out” form. Furthermore, the information required to properly opt-out of the Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement, and the mailing address to where the opt-out notice must be sent, differs from the information required and the mailing address to properly opt-out of the Economic and Property Damages Class Action Settlement.

Click here to download a sample Deepwater Horizon Economic and Property Damages Class Action Settlement Opt-Out Notice.

Click here to download a sample Deepwater Horizon Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement Opt-Out Notice.

________________

It’s Time for BP Oil Spill Victims to Opt-Out of the Deepwater Horizon Class Action Settlements

It’s Time for BP Oil Spill Victims to Opt-Out of the Deepwater Horizon Class Action Settlements

The Only Beneficiaries Are BP and the Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee

Tampa, FL (August 29, 2012) – The deadline for BP oil spill victims (“Class Members”) to opt-out of the Deepwater Horizon Economic and Property Damages Class Action Settlement and the Deepwater Horizon Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement is November 1, 2012.

It is important to note that these class action settlements do not actually provide for funds to be distributed to Class Members; they merely give BP oil spill victims the right to submit, yet again, a claim for economic and property damages and medical benefits.

“BP has estimated the cost of the proposed settlement to be approximately $7.8 billion.” Judge Barbier’s admonition in his Order of August 26, 2011 is instructive: “The long term effects [of the BP oil spill] on the environment and fisheries may not be known for many years.” Since, as Judge Barbier points out, the long term effects, and therefore the associated costs, of the BP oil spill on the environment and fisheries may not be known for many years, BP can only estimate its cost by multiplying the approximate number of claimants by an average amount BP is willing to pay each claimant. The average amount BP proposes to pay each claimant under the Proposed Settlements is not difficult to surmise: “The BP Parties may appeal a final compensation award determination only where the compensation amount determined by the settlement program is in excess of $25,000.” (p. 58, Rec. Doc. 6276-1).

Class Members who do not opt-out will be at the complete mercy of BP, Garden City Group, Inc., BrownGreer, PLC, and PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP. Under Feinberg/GCCF, and now under Juneau/DHCC, this means payment will be denied to approximately 61.46% of the claimants who file claims; the average total amount that will be paid per claimant will be $27,466.47.

Who Should Opt-Out

All Class Members, not represented by legal counsel, who have not been fully compensated for damages resulting from the BP oil spill should opt-out. This includes any natural person or entity who or that made a claim to GCCF and was illegally forced to execute a “Release and Covenant Not to Sue” in order to receive a miniscule payment.

Each natural person or entity who or that has suffered damages resulting from the BP oil spill of April, 2010 has the legal right to, and should immediately seek, competent legal counsel to directly represent his, her, or its interests. BP oil spill victims must understand that the Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee, attorneys who unscrupulously signed-up hundreds or even thousands of class members for class action lawsuits immediately after the oil spill incident, and attorneys who represent industry coalitions and organizations do not represent their individual interests.

Given that the damages suffered by the vast majority of Class Members as a result of the BP oil spill of April, 2010 are potentially so great and will be on-going, class action lawsuits should not be necessary to permit effective litigation of these claims. Here, where the amount of damages suffered by the individual is so great, the filing of an individual lawsuit should be economically feasible and in the best interests of the plaintiff.

When Should Class Members Opt-Out

All Class Members who have not been fully compensated for damages resulting from the BP oil spill by September 1, 2012 should opt-out. This will allow sufficient time for Class Members to learn: (a) the legal rights provided to BP oil spill victims under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (“OPA”); (b) why BP oil spill victims should not be required to prematurely waive their right to sue in exchange for a miniscule final settlement payment; and (c) why class actions may not be in the best interests of BP oil spill victims.

Opting-out would be an excellent Labor Day weekend activity for all BP oil spill victims. A properly executed Opt-Out Notice for each of the two proposed class action settlements should be mailed by Class Members on September 4, 2012.

How to Opt-Out

Not surprisingly, the Class Action Settlement Notices do not provide Class Members with an “Opt-Out” form. Furthermore, the information required to properly opt-out of the Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement, and the mailing address to where the opt-out notice must be sent, differs from the information required and the mailing address to properly opt-out of the Economic and Property Damages Class Action Settlement.

Click here to download a sample Deepwater Horizon Economic and Property Damages Class Action Settlement Opt-Out Notice.

Click here to download a sample Deepwater Horizon Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement Opt-Out Notice.

Why Class Members Should Opt-Out

The standard for reviewing a proposed settlement of a class action is whether the proposed settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate” and whether it has been entered into without collusion between the parties.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana defines “collusion” as the “lawful means for the accomplishment of an unlawful purpose” and as a “secret understanding between two or more persons prejudicial to another, or a secret understanding to appear as adversaries, though in agreement.” Collusion does not require fraudulent conduct. See Dynamic Marine Consortium, SA v. Latini, MV, 179 F.3d 278 (5th Cir. 1999)

These Class Action Settlements Are Not Fair, Reasonable, and Adequate

Kenneth R. Feinberg, the former administrator of the now defunct Gulf Coast Claims Facility (“GCCF”), during widely-reported town hall meetings organized to promote GCCF, repeatedly told victims of the BP oil spill that they did not need to hire a lawyer. Feinberg explained, “The litigation route in court will mean uncertainty, years of delay and a big cut for the lawyers….I take the position, if I don’t find you eligible, no court will find you eligible….I am determined to come up with a system that will be more generous, more beneficial, than if you go and file a lawsuit.”

The GCCF has been replaced by the Deepwater Horizon Claims Center (“DHCC”). Patrick Juneau, the court-appointed administrator of the DHCC, repeatedly tells victims of the BP oil spill, “If you’re in doubt, file the claim…..We’ll do the homework for you.” Juneau, with a very slight change in rhetoric, is obviously using the same “Delay, Deny, Defend” playbook which proved to be so successful for Feinberg.

The DHCC and the GCCF are virtually identical. Under the GCCF, the evaluation and processing of claims were performed by Garden City Group, Inc., BrownGreer, PLC, and PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP. Under the DHCC, the evaluation and processing of claims shall continue to be performed by Garden City Group, Inc., BrownGreer, PLC, and PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP.  Accordingly, although Patrick Juneau has replaced Feinberg, there is no reason to believe that the percentage of claimants denied payment and the average total amount paid per claimant will change under the DHCC.

Recently Feinberg said, “I think it’s a tribute to the GCCF that all the people we used have been retained. I take great satisfaction in that fact.” It is unlikely that Class Members will share Feinberg’s satisfaction.

Here is a perfect example of a “secret understanding between two or more persons” (BP, the PSC, the GCCF, and the DHCC) which is “prejudicial to another” (the Class Members).

The Miniscule Amount GCCF Paid to BP Oil Spill Victims

GCCF Overall Program Statistics

(Status Report as of March 7, 2012)

Total Amount Paid = $6,079,922,450.47

Total Number of Paid Claimants = 221,358

Average Total Amount Paid Per Claimant = $27,466.47

The GCCF data indicates that a total of 574,379 unique claimants filed claims with the GCCF during the period from approximately August 23, 2010 to March 7, 2012.  The GCCF paid only 221,358 of these Claimants. In sum, the GCCF denied payment to approximately 61.46% of the claimants who filed claims.

These Class Action Settlements Provide for a Refund of Approximately $6 Billion to BP While Granting Excessive Compensation to the PSC and Other Counsel Performing “Common Benefit” Work

(1) The Refund to BP

Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust     $20.0 Billion

Approximate Amount Paid to Claimants by GCCF   $ 6.2 Billion

Cost of the Proposed Settlement     $ 7.8 Billion

Amount to be Refunded to BP     $ 6.0 Billion

(2) The Excessive Compensation to the PSC, et al.

The PSC and other counsel allegedly performing common benefit work in MDL 2179 are not double-dipping; they are triple-dipping. The known sources of compensation received by attorneys allegedly doing common benefit work on behalf of BP oil spill victims in MDL 2179 are:

(a) Six percent (6%) of the gross monetary settlements, judgments or other payments made on or after December 30, 2011 through June 3, 2012 to any other plaintiff or claimant-in-limitation. (p. 3, Rec. Doc. 5274);

N.B. – The Donovan Law Group received a Final Payment Offer from GCCF on behalf of a client. This offer, dated June 3, 2012 and postmarked June 8, 2012, was received on June 11, 2012. This offer, along with probably hundreds of other offers made to Claimants by GCCF, is dated one day before Claimants are no longer required to pay six percent (6%) of the gross monetary settlement they receive to the MDL 2179 common benefit fund. June 3, 2012 was a Sunday. These offers were dated June 3rd in order to ensure that the PSC received the maximum amount of payment from the 6% hold-back provision.

(b) BP has agreed to pay any award for common benefit and/or Rule 23(h) attorneys’ fees, as determined by the Court, up to $600 million. (p. 10, Rec. Doc. 6418);

(c) Many attorneys doing common benefit work have their own clients and have also received or will also receive a fee directly from them. (N.B. – On June 15, 2012, the MDL 2179 Court ordered that “contingent fee arrangements for all attorneys representing claimants/plaintiffs that settle claims through either or both of the Settlements will be capped at 25% plus reasonable costs.”) (Rec. Doc. 6684); and

(d) Co-counsel fees received by member firms of the PSC for serving as co-counsel to non-member firms of the PSC. For example, on March 13, 2012, The Donovan Law Group received an unsolicited mass email from a member firm of the PSC. The email stated, in pertinent part, “Co-Counsel Opportunity for BP Oil Spill Cases: News of the recent BP Settlement has caused many individuals and businesses along the Gulf Coast to contemplate either filing a new claim or amending a claim that has already been submitted. If you receive inquiries of this nature we would like you to consider a co-counsel relationship with our firm. Even if someone has already filed a claim it is advisable to retain legal counsel to analyze the impact of this settlement on claimants and maximize recovery. If you receive inquiries and are interested in co-counseling with us on the BP claims, please email…”

In order to be awarded a common benefit fee of $600 million, the PSC attorneys and other counsel performing “common benefit” work would have to work two million hours. This fee amount, which does not include the aforementioned (a), (c), and (d) known sources of compensation, fails the reasonableness test.

The PSC, Not Class Members, Shall be Compensated “The BP Parties shall make a non-refundable payment of $75 million (the “Initial Payment”) into the Common Benefit Fee and Costs Fund on the first date on which all of the following have occurred: (i) 30 days have elapsed after the Court has granted preliminary approval of the Economic Agreement, and (ii) the Court has entered an Order modifying the Holdback Order to provide that it shall not apply to any Settlement Payments or Other Economic Benefits paid pursuant to the Economic Agreement…..” “……within 15 days after the end of each calendar quarter, the BP Parties shall irrevocably pay into the Common Benefit Fee and Costs Fund an amount equal to 6 % (six percent) of the aggregate Settlement Payments paid under the Economic Agreement in respect of Claimants that have executed an Individual Release.” (pp. 3-4, Rec. Doc. 6276-46).

In sum, the PSC and other counsel allegedly performing common benefit work are financially motivated to have as many Claimants execute an Individual Release as expeditiously as possible regardless of whether the negotiated settlements reflect the true value of the claims.

Collusion Permeates MDL 2179 and These Class Action Settlements

These Class Action Settlements Were Not Achieved in the Context of the Adversarial Process

While class action settlements may have certain attractive aspects, such as reducing litigation expenses, many of the traditional aspects of adversarial litigation are missing. As a result, the settlement is potentially the product of collusion among the parties: defendants who wish to rid themselves of the burden of litigation and plaintiffs’ counsel who wish to receive immediate compensation. “Often, the plaintiffs’ attorneys and the defendants can settle on a basis that is adverse to the interests of the plaintiffs. At its worst, the settlement process may amount to a covert exchange of a cheap settlement for a high award of attorney’s fees.” John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 669, 714 (1986).

BP and the PSC report that in February 2011 settlement negotiations began in earnest for two distinct class action settlements: a Medical Benefits Settlement and an Economic and Property Damages Settlement.” (p. 3, Rec. Doc. 6418). In sum, the PSC and other counsel allegedly performing common benefit work in MDL initiated settlement negotiations “in earnest” merely six (6) months after the JPML created MDL 2179.

The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (‘OPA”), a strict liability statute, governs cases alleging economic loss due to the BP oil spill. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”) governs personal injury and wrongful death actions and borrows the law of the adjacent state as surrogate federal law.

In order to recover damages under OPA, a claimant merely needs to show that his or her damages “resulted from” the oil spill. OPA, in pertinent part, states:

“The responsible party for a vessel or a facility from which oil is discharged, or which poses the substantial threat of a discharge of oil, into or upon the navigable waters or adjoining shorelines or the exclusive economic zone is liable for the removal costs and damages that result from such incident.” See 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a).

The damages referred to in 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) include, but are not limited to:

“Damages equal to the loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity due to the injury, destruction, or loss of real property, personal property, or natural resources, which shall be recoverable by any claimant.” 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(E) (Emphasis added).

Rather than allege claims under OPA, the PSC made the unfathomable decision to allege claims under a hodgepodge of statutes. On February 9, 2011, in the B1 First Amended Master Complaint, the PSC states, “The claims presented herein are admiralty or maritime claims within the meaning of Rule 9(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs hereby designate this case as an admiralty or maritime case, and request a non-jury trial, pursuant to Rule 9(h).”

The PSC appears to be more interested in ensuring significant economy and efficiency in the judicial administration of the MDL 2179 court rather than in obtaining justice for the MDL 2179 plaintiffs. As noted above, in its B1 First Amended Master Complaint, the PSC alleges claims under general maritime law, not under OPA and OCSLA, thereby assisting the MDL 2179 Court to expeditiously:

(a) Find, “The Deepwater Horizon was at all material times a vessel in navigation.”

(b) Find, “Admiralty jurisdiction is present because the alleged tort occurred upon navigable waters of the Gulf of Mexico, disrupted maritime commerce, and the operations of the vessel bore a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity. With admiralty jurisdiction comes the application of substantive maritime law.”

(c) Find, “State law, both statutory and common, is preempted by maritime law, notwithstanding OPA’s savings provisions. All claims brought under state law are dismissed.”

(d) Find, “General maritime law claims that do not allege physical damage to a proprietary interest are dismissed under the Robins Dry Dock rule, unless the claim falls into the commercial fishermen exception.”

(e) Find, “…. That nothing prohibits Defendants from settling claims for economic loss. While OPA does not specifically address the use of waivers and releases by Responsible Parties, the statute also does not clearly prohibit it. In fact, as the Court has recognized in this Order, one of the goals of OPA was to allow for speedy and efficient recovery by victims of an oil spill.”

In re Oil Spill by the Rig Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, – F. Supp. 2d -, 2011 WL 3805746 (Aug. 26, 2011 E.D. La.).

In sum, in February, 2011, the PSC: (a) initiated settlement negotiations “in earnest” with BP for two distinct class action settlements: a Medical Benefits Settlement and an Economic and Property Damages Settlement; and (b) filed the B1 First Amended Master Complaint under general maritime law, rather than OPA and OCSLA, thereby ensuring that BP would not be held strictly liable in the bench trial.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Deepwater Horizon Economic and Property Damages Class Action Settlement and the Deepwater Horizon Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement are neither “fair, reasonable, and adequate” nor have they been entered into without collusion between the parties.

The motto for Class Members should be: “If in doubt, opt-out!”

_________________

OPT-OUT UPDATE No. 1

Beginning on September 10, 2012, some BP oil spill victims filed requests for discovery with the MDL 2179 Court regarding the economic class action settlement. These individuals are objecting to the economic class action settlement entered into between the PSC and BP. Accordingly, the Court refers to them as “Objectors.”

These victims contend, in part, that: (1) much of the evidence submitted by the PSC and BP on August 13, 2012 in support of the motions for final approval of the settlement was not published or otherwise available prior thereto; (2) communications between the PSC and BP relating to the propriety of the proposed settlement were not shared with counsel for Objectors; (3) the PSC and BP did not produce any of the evidence on which their experts’ opinions are based; (4) it is impossible for the Objectors to evaluate the proposed settlement without “limited discovery;” (5) the Court has discretion to grant their requests for “limited discovery;” (6) the Phase One and Phase Two discovery concerns only the issue of liability; (7) the rationale and bases for the terms of the settlement cannot be found in the record; and (8) discovery is required because the Economic Loss Zones are arbitrary and capricious.

On September 25, 2012, these requests were denied by the MDL 2179 Court. The Court held:

Objectors Have No Absolute Right to Discovery.

There is no “absolute right” to conduct discovery or present evidence simply because a person is a class member. In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 144 F.R.D. 421, 424 (N.D. Ga. 1992). In evaluating settlements for approval, the fundamental question is whether the Court has sufficient facts before it to approve or disapprove the settlement. In re Gen. Tire & Rubber Co. Sec. Litig., 726 F.2d 1075, 1084 n.6 (6th Cir. 1984). The Court has broad discretion to permit or deny objector discovery requests. Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1333 (5th Cir. 1977).

Objectors’ Discovery Requests Are Unnecessary.

In Newby v. Enron, Corp., 394 F.3d 296 (5th Cir. 2004), the Fifth Circuit held that “formal discovery is not necessary as long as (1) the interests of the class are not prejudiced by the settlement negotiations and (2) there are substantial factual bases on which to premise settlement.” Id. at 306. The “critical question” to determine whether independent discovery by objectors is necessary is whether the Court has “sufficient facts before it to intelligently consider the proposed settlement.” In re Ford Motor Co. Bronco II Prods. Liab. Litig., 1994 WL 593998 at *3 (E.D. La. Oct. 28, 1994). Where significant documentation has already been produced and testimony taken, “independent discovery should generally not be allowed.” In re Ford Motor Co. Bronco II, 1994 WL 593998 at *3.

The Court’s task is to consider the record that appears before it to determine if, on the basis of that record, it may make the findings necessary to certify the settlement class and determine that the settlement agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate under Rule 23. It is not the role of the Objectors to renegotiate the agreement, nor determine whether the class would receive more compensation in contested litigation. None of the Objectors demonstrate how their discovery is required to enable them to support their objections, to decide whether to remain in the settlement class, or to aid the Court. The Objectors’ discovery is unnecessary because it is not relevant to the Court’s review.

The settlement compensates each and every class member according to frameworks that are transparent and which were filed nearly five months ago. Any class member seeking to determine his compensation may simply read the settlement agreements and determine how his circumstances fit into the frameworks. There is no reason that any objector needs to know the estimated size of the class, because the settlement is uncapped for the majority of claimants. An objector does not need to know the total amount of losses of the class when the settlement agreement provides for the payment of all compensatory damages. The Court may determine that the settlement agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate without this information.

Since April 18, the Objectors were able to review the settlement agreement, analyze the benefits under the agreement, evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of their own claims and determine whether they are better off participating in the settlement or opting out. By opting out, those who are not satisfied with the settlement’s provisions escape their binding effect, and thus are free to pursue their claims and seek the relief they desire. In re Vitamins Antitrust Class Actions, 215 F.3d 26, 28-29 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

The bottom line is that the proposed discovery will neither materially advance the objectors’ objections nor assist the Court’s consideration of the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the settlement agreement.

The Settlement Agreement is the Product of Arms-Length Negotiations.

The Settlement Agreement was negotiated in good faith and at arm’s length over many months. All told, BP and the PSC engaged in more than 145 days of face-to-face meetings. Rec. Doc. 6418 at 3. The negotiations were extensive and highly contested. In the final months the negotiations were conducted under the supervision of the undersigned as Court mediator.

Because the settlement agreement was reached through arm’s length negotiations, information sought by the movers on why the parties negotiated the terms that they did is unnecessary. See Manual for Complex Litigation (4th), p. 328 (“A court should not allow discovery into the settlement negotiation process unless the objector makes a preliminary showing of collusion or other improper behavior.”)

__________________

OPT-OUT UPDATE No. 2

DHCC Overall Program Statistics

(Status Report as of October 5, 2012)

Individual Economic Loss

19,338 claim forms were submitted,

DHCC made 79 payment offers in the total amount of $860,968,

24 offers were accepted, and

DHCC made 6 payments in the total amount of $38,173.

Individual Periodic Vendor or Festival Vendor Economic Loss

132 claim forms were submitted,

DHCC made 0 payment offers,

0 offers were accepted, and

DHCC made 0 payments.

Business Economic Loss

14,558 claim forms were submitted,

DHCC made 485 payment offers in the total amount of $86,962,974,

280 offers were accepted, and

DHCC made 65 payments in the total amount of $10,181,973.

Start-Up Business Economic Loss

1,202 claim forms were submitted,

DHCC made 7 payment offers in the total amount of $1,235,483,

2 offers were accepted, and

DHCC made 0 payments.

Failed Business Economic Loss

1,238 claim forms were submitted,

DHCC made 0 payment offers,

0 offers were accepted, and

DHCC made 0 payments.

The DHCC data indicates that a total of 36,468 claimants filed the above types of claims with the DHCC during the period from approximately June 4, 2012 to October 5, 2012. The DHCC paid only 71 of these claimants. In sum, the DHCC paid only 0.19% of the claimants who filed claims.

Of the 19,338 Individual Economic Loss claims submitted, 79 claimants have received payment offers totaling $860,968, resulting in 6 payments totaling $38,173. This equates to an average payment of only $6,362.17 per Individual Economic Loss Claimant!

What is life worth?

According to BP and Feinberg, et al., the life of an individual BP oil spill victim wasn’t worth very much. According to BP/PSC and Juneau, et al., the life of an individual BP oil spill victim is worth even less!

How the BP Oil Spill Proposed Class Action Settlement Makes a Mockery of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990

How the BP Oil Spill Proposed Class Action Settlement

Makes a Mockery of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990

Tampa, FL (July 5, 2012) – On April 18, 2012, the MDL 2179 Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee (“PSC”) and BP filed their Proposed Settlement. The Proposed Settlement allegedly intends to resolve certain claims by private individuals and businesses for economic loss and property damage resulting from the “Deepwater Horizon Incident.” The Proposed Settlement defines “Deepwater Horizon Incident” as the events, actions, inactions and omissions leading up to and including (i) the blowout of the MC252 Well; (ii) the explosions and fire on board the Deepwater Horizon on or about April 20, 2010; (iii) the sinking of the Deepwater Horizon on or about April 22, 2010; (iv) the release of oil, other hydrocarbons and other substances from the MC252 Well and/or the Deepwater Horizon and its appurtenances; (v) the efforts to contain the MC252 Well; (vi) Response Activities, including the VoO Program; (vii) the operation of the GCCF; and (viii) BP public statements relating to all of the foregoing.

On May 2, 2012, the MDL 2179 Court entered a Preliminary Approval Order [As to the Proposed Economic and Property Damages Class Action Settlement].

On July 2, 2012, Plaintiff Selmer M. Salvesen, a clam farmer in Florida, filed a Motion to Vacate Preliminary Approval Order [As to the Proposed Economic and Property Damages Class Action Settlement], Rec. Doc. 6418 dated May 2, 2012, with the MDL 2179 Court.

The following is an excerpt from Plaintiff Salvesen’s Motion to Vacate.

B.  The Proposed Settlement Violates the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (“OPA”).

Judge Barbier clearly states, “Moreover, OPA applies of its own force, because that act governs, inter alia, private claims for property damage and economic loss resulting from a discharge of oil in navigable waters. See 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a), (b)(2)(B), (b)(2)(C), (b)(2)(E).” (p. 11, Rec. Doc. 3830); “OPA is a comprehensive statute addressing responsibility for oil spills, including the cost of clean-up, liability for civil penalties, as well as economic damages incurred by private parties and public entities. Indeed, the Senate Report provides that the Act “builds upon section 311 of the Clean Water Act to create a single Federal law providing cleanup authority, penalties, and liability for oil pollution.” S. Rep. 101-94, at 730 (1989). One significant part of OPA broadened the scope of private persons who are allowed to recover for economic losses resulting from an oil spill. OPA allows recovery for economic losses “resulting from” or “due to” the oil spill, regardless of whether the claimant sustained physical damage to a proprietary interest. OPA allows recovery for “[d]amages equal to the loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity due to the injury, destruction, or loss of real property, or natural resources, which shall be recoverable by any claimant.” 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(E) (Emphasis added). Furthermore, the House Report noted that “[t]he claimant need not be the owner of the damaged property or resources to recover for lost profits or income.” H.R. Conf. Rep. 101-653, at 781 (1990).” (pp. 20-21, Rec. Doc. 3830).

The Proposed Settlement is replete with references to the OPA: “….the operation of BP’s separate OPA facility…” (p. 27, Rec. Doc. 6276-1); “This provision does not apply to Economic Class Members who have gone through the OPA Process and provided a release as part of that OPA Process.” (p. 66, Rec. Doc. 6276-1); “The Release is not intended to prevent BP from exercising its rights of contribution, subrogation, or indemnity under the OPA……” (p. 72, Rec. Doc. 6276-1); “BP is hereby subrogated to any and all rights that the Economic Class Members, or any of them, may have had or have arising out of, due to, resulting from, or relating in any way to, directly or indirectly, the Deepwater Horizon Incident under the OPA.” (p. 72, Rec. Doc. 6276-1); “Notwithstanding the law applicable to the underlying claims, which the Parties dispute, this Agreement and the Release and Individual Releases hereunder shall be interpreted in accordance with General Maritime Law as well as in a manner intended to comply with OPA.” (p. 90, Rec. Doc. 6276-1); “OPA Process shall mean the claims presentment procedure pursuant to the OPA, including claims that have been submitted to the BP Parties or claims that have been submitted to the GCCF as part of the OPA Process.” (p. 104, Rec. Doc. 6276-1); “….the parties have represented that BP will continue to receive and process Oil Pollution Act (“OPA”) claims for those excluded from the settlement class and those who opt out of the settlement class. (Tr. of Prelim. Approval Hr’g, 4/25/12, pp. 14-15, 49-50, Rec. Doc. 6395); see also Attach. “A” to Supp. Decl. of Cameron Azari, Ques. 15 & 25, Rec. Doc. 6414-4 at 15, 23). Presumably, that process will include an interim payments process, as well as any other requirements imposed by OPA. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 2705(a), 2714(b)(2).“ (p. 18, Rec. Doc. 6418); “This is, unlike most mass torts, a single-incident disaster, governed predominantly by a single body of federal law including OPA and uniform federal maritime law.” (p. 28, Rec. Doc. 6418).

Clearly, BP and the PSC are very familiar with the OPA and quite capable of applying the statute. Unfortunately, BP and the PSC cherry-pick OPA’s provisions for their benefit at the detriment to Claimants and Plaintiffs.

1.  The Proposed Settlement Defines Class Members by Geographic Bounds and Certain Business Activities While Requiring Proof of a Heightened, Vague  Standard of Causation.

OPA is a strict liability statute. In order to recover damages, a claimant merely needs to show that his or her damages “resulted from” the oil spill. OPA, in pertinent part, states:

“The responsible party for a vessel or a facility from which oil is discharged, or which poses the substantial threat of a discharge of oil, into or upon the navigable waters or adjoining shorelines or the exclusive economic zone is liable for the removal costs and damages that result from such incident.” See 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a).

The damages referred to in 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) include, but are not limited to:

“Damages equal to the loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity due to the injury, destruction, or loss of real property, personal property, or natural resources, which shall be recoverable by any claimant.” 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(E) (Emphasis added).

OPA’s legislative history is shot through with general statements indicative of congressional intent to authorize recovery of “a broad class of damages.” 135 CONG. REC. E842, (daily ed. Mar. 16, 1989) (statement of Rep. Jones). See also S. REP. NO. 101–94, at 12 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 734. (“These provisions are intended to provide compensation for a wide range of injuries and are not so narrowly focused as to prevent victims of an oil spill from receiving reasonable compensation.”); 135 CONG. REC. H7893 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1989) (statement of Rep. Quillen) (“full, fair, and swift compensation for everyone injured by oil spills”; “residents of States will be fully compensated for all economic damages”).

The OPA statute was carefully drafted by Congress. It seems plain that the combination of Sections 2702(a) and 2702(b)(2)(E) requires an economic-loss claimant to establish that the defendant’s spill was a factual cause of injury, destruction, or loss of tangible property or natural resources that in turn was a factual cause of the claimant’s damages – nothing more and nothing less. Because the prevailing, default test for factual causation in Anglo-American tort law is the but-for test, we can be fairly precise about the evident meaning of Sections 2702(a) and 2702(b)(2)(E) for an economic-loss claimant: The claimant is required to show that if the spill had not brought about the injury, destruction, or loss of tangible property or natural resources, the damages complained of probably would not have been sustained. See David W. Robertson, The Oil Pollution Act’s Provisions on Damages for Economic Loss, 30 Miss. C.L. Rev. 157 (2011).

An early version of a bill culminating in OPA provided that economic loss plaintiffs would have to prove “proximate cause;” Congress took that out of the bill. Neither Section 2702(a) nor Section 2702(b)(2)(E) includes any mention of “proximate cause.” Where Congress includes limiting language in an earlier version of a bill but deletes it prior to enactment, it may be presumed that the limitation was not intended. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23-24 (1983). Therefore, Russello counsels us to conclude that the OPA Congress did not want to require claimants seeking economic loss damages to meet a proximate cause requirement. Id.

OPA’s predecessor legislation included an explicit proximate cause limit. Title III of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978 provided for the recovery of pollution-caused damages that were “proximately caused by the discharge of oil from an offshore facility or vessel.” OPA repealed this provision, replacing it with Section 2702(a). So here again, the Russello canon calls for the presumption that the OPA Congress did not intend a proximate cause limit to be read into its economic loss provisions. See H.R. REP. NO. 101–653 (1990) (Conf. Rep.) (presenting § 1002(a) of H.R. 1465 as providing for liability for removal costs and damages “that result from” a spill or substantial threat of a spill; the language is identical to the enacted Section 2702(a)). Here once again, the Russello canon requires a presumption that the OPA Congress intended that for purposes of recovering economic loss damages, the only causation requirement should be factual causation (Emphasis added). Id.

The Preliminary Approval Order states that the Economic Loss and Property Damage Settlement Class “would consist of individuals and entities defined by (1) geographic bounds and (2) the nature of their loss or damage. If both criteria are not met……..the individual or entity is not within the settlement class.” “The geographic bounds of the settlement are Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and certain coastal counties in eastern Texas and western Florida, as well as specified adjacent Gulf waters, bays, etc. Individuals must have lived, worked, owned property, leased property, etc., in these areas between April 20, 20108 and April 16, 2012. Similarly, entities must have conducted certain business activity in these areas between April 20, 2010 and April 16, 2012.” (p. 5, Rec. Doc. 6418). “Causation is presumed for some claimants; other claimants must demonstrate that a loss is due to the oil spill as outlined by the Proposed Settlement.” (p. 8, Rec. Doc. 6418).

OPA’s legislative history specifically mentioned classes of claimants as entitled to protection. These included, but were not limited to, fishermen and beachfront hotel owners, fish processing plant employees, and those who work at the companies depending on the fisheries. 135 CONG. REC. E1237 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 1989) (statement of Rep. Miller); “an employee at a coastal motel” 135 CONG. REC. H7898 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1989) (statement of Rep. Jones); “restaurant operators” 135 CONG. REC. H8263 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1989) (statement of Rep. Studds); “fishermen and others whose livelihood depended on the once-pristine waters” 135 CONG. REC. H8271(daily ed. Nov. 9, 1989) (statement of Rep. Slaughter).

The following is merely one example of how the Proposed Settlement limits BP’s liability at the expense of BP oil spill victims:

Jack owns a seafood restaurant located in Macon, Georgia which serves seafood exclusively from the Gulf of Mexico. Jack’s restaurant has always catered to those diners who prefer fresh seafood, delivered straight from the Gulf of Mexico, over the processed seafood dishes served by the national seafood restaurant chains.

The BP oil spill incident devastated the commercial fishing industries of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida, thereby virtually eliminating the ability of Jack’s restaurant to serve fresh seafood to its customers. Fresh oysters and mini-shrimp, two of Jack’s most popular items, were unavailable. Jack was forced to pay higher prices for frozen seafood to East Coast seafood suppliers. The negative publicity generated by the constant media coverage of this oil spill incident made even Jack’s loyal customers fearful of eating seafood from the Gulf of Mexico. A marketing survey commissioned by Louisiana’s seafood promotion board reported in January, 2011 that about 71 percent of consumers polled nationally expressed some level of concern about seafood safety.

Jack claims that the stoppage of fresh seafood deliveries from the Gulf of Mexico, the increase in the price of alternative East Coast seafood, and the fear of seafood contamination and seafood poisoning that resulted from the BP oil spill incident decreased gross sales to the point that the restaurant, after approximately 25 years of successful and profitable operation, was forced to close its doors.

In the above example, Jack was forced to close his restaurant as a result of the BP oil spill. Under OPA, since the damages resulted from the BP oil spill incident, damages shall be recoverable by Jack. Under the Proposed Settlement, due to the arbitrary geographic bounds established by BP/PSC, Jack is out of luck.

As the Supreme Court recently explained:

[I]n interpreting a statute a court should always turn first to one, cardinal canon before all others. We have stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992).

Congress never intended that a claimant’s recovery of damages under OPA be limited by geographic bounds, pertain solely to certain business activities, or require a heightened, and in this case vague, proof of causation between his or her damages and the oil spill incident.

2.  The Proposed Settlement Provides for a Shortened Period of Limitations.

Under OPA, an action for damages shall be barred unless the action is brought within three years after the date on which the loss and the connection of the loss with the discharge in question are reasonably discoverable with the exercise of due care. 33 U.S.C. § 2717(f)(1)(A)

In violation of OPA, the Preliminary Approval Order states, “The deadline for filing most claims with the Settlement Program is the later of April 22, 2014 or six months after the “Effective Date” of the Proposed Settlement. Claimants in the Seafood Compensation Program must submit their claim within 30 days from the date of entry of a Final Order and Judgment of the Court after it rules upon final approval of the Proposed Settlement.”  (p. 6, Rec. Doc. 6418).

The Proposed Settlement’s “take it or leave it” period of limitations and the final settlement offer are unconscionable, requiring the financially-stressed Plaintiffs to file a claim before Plaintiffs know, and are able to corroborate, the full extent of the damages incurred as a result of the BP oil spill. As Judge Barbier aptly stated in his Order of August 26, 2011, “The long term effects [of the BP oil spill] on the environment and fisheries may not be known for many years.” (p. 31, Rec. Doc. 3830) (Emphasis added).

3.  The Proposed Settlement Requires Class Members to Waive Their Right to Sue in Exchange for a Miniscule Single Final Settlement Payment.

OPA further provides: (a) “Payment or settlement of a claim for interim, short-term damages representing less than the full amount of damages to which the claimant ultimately may be entitled shall not preclude recovery by the claimant for damages not reflected in the paid or settled partial claim.” 33 U.S.C. § 2705(a); and (b) Any person, including the [Oil Spill Liability Trust] Fund, who pays compensation pursuant to OPA to any claimant for damages shall be subrogated to all rights, claims, and causes of action that the claimant has under any other law. Moreover, payment of such a claim shall not foreclose a claimant’s right to recovery of all damages to which the claimant otherwise is entitled under OPA or under any other law. 33 U.S.C. § 2715(b)(2).

The Preliminary Approval Order states, “Those who accept payments under the Proposed Settlement are required to release their claims against BP, government oil spill liability funds, and all other Defendants in MDL 2179 (except Transocean and Halliburton)….If preliminary approval is given, the Settlement Program will process claims and make settlement payments to class members so long as they execute an individual release.” (pp. 6-7, Rec. Doc. 6418).

OPA’s legislative history is shot through with general statements indicative of congressional intent to ensure that all oil spill victims are fully compensated. 135 CONG. REC. H7959 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1989) (statement of Rep. Tauzin) (“ensure that all victims are fully compensated”); 135 CONG. REC. H7964 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1989) (statement of Rep. Hammerschmidt) (“ensure that all justified claims for compensation are satisfied”); 135 CONG. REC. H7969 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1989) (statement of Rep. Dyson) (“assurances that damages arising from spills will be completely compensated”); 136 CONG. REC. H336 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) (statement of Rep. Carper) (“ensure that those people or those businesses that are damaged by these spills are fairly and adequately compensated”); 136 CONG. REC. S7752 (daily ed. June 12, 1990) (statement of Sen. Mitchell) (“ensure the fullest possible compensation of oil spill victims”).

No claimant should receive any less compensation from the Proposed Settlement than they are entitled to under the OPA. Under OPA, as noted above, the term “claim” means “a request, made in writing for a sum certain, for compensation for damages or removal costs resulting from an [oil spill] incident” and payment of such a claim shall not foreclose a claimant’s right to recovery of all damages to which the claimant otherwise is entitled under OPA or under any other law. 33 U.S.C. § 2715(b)(2).

4.  The Proposed Settlement Fails to Pay Interest on the Amount Paid.

Under OPA, 33 U.S.C. § 2705(a), the responsible party or the responsible party’s guarantor is liable to a claimant for interest on the amount paid in satisfaction of a claim. The period for which interest shall be paid is the period beginning on the 30th day following the date on which the claim is presented to the responsible party or guarantor and ending on the date on which the claim is paid. The Proposed Settlement fails to pay interest on the amount paid in satisfaction of a claim.

Plaintiff Salvesen respectfully points out to this Honorable Court that the Proposed Settlement makes a mockery of the OPA.

Is the BP Oil Spill Proposed Class Action Settlement Fair, Reasonable, and Adequate?

Is the BP Oil Spill Proposed Class Action Settlement Fair, Reasonable, and Adequate?

_____________________________

Plaintiff Files Motion to Vacate Preliminary Approval Order

Tampa, FL (July 4, 2012) – On April 18, 2012, the MDL 2179 Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee (“PSC”) and BP filed their Proposed Settlement. The Proposed Settlement allegedly intends to resolve certain claims by private individuals and businesses for economic loss and property damage resulting from the “Deepwater Horizon Incident.” The Proposed Settlement defines “Deepwater Horizon Incident” as the events, actions, inactions and omissions leading up to and including (i) the blowout of the MC252 Well; (ii) the explosions and fire on board the Deepwater Horizon on or about April 20, 2010; (iii) the sinking of the Deepwater Horizon on or about April 22, 2010; (iv) the release of oil, other hydrocarbons and other substances from the MC252 Well and/or the Deepwater Horizon and its appurtenances; (v) the efforts to contain the MC252 Well; (vi) Response Activities, including the VoO Program; (vii) the operation of the GCCF; and (viii) BP public statements relating to all of the foregoing.

On May 2, 2012, the MDL 2179 Court entered a Preliminary Approval Order [As to the Proposed Economic and Property Damages Class Action Settlement].

On July 2, 2012, Plaintiff Selmer M. Salvesen, a clam farmer in Florida, filed a Motion to Vacate Preliminary Approval Order [As to the Proposed Economic and Property Damages Class Action Settlement], Rec. Doc. 6418 dated May 2, 2012, with the MDL 2179 Court.

The following is an excerpt from Plaintiff Salvesen’s Motion to Vacate.

A. The Proposed Settlement Is Not Fair, Reasonable, and Adequate.

Rule 23(e) places the burden of persuasion on the movers that the proposed settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”  In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., 2012 WL 92498, at *7 (E.D. La. Jan. 10, 2012). If the proposed settlement “discloses no reason to doubt its fairness, has no obvious deficiencies, does not improperly grant preferential treatment to class representatives or segments of the class, does not grant excessive compensation to attorneys, and appears to fall within the range of possible approval, the court should grant preliminary approval.” In re OCA, Inc. Sec. & Deriv. Litig., No. 05-2165, 2008 WL 4681369, at *11 (E.D. La. Oct. 17, 2008).

1.  The Proposed Settlement Provides Misleading Information to Class Members.

Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (‘OPA”), claims for damages must be presented first to the responsible party. 33 U.S.C. § 2713(a). In the event that a claim for damages is not paid by the responsible party within 90 days, the claimant may elect to commence an action in court against the responsible party or to present the claim to the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund. 33 U.S.C. § 2713(c).

“The Court is satisfied that, pursuant to the terms of the Proposed Settlement, Class Members who opt out or who possess reserved claims will be able to pursue those claims effectively outside the Class Settlement.” (p. 26, Rec. Doc. 6418). BP and the PSC have misled this Honorable Court and Class Members.

(a)  The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund

The OPA provides the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (“OSLTF”) to pay for oil spill costs when the responsible party cannot or does not pay. The OSLTF, administered by the U.S. Coast Guard through its National Pollution Funds Center (“NPFC”), is primarily financed through a tax on petroleum products, and is subject to a $1 billion cap on the amount of expenditures from the OSLTF per incident. For any one oil pollution incident, the OSLTF may pay up to $1 billion. Victims of the BP oil spill are at risk as a result of this cap. The cap is for total expenditures. This $1 billion expenditure limit applies even if the OSLTF is fully reimbursed by the responsible party and net expenditures are zero. OSLTF expenditures for natural resource damage assessments and claims in connection with a single incident are limited to $500 million of that $1 billion. NPFC administers the OSLTF by disbursing funds to government agencies to reimburse them for their oil spill cleanup costs (cost reimbursements), monitoring the sources and uses of funds, adjudicating claims submitted by individuals and businesses to the OSLTF for payment (claims), and pursuing reimbursement from the responsible party for costs and damages paid from the OSLTF (billing the responsible party).

On March 9, 2012, Mr. Craig A. Bennett, Director – NPFC, provided the following OSLTF status report in regard to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill incident:

Deepwater Horizon OSLTF Costs     =          $619 million

Deepwater Horizon Pending Claims =          $410 million (for 1,659 claims received)

On March 9, 2012, total OSLTF expenditures (paid + pending claims) in regard to the Deepwater Horizon was $1.019 billion. In sum, since the OSLTF has exceeded, or will very shortly exceed, its $1 billion expenditure cap for the Deepwater Horizon oil spill incident, the OSLTF cannot pay valid individual or business claims which are not paid by BP.

(b)  The Litigation Option

OPA, a strict liability statute, governs the MDL 2179 cases alleging economic loss due to the BP oil spill. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”) governs the MDL 2179 personal injury and wrongful death actions and borrows the law of the adjacent state as surrogate federal law.

Judge Barbier aptly stated in his Order dated August 26, 2011, “The Court finds that the text of OPA clearly requires that OPA claimants must first “present” their OPA claim to the Responsible Party before filing suit….The text of the statute is clear. Congress intended presentment to be a mandatory condition precedent to filing suit….There are likely large numbers of B1 claimants who have completely bypassed the OPA claim presentation requirement, others who have attempted to present their claims but may not have complied with OPA, and others who have properly presented their claims but have been denied for various reasons. Claimants who have not complied with the presentment requirement are subject to dismissal without prejudice, allowing them to exhaust the presentment of their claims before returning to court. In the ordinary case, the Court would simply dismiss those claims without prejudice. However, as the Court has previously noted, this is no ordinary case….. A judge handling an MDL often must employ special procedures and case management tools in order to have the MDL operate in an orderly and efficient manner. In this massive and complex MDL, the Court is faced with a significant practical problem. It would be impractical, time-consuming, and disruptive to the orderly conduct of this MDL and the current scheduling orders if the Court or the parties were required to sort through in excess of 100,000 individual B1 claims to determine which ones should be dismissed at the current time. Moreover, such a diversion at this time would be unproductive and would not advance towards the goal of allowing the parties and the Court to be ready for the limitation and liability trial scheduled to commence in February 2012. No matter how many of the individual B1 claims might be dismissed without prejudice, the trial scheduled for February would still go forward with essentially the same evidence…..In summary on this issue, the Court finds that presentment is a mandatory condition precedent with respect to Plaintiffs’ OPA claims. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged presentment in their B1 Master Complaint, at least with respect to some of the Claimants.” (pp. 29, 30, 31, Rec. Doc. 3830) (Emphasis added).

Pursuant to the terms of the Proposed Settlement, “Regardless of whether the Agreement becomes effective, Claims with a sum certain and some documentation and/or other proof that are submitted to the Settlement Program shall be deemed to satisfy presentment and all requirements of 33 U.S.C. § 2713.” (pp. 62-63, Rec. Doc. 6276-1); “OPA Process shall mean the claims presentment procedure pursuant to the OPA, including claims that have been submitted to the BP Parties or claims that have been submitted to the GCCF as part of the OPA Process.” (p. 104, Rec. Doc. 6276-1); “Economic Class Members with expired offers from the GCCF who Opt-Out of the Economic Class shall be deemed to have satisfied the presentment requirements under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (“OPA”).” (p. 15, Rec. Doc. 6276-1).

BP and the PSC clearly understand that, under OPA, Congress intended presentment to be a mandatory condition precedent to filing suit. However, yet again, the parties mislead this Honorable Court and Class Members by intentionally failing to counsel those Claimants who may opt-out of the Proposed Settlement that, under OPA, claims for damages must be presented first to the responsible party. 33 U.S.C. § 2713(a). In the event that a claim for damages is not paid by the responsible party within 90 days, the claimant may elect to commence an action in court against the responsible party. 33 U.S.C. § 2713(c). If a Claimant files a Complaint against BP under OPA prior to first presenting his, her, or its claim to BP and then waiting 90 days, the case will be subject to dismissal and the claimant will again be left out in the cold.

BP and the PSC are obviously aware that the OSLTF is not a viable alternative for Claimants who opt-out and, for many opt-out Claimants, filing a suit against BP under OPA will be either thwarted or delayed by the OPA presentment requirement. However, the Proposed Settlement “generously” provides that, “Any Economic Class Member may revoke his, her or its Opt Out from the Economic Class and thereby receive the benefit of this Economic and Property Damage Settlement up until three (3) days prior to the Fairness Hearing; or later, if the BP Parties consent in their sole and unilateral discretion..” (p. 40, Rec. Doc. 6418).

(i)  The Statute of Limitations

The PSC further misleads Class Members by intentionally failing to counsel those Claimants who may opt-out of the Proposed Settlement that a lawsuit brought against a non-Responsible Party, e.g., a lawsuit asserting claims for gross negligence, fraud, etc. against Kenneth R. Feinberg, et al, may be barred by the statute of limitations. In federal question cases, the federal court will apply the specific statute of limitations period established by the federal statute under which the plaintiff is seeking relief. Federal courts that are hearing a controversy based on diversity of citizenship of the parties must apply the applicable state law of the forum state. In this case, the statute of limitations for a suit brought against a non-Responsible Party may be only two years.

2.  The Proposed Settlement Grants Excessive Compensation to Attorneys.

The question is whether the Proposed Settlement grants excessive compensation to the PSC and other counsel performing common benefit work in MDL 2179. This issue can be determined by a simple two-prong comparison test: First, by comparing the common benefit fees received by attorneys in MDL 2179 with the average total payment amount received by the claimants; and Second, by comparing the common benefit fees received by attorneys in MDL 2179 with the common benefit fees received by attorneys in comparable MDLs.

(a)  The Average Total Payment Amount Received From GCCF by Claimants

GCCF Overall Program Statistics (Status Report as of March 7, 2012)

Total Amount Paid                                           = $6,079,922,450.47

Total No. of Paid Claimants                           = 221,358

Average Total Amount Paid Per Claimant  = $27,466.47

The GCCF data indicates that a total of 574,379 unique claimants filed claims with the GCCF during the period from approximately August 23, 2010 to March 7, 2012. The GCCF paid only 221,358 of these Claimants. In sum, the GCCF denied payment to approximately 61.46% of the claimants who filed claims. See “Gulf Coast Claims Facility Overall Program Statistics” (Status Report, Mar. 7, 2012) (a copy is attached hereto as Exhibit A).

On March 8, 2012, this Honorable Court terminated the GCCF claims process and appointed Patrick Juneau as the Claims Administrator of the Transition Process and the proposed Court Supervised Claims Program (“CSCP”). On May 2, 2012, Patrick Juneau was appointed as Claims Administrator to oversee the Claims Administration Vendors, who will process the claims in accordance with the Proposed Settlement. Under the CSCP, the evaluation and processing of claims shall continue to be performed by Garden City Group, Inc., BrownGreer, PLC, and PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP. Accordingly, there is no reason to believe that the percentage of claimants denied payment and the average total amount paid per claimant will change under the CSCP.

(b)  The Common Benefit Fees Received by Attorneys in Comparable MDLs

In order to determine an appropriate common benefit fee, this Court looks to comparable MDL set-aside assessments and awards of common benefit fees. E.g., In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 553 F. Supp. 2d at 442, 457-58, 491-96 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (describing 9% federal and 6% state assessments later reduced to 6% and 4%, respectively; awarding less than total fund created by assessments); In re Zyprexa, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 261-63 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2007) (1% and 3% of separate settlement amounts); In re Sulzer Hip Prosthesis & Knee Prosthesis Liab. Litig., 268 F. Supp. 2d at 907, 909, 919 n.19 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (awarding common benefit fees out of $50,000,000 fund created through assessment representing 4.8% of settlement value); In re Protegen Sling & Vesica Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1387, 2002 WL 31834446, at *1, *3 (D. Md. Apr. 12, 2002) (9% federal, 6% coordinated state assessments); In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1348, 2002 WL 441342, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2002) (6% withholding in federal cases, 4% in participating state cases); See also William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Common Benefit Fee” Is, Is Not, and Should Be, 3 Class Action Att’y Fee Dig. at 87 (2009) (collecting cases and concluding that most common benefit assessments range from 4% to 6%); 4 Alba Conte & Herbert B. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions § 14:9 (4th ed. 2002) (“Most [MDL] courts have assessed common benefit fees at about a 4-6% level, generally 4% for a fee and 2% for costs.”); Paul D. Rheingold, Litigating Mass Tort Cases § 7:35 (2010) (“[P]ercentages awarded for common funds in recent MDLS … were in the 4-6% range.”)(citation omitted). In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 760 F. Supp. 2d 640 (E.D. La. 2010) (“October 19, 2010 Order and Reasons”).

The Court’s analysis in the Vioxx MDL case is instructive. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig. (“MDL 1657”) involves the prescription drug Vioxx. Merck, a New Jersey corporation, researched, designed, manufactured, marketed and distributed Vioxx to relieve pain and inflammation resulting from osteoarthritis, rheumatoid arthritis, menstrual pain, and migraine headaches. On September 20, 2004, Merck withdrew it from the market after data indicated that the use of Vioxx increased the risk of cardiovascular thrombotic events such as myocardial infarction (heart attack) and ischemic stroke. Thereafter, thousands of individual suits and numerous class actions were filed against Merck in state and federal courts throughout the country.

On February 16, 2005, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (“JPML”) conferred MDL status on Vioxx lawsuits filed in various federal courts throughout the country and transferred all such cases to this Court to coordinate discovery and to consolidate pretrial matters pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407. See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 360 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (J.P.M.L. 2005).

On November 9, 2007, Merck and the Negotiating Plaintiffs’ Counsel (“NPC”) formally announced that they had reached a Settlement Agreement. The private Settlement Agreement established a pre-funded program for resolving pending or tolled state and federal Vioxx claims against Merck as of the date of the settlement, involving claims of heart attack (“MI”), ischemic stroke (“IS”), and sudden cardiac death (“SCD”), for an overall amount of $4.85 billion. In Vioxx, Judge Fallon stated, “The Settlement Agreement created a $4.85 billion fund for the compensation of Vioxx claimants. The Court finds no reason to omit any portion of that settlement fund from consideration with respect to the reasonable amount of common benefit fees. Accordingly, $4.85 billion is the appropriate amount for calculation of a reasonable percentage of common benefit fees.”

The Vioxx Court awarded a common benefit fee of $315,250,000, which is equivalent to 6.5% of $4,850,000,000. In Vioxx, unlike MDL 2179, the attorneys came from states across the country. Accordingly, the Court found that an average hourly billable rate of $443.29 was reasonable.

There are two significant differences between MDL 1657 and MDL 2179:

(i)  The Time and Labor Required

The PSC and other counsel performing common benefit work in MDL 1657 documented and submitted over 560,000 hours of work during the course of the litigation. The PSC operated on many fronts, preparing pleadings and Master Class Action complaints, taking over 2,000 depositions, reviewing and compiling over 50,000,000 documents, briefing and arguing over 1,000 discovery motions, assembling a trial package, conducting bellwether trials, negotiating the global Settlement Agreement, and implementing the payout under the Agreement.

In contrast, “In the 20 months that have passed since the JPML’s centralization order, the parties [in MDL 2179] have engaged in extensive discovery and motion practice, including taking 311 depositions, producing approximately 90 million pages of documents, and exchanging more than 80 expert reports on an intense and demanding schedule……..BP and the PSC report that in February 2011 settlement negotiations began in earnest for two distinct class action settlements: a Medical Benefits Settlement and an Economic and Property Damages Settlement.” (p. 3, Rec. Doc. 6418).

In sum, the PSC and other counsel allegedly performing common benefit work in MDL 2179 only took 311 depositions and initiated settlement negotiations “in earnest” merely six (6) months after the JPML created MDL 2179.

The MDL 1657 Court conducted six Vioxx bellwether trials. During the same period that the Court was conducting six bellwether trials, approximately thirteen additional Vioxx-related cases were tried before juries in various state courts.

The MDL 2179 Court did not conduct a single bellwether trial.

(ii)  The Results Obtained

Attorneys doing common benefit work on behalf of Vioxx users in MDL 1657 achieved a favorable and meaningful global resolution. The Settlement Agreement ensured fair and comprehensive compensation to all qualified participants. In only 31 months, the parties to the Vioxx case were able to reach a global settlement and distribute $4,353,152,064 to 32,886 claimants, out of a pool of 49,893 eligible and enrolled claimants.

In contrast, attorneys doing common benefit work on behalf of BP oil spill victims in MDL 2179 did not remotely achieve “a favorable and meaningful global resolution.” The MDL 2179 Proposed Settlement does not ensure fair and comprehensive compensation to all qualified participants. This conclusion is supported by the following comparison:

Average Total Amount Paid Per Claimant in MDL 1657 =  $132,370.98

Average Total Amount Paid Per Claimant in MDL 2179 =  $  27,466.47

(c)  The Common Benefit Fees Received by Attorneys in MDL 2179

The PSC and other counsel allegedly performing common benefit work in MDL 2179 are not double-dipping; they are triple-dipping.

The known sources of compensation received by attorneys allegedly doing common benefit work on behalf of BP oil spill victims in MDL 2179 are:

(a) Six percent (6%) of the gross monetary settlements, judgments or other payments made on or after December 30, 2011 through June 3, 2012 to any other plaintiff or claimant-in-limitation. (p. 3, Rec. Doc. 5274);

(b) BP has agreed to pay any award for common benefit and/or Rule 23(h) attorneys’ fees, as determined by the Court, up to $600 million. (p. 10, Rec. Doc. 6418);

(c) Many attorneys doing common benefit work have their own clients and have also received or will also receive a fee directly from them. (N.B. – On June 15, 2012, the MDL 2179 Court ordered that “contingent fee arrangements for all attorneys representing claimants/plaintiffs that settle claims through either or both of the Settlements will be capped at 25% plus reasonable costs.”) (Rec. Doc. 6684); and

(d) Co-counsel fees received by member firms of the PSC for serving as co-counsel to non-member firms of the PSC. For example, on March 13, 2012, Counsel for Plaintiff Salvesen received an unsolicited mass email from a member firm of the PSC. The email stated, in pertinent part, “Co-Counsel Opportunity for BP Oil Spill Cases: News of the recent BP Settlement has caused many individuals and businesses along the Gulf Coast to contemplate either filing a new claim or amending a claim that has already been submitted. If you receive inquiries of this nature we would like you to consider a co-counsel relationship with our firm. Even if someone has already filed a claim it is advisable to retain legal counsel to analyze the impact of this settlement on claimants and maximize recovery. If you receive inquiries and are interested in co-counseling with us on the BP claims, please email…”

Over the years courts have employed various methods to determine the reasonableness of an award of attorneys’ fees. These methods include the “lodestar” method, which entails multiplying the reasonable hours expended on the litigation by an adjusted reasonable hourly rate, Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 624 F.2d 575, 583 & n.15 (5th Cir. 1980); the percentage method, in which the Court compensates attorneys who recovered some identifiable sum by awarding them a fraction of that sum; or, more recently, a combination of both methods in which a percentage is awarded and checked for reasonableness by use of the lodestar method.

(i)  The Percentage Method

As noted above, “percentages awarded for common funds in recent MDLS … were in the 4-6% range.” Given that the PSC and other counsel allegedly performing common benefit work in MDL 2179 only took 311 depositions and initiated settlement negotiations “in earnest” merely six (6) months after the JPML created MDL 2179, the appropriate percentage should be no greater than 4%.

BP has estimated the cost of the proposed settlement to be approximately $7.8 billion. (p. 156, Rec. Doc. 6266-2). A 4% award would yield $312 million for common funds.

(ii)  The Lodestar Cross-Check

The lodestar analysis is not undertaken to calculate a specific fee, but only to provide a broad cross-check on the reasonableness of the fee arrived at by the percentage method.

This Court has previously used a range of $300 to $400 per hour for members of a Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee and $100 to $200 per hour for associates to “reasonably reflect the prevailing [billable time] rates in this jurisdiction.” Turner v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 2d at 868-69 (E.D. La. 2007).

Amount Awarded                      Billable Hourly Rate                      Hours Required to Have Been Expended

$312,000,000.00                             $300/hr.                                                       1,040,000 hours

$600,000,000.00                            $300/hr.                                                       2,000,000 hours

In sum, in order to be awarded a common benefit fee of $312 million, this Honorable Court would have to believe that the PSC attorneys worked more than one million hours; in order to be awarded a common benefit fee of $600 million, this Honorable Court would have to believe that the PSC attorneys worked two million hours. Both of these fee amounts, which do not include the aforementioned (a), (c), and (d) known sources of compensation, fail the reasonableness test.

Has the MDL 2179 Court Overreached Its Authority?

Has the MDL 2179 Court Overreached Its Authority?

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Supreme Court Decision Poses an Interesting Dilemma for the BP Oil Spill Trial Court

Tampa, FL (April 11, 2012) – The Supreme Court has held that a district court conducting pretrial proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1407(a) has no authority to invoke 28 U.S.C. §1404(a) to assign a transferred case to itself for trial. Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998).

On April 8, 2012, Selmer M. Salvesen, a clam farmer in Florida, filed a Motion to Vacate Order and Reasons [As to Motions to Dismiss the B1 Master Complaint] (Rec. Doc. 3830 dated August 26, 2011) with the MDL 2179 court. Mr. Salvesen’s Motion to Vacate poses an interesting dilemma for the BP Oil Spill trial court: (a) Does the court grant the motion to vacate the B1 order thereby derailing the MDL 2179 runaway train? or (b) Does the court ignore the Supreme Court decision in Lexecon in the name of judicial discretion, judicial efficiency, judicial economy and political expediency?

The Lexecon Rule

Justice Souter, in delivering the opinion of the Court in Lexecon, explained 28 U. S. C. §1407(a) authorizes the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (the “Panel”) to transfer civil actions with common issues of fact “to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings,” but imposes a duty on the Panel to remand any such action to the original district “at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings.” “Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have been previously terminated.” 28 U.S.C. §1407(a).

Justice Souter pointed out that the Panel’s instruction comes in terms of the mandatory “shall,” which normally creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion. Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U. S. 482, 485 (1947).

Moreover, the Supreme Court found that neither the statute’s language nor legislative history can unsettle §1407’s straightforward language imposing the Panel’s responsibility to remand, which bars recognizing any self-assignment power in a transferee court and consequently entails the invalidity of the Panel’s Rule 14(b).

The legislative history tends to confirm that self-assignment is beyond the scope of the transferee court’s authority. Justice Souter noted that the same House Report that spoke of the continued vitality of §1404 in §1407 cases also said this:

The proposed statute affects only the pretrial stages in multidistrict litigation. It would not affect the place of trial in any case or exclude the possibility of transfer under other Federal statutes…..The subsection requires that transferred cases be remanded to the originating district at the close of coordinated pretrial proceedings. The bill does not, therefore, include the trial of cases in the consolidated proceedings.” H. R. Rep. No.1130, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 4 (1968) (Emphasis added)

The comments of the bill’s sponsors further suggest that application of 28 U.S.C. §1407 would not affect the place of trial. See, e.g., Multidistrict Litigation: Hearings on S. 3815 and S. 159 before the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. Pt. 2, p. 110 (1967) (Sen. Tydings) (“[W]hen the deposition and discovery is completed, then the original litigation is remanded to the transferor district for trial”). Both the House and the Senate Reports stated that Congress would have to amend the statute if it determined that multidistrict litigation cases should be consolidated for trial. S. Rep. No. 454, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 5 (1967). (Emphasis added)

MDL 2179

In order to efficiently manage MDL 2179, the court consolidated and organized the various types of claims into several “pleading bundles.” The “B1” pleading bundle includes all claims for private or “non-governmental” economic loss and property damages.  There are between 100,000 – 130,000 individual claims encompassed within the “B1” pleading bundle.

Rather than allege claims under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (“OPA”) (which governs the MDL 2179 cases alleging economic loss due to the BP oil spill) and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”) (which governs the MDL 2179 personal injury and wrongful death actions and borrows the law of the adjacent state as surrogate federal law), the PSC made the unfathomable decision to allege claims under a hodgepodge of statutes.

In the B1 First Amended Master Complaint, the PSC states, “The claims presented herein are admiralty or maritime claims within the meaning of Rule 9(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs hereby designate this case as an admiralty or maritime case, and request a non-jury trial, pursuant to Rule 9(h).”

Under general maritime law, the PSC alleges claims for negligence, gross negligence and willful misconduct, and strict liability for manufacturing and/or design defect. Under various state laws, the PSC alleges claims for nuisance, trespass, and fraudulent concealment. Under the Florida Pollutant Discharge Prevention and Control Act, Fla. Stat. § 376.011, et seq., PSC alleges a claim for strict liability. The PSC also seeks: (a) punitive damages under all claims; and (b) a declaration by the Court that the conduct of BP and its agents and representatives, including the Gulf Coast Claims Facility (“GCCF”), in obtaining releases and/or assignments of claims against other parties, persons, or entities is not an obligation of BP under OPA.

The PSC appears to be more interested in ensuring significant economy and efficiency in the judicial administration of the MDL 2179 court rather than in obtaining justice for the MDL 2179 plaintiffs. As noted above, in its B1 First Amended Master Complaint, the PSC alleges claims under general maritime law, not under OPA and OCSLA, thereby assisting the court in expeditiously being able to:

(a) Find, “The Deepwater Horizon was at all material times a vessel in navigation.”

(b) Find, “Admiralty jurisdiction is present because the alleged tort occurred upon navigable waters of the Gulf of Mexico, disrupted maritime commerce, and the operations of the vessel bore a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity. With admiralty jurisdiction comes the application of substantive maritime law.”

(c) Find, “State law, both statutory and common, is preempted by maritime law, notwithstanding OPA’s savings provisions. All claims brought under state law are dismissed.”

(d) Find, “General maritime law claims that do not allege physical damage to a proprietary interest are dismissed under the Robins Dry Dock rule, unless the claim falls into the commercial fishermen exception.”

(e) Find, “…. That nothing prohibits Defendants from settling claims for economic loss. While OPA does not specifically address the use of waivers and releases by Responsible Parties, the statute also does not clearly prohibit it. In fact, as the Court has recognized in this Order, one of the goals of OPA was to allow for speedy and efficient recovery by victims of an oil spill.”

In re Oil Spill by the Rig Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, – F. Supp. 2d -, 2011 WL 3805746 (Aug. 26, 2011 E.D. La.).

Since the PSC requests a non-jury trial pursuant to Rule 9(h) and alleges claims under general maritime law, rather than OPA and OCSLA, the MDL 2179 court has formulated a trial plan that dispenses with trial by jury and instead conducts a bench trial applying general maritime law.

The Heyburn Rule

The Honorable John G. Heyburn II, Chair of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, addressed the Lexecon decision in his article, “A View From the Panel: Part of the Solution,” 82 Tulane L. Rev. 2225 (2008).  The following is an excerpt from Judge Heyburn’s article.

Judge Heyburn points out that five appropriate strategies are available by which the Lexecon conundrum may be avoided:

(a) Provided the plaintiff is amenable and venue lies in the transferee district, the action could be refiled there.

(b) The parties could also agree to waive objections to venue.

(c) Alternatively, the transferee court could try a “Bellwether” case that was originally filed in the transferee district, the result of which may promote settlement of the transferred actions in the MDL.

(d) Another option, suggested in the Lexecon opinion itself, is for the transferor court to transfer the action back to the transferee court under § 1404(a).

(e) Still another option would be for the transferee judge to follow the action to the transferor court after obtaining an intracircuit or intercircuit assignment.

The MDL 2179 court has failed to avail itself of any of these “appropriate” strategies.

A “Bellwether” trial is sui generis; a “walks like a duck, quacks like a duck, it must be a duck” analysis cannot be used. Judge Barbier cannot try the cases transferred for “pretrial proceedings.” Judge Barbier certainly cannot try all of the plaintiffs’ claims in the aggregate in this proceeding. Nor can the Lexecon decision be circumvented by the device of permitting claimants to file “short-form joinders” injecting themselves into the limitation action. Accordingly, Judge Barbier, at the request of the PSC, formulated a non-jury trial plan which does not seek to adjudicate all the plaintiffs’ claims in the aggregate. Instead, it plans a non-jury trial of “issues” related to “allocation of fault” in the abstract. This novel proposal is still defective, as a trial of “issues” would try parts of actions that under Lexecon the MDL judge must not try and would amount to a class action in a limitations proceeding contrary to Rule 23. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit has held that class actions are not permitted in limitation proceedings. Lloyds Leasing Ltd. v. Bates, 902 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1990). Indeed, such a trial resembles an unsanctioned class action in almost everything but name. It does not remotely resemble a “Bellwether” trial.

Although Judge Barbier and the PSC refer to the MDL 2179 court’s “broad discretionary authority,” a “special-procedure” should not be crafted where a mandatory procedure already exists. It is important to remember that the very MDL procedures Judge Barbier and the PSC wish to circumvent were specifically enacted to reduce costs and promote judicial economy. Allowing the MDL 2179 trial plan would be inconsistent with the clear statutory mandate of the multidistrict litigation enabling statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a), and the Supreme Court’s holding in Lexecon. While the need to promote efficiency in litigation is real, it cannot be accomplished by overriding the applicable provisions set forth by Congress. In re: FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Products Liability Litigation, 2009 WL 2390668 (United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana).

Judge Heyburn describes the Lexecon decision as a “conundrum” which may be avoided by “resourceful” transferee judges. Plaintiff Salvesen respectfully disagrees. The Lexecon decision is not a conundrum. It is not an obstacle which judicial discretion may circumvent in the name of judicial efficiency, judicial economy or political expediency. It is the law.

GCCF Claimants Should Not be Required to Pay the Litigation Fees and Expenses Incurred by the MDL 2179 Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee

GCCF Claimants Should Not be Required to Pay the Litigation Fees and Expenses Incurred by the MDL 2179 Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee

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BP Oil Spill Victims Should Not be Taxed on the Miniscule Monetary Settlements They Receive from GCCF

Tampa, FL (January 12, 2012) – The amended MDL 2179 court order, dated January 4, 2012, provides:

“ORDERED that Defendants, or any agent or representative acting on a Defendant’s behalf, shall withhold and deposit an amount equivalent to six percent (6%) of the gross monetary settlements, judgments or other payments made after December 30, 2011, by or on behalf of one or more Defendants to any other plaintiff, putative class member or other claimant, arising out of the Macondo / Deepwater Horizon disaster, (with the exception of settlements, judgments or other payments to the United States), into a court-supervised escrow account, in order to establish a fund from which common benefit litigation fees and expenses may be paid, if and as awarded by the Court, at an appropriate time, pursuant to procedures to be determined by future order of the Court. Specifically, this hold back requirement applies to all actions filed in or removed to federal court that have been or become a part of the MDL, whether or not a motion to remand has been filed, claimants who settle directly with the Gulf Coast Claims Facility, or state court plaintiffs represented by counsel who have participated in or had access to the discovery conducted in this MDL. Exempt from this hold back requirement are state court counsel who have or had no cases in this MDL and who have never had access to any of the discovery undertaken in the MDL.”

The Impact of the Court’s Order on Private Claimants Receiving Settlements from the GCCF

The court’s amended order of January 4, 2012 will mean private claimants receiving settlements from the GCCF will be impacted by an unjustifiable financial loss and, more importantly, by their resultant loss of faith in the judicial system.

UNJUSTIFIABLE FINANCIAL LOSS

On January 3, 2012, The Louisiana Record reported that as of December 31, 2011 the GCCF had paid $2.3 billion to about 160,000 individuals, and $3.5 billion to about 60,000 businesses. Assuming BP fully funds its $20 billion commitment to the GCCF, and the GCCF fully utilizes the $20 billion to compensate victims of the BP oil spill, the monetary impact of the court order on private claimants would be approximately $852 million.

Claims which are settled through the GCCF should not be subject to the six percent (6%) hold-back because these settlements are not the result of any common benefit work. The Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee (“PSC”) itself states that, “The only work entitled to compensation from a common benefit fund is work that has demonstrably provided a benefit to all plaintiffs, or to a defined group of plaintiffs as a whole – the common benefit work.” The PSC has not performed work that has “demonstrably provided a benefit” to claimants who resolve their claims under the OPA through negotiations with the GCCF.

OPA is a strict liability statute. In order to recover damages, a claimant merely needs to show that his or her damages “resulted from” the oil spill. OPA states, “The responsible party for a vessel or a facility from which oil is discharged, or which poses the substantial threat of a discharge of oil, into or upon the navigable waters or adjoining shorelines or the exclusive economic zone is liable for the removal costs and damages that result from such incident.” See 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a)

Under OPA, claims for damages must be presented first to the responsible party. 33 U.S.C. § 2713(a). The term “claim” means “a request, made in writing for a sum certain, for compensation for damages or removal costs resulting from an oil spill incident.” 33 U.S.C. § 2701(3). In the event that a claim for damages is either denied or not paid by the responsible party within 90 days, the claimant may elect to commence an action in court against the responsible party or to present the claim to OSLTF. 33 U.S.C. § 2713(c)

“The overarching purpose of OPA’s mandatory alternative dispute resolution process is ‘to encourage settlement and avoid litigation.’” Boca Ciega Hotel, Inc. v. Bouchard Trans. Co., 51 F. 3d 235, 240 (11th Cir. 1995). Unfortunately, GCCF’s “Delay, Deny, Defend” strategy avoids settlement and encourages litigation.

BP oil spill victims who submit claims and settle them through negotiations with the GCCF are simply following the law. The PSC cannot take credit for the passing of OPA and its “presentment” requirement any more than it can take credit for creation of the GCCF itself, established as a result BP’s designation as a “Responsible Party” under OPA. Both of these factors, OPA’s statutory requirements and the creation of the GCCF, have led to the resolution of many claims and will lead to more in the future. The PSC cannot legitimately claim responsibility for either. See Opposition to PSC’s “Motion to Establish Account and Reserve for Litigation Expenses,” In re: Oil Spill by the Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010 (10-02179), Doc. R. 4682 at p. 5.

The PSC alleges it has “exerted an enormous litigation pressure, risk, leverage and incentive for BP, through the GCCF, to try to settle its liabilities, in advance of trial.” The PSC further contends its work has “common benefit” for all plaintiffs. As explained below, this is inaccurate.

LOSS OF FAITH IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM

Multidistrict Litigation (“MDL”)

The Multidistrict Litigation Act passed by Congress in 1968, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1407, states that civil actions pending in different districts and involving one or more common questions of fact may be transferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.

The purpose of consolidation is to promote the “just and efficient” conduct of the action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a); see also H.R. Rep. No. 1130, 90th Cong. 2nd Session, 1968 USCCAN 1898, 1900 (explaining that “pretrial consolidation must promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions and be for the convenience of the parties and witnesses”). Congress intended for consolidation to be ordered “only where significant economy and efficiency in judicial administration may be obtained.” See H.R. Rep. No. 1130, 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1900 (emphasis added).

In the MDL No. 2179 Transfer Order, dated August 10, 2010, the J.P.M.L. held that the Eastern District of Louisiana was an appropriate Section 1407 forum for actions which “indisputably share factual issues concerning the cause (or causes) of the Deepwater Horizon explosion/fire and the role, if any, that each defendant played in it. Centralization under Section 1407 will eliminate duplicative discovery, prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, including rulings on class certification and other issues, and conserve the resources of the parties, their counsel, and the judiciary. In all these respects, centralization will serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the more just and efficient conduct of these cases, taken as a whole.” See In re: Oil Spill by the Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, 731 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1354 (J.P.M.L. 2010).

U.S. District Judge Carl J. Barbier, who has been appointed by the J.P.M.L. to serve as the transferee judge in MDL 2179, is responsible for ensuring that significant economy and efficiency in judicial administration is obtained. Judge Barbier appointed each member of the PSC and, via the court’s amended order of January 4, 2012, established a fund of potentially $852 million from which PSC’s common benefit litigation fees and expenses may be paid.

The appointment and compensation of the PSC by Judge Barbier raises an important question for GCCF claimants and MDL 2179 plaintiffs: Does PSC’s loyalty rest with: (a) ensuring justice is obtained for the plaintiffs, or (b) ensuring significant economy and efficiency in the judicial administration of the MDL 2179 Court?

OCSLA and OPA, Not General Maritime Law, Govern MDL 2179

The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”), 43 U.S.C. § 1331 et seq., governs those cases involving personal injury and wrongful death actions. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (“OPA”),  33 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq, governs those cases alleging economic loss due to the BP oil spill. See “BP Oil Spill: Is the MDL 2179 Trial Plan Unconstitutional?” available online at https://donovanlawgroup.wordpress.com/2012/01/03/bp-oil-spill-is-the-mdl-2179-trial-plan-unconstitutional/

Background

In order to efficiently manage MDL 2179, the Court consolidated and organized the various types of claims into several “pleading bundles.” The “B1” pleading bundle includes all claims for private or “non-governmental economic loss and property damages.” There are in excess of 100,000 individual claims encompassed within the “B1″ bundle.

On January 12, 2011, the MDL 2179 Court issued PTO No. 25, in order to clarify “the scope and effect” of the “B1″ bundle Master Complaint. The Court held that any individual plaintiff who is a named plaintiff in a case that falls within pleading bundle “B1″ “is deemed to be a plaintiff in the “B1″ Master Complaint.” Also, “the allegations, claims, theories of recovery and/or prayers for relief contained within the pre-existing petition or complaint are deemed to be amended, restated, and superseded by the allegations, claims, theories of recovery, and/or prayers for relief in the respective “B1″ Master Complaint(s) in which the Defendant is named.”

The “B1” Master Complaint

In the “B1” Master Complaint, the PSC alleged claims under general maritime law, various state laws, and OPA. Under general maritime law, PSC alleged claims for negligence, gross negligence, and strict liability for manufacturing and/or design defect. Under various state laws, PSC alleged claims for nuisance, trespass, and fraudulent concealment, and also alleged a claim for strict liability under the Florida Pollutant Discharge Prevention and Control Act, Fla. Stat. § 376.011, et seq. Additionally, PSC sought punitive damages under all claims and requested declaratory relief regarding any settlement provisions that purport to affect the calculation of punitive damages.

The Court’s Order and Reasons [As to Motions to Dismiss the B1 Master Complaint]

On August 26, 2011, the MDL 2179 Court granted in part Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss the “B1″ Master Complaint. The Court ruled: (a) Admiralty jurisdiction is present because the alleged tort occurred upon navigable waters of the Gulf of Mexico, disrupted maritime commerce, and the operations of the vessel bore a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity. With admiralty jurisdiction comes the application of substantive maritime law; (b) State law, both statutory and common, is preempted by maritime law, notwithstanding OPA’s savings provisions. All claims brought under state law are dismissed; and (c) General maritime law claims that do not allege physical damage to a proprietary interest are dismissed under the Robins Dry Dock rule, unless the claim falls into the commercial fishermen exception. In re Oil Spill by the Rig Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, –  F. Supp. 2d -, 2011 WL 3805746 (Aug. 26, 2011 E.D. La.).

The Rule of Lexecon

The rule of Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998) holds that an MDL judge may not try the actions transferred from other judicial districts under 28 U.S.C. § 1407. When the J.P.M.L. transfers a matter to an MDL judge, “[e]ach action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have been previously terminated.” 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a). In Lexecon, the Supreme Court read that language strictly and reversed a judgment entered after trial of a matter that the J.P.M.L. had transferred pursuant to § 1407. The Court held that “considerations of ‘finality, efficiency and economy”‘ do not justify “defiance of the congressional condition” that such an action be remanded to the transferor court for trial. Lexecon applies to MDL 2179.

Potential Reasons for the Loss of Faith in the Judicial System by GCCF Claimants

I. Private claimants receiving settlements directly from the GCCF are being forced by the MDL 2179 court to pay the litigation fees and expenses of a PSC from which the claimants will receive no benefit whatsoever. Moreover, the actions by this PSC ensure that the GCCF has no incentive to settle claims.

II. The PSC appears to be more interested in ensuring significant economy and efficiency in the judicial administration of the MDL 2179 court rather than in obtaining justice for the MDL 2179 plaintiffs. In its “B1” Master Complaint, the PSC alleged claims under general maritime law, not under OCSLA and OPA, thereby assisting the court in expeditiously being able to:

(a)  Find, “…. that nothing prohibits Defendants from settling claims for economic loss. While OPA does not specifically address the use of waivers and releases by Responsible Parties, the statute also does not clearly prohibit it. In fact, as the Court has recognized in this Order, one of the goals of OPA was to allow for speedy and efficient recovery by victims of an oil spill.”

(b)  Find, “State law, both statutory and common, is preempted by maritime law, notwithstanding OPA’s savings provisions. All claims brought under state law are dismissed.”

(c)  Find, “General maritime law claims that do not allege physical damage to a proprietary interest are dismissed under the Robins Dry Dock rule, unless the claim falls into the commercial fishermen exception.” and

(d)  Develop a trial plan that dispenses with trial by jury and instead conducts a bench trial applying general maritime law.

Judicial economy is undoubtedly well-served by MDL consolidation when scores of similar cases are pending in the courts. Nevertheless, the excessive delay and “marginalization of juror fact finding” (i.e., dearth of jury trials) sometimes associated with traditional MDL practice are developments that cannot be defended. Delaventura v. Columbia Acorn Trust, 417 F. Supp. 2d at 153 (D. Mass. 2006). By forcing Plaintiffs in the instant case to await resolution of irrelevant discovery and factual disputes relating to completely different parties, theories of recovery and remedies, consolidation with MDL No. 2179 unreasonably delays Plaintiffs’ pursuit of their claims.

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